Essays in International Economics. by Proebsting, Christian
Essays in International Economics
by
Christian Proebsting
A dissertation submied in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy
(Economics)
in the University of Michigan
2016
Doctoral Commiee:
Professor Linda L. Tesar, Chair
Assistant Professor Javier Cravino
Professor Kathryn M. Dominguez
Associate Professor Christopher L. House
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank my commiee chair, Linda Tesar, for her excellence guidance and support
throughout the entire process of writing this thesis and beyond. This work would not have been
possible without her enthusiasm, advice and continuous support.
I would also like to thank Javier Cravino, Christopher House, Kathryn Dominguez, Rahul
Mukherjee and John Leahy for their very useful comments, help and suggestions. Special thanks
go to all employees of Statistics Estonia who have been very helpful in providing the micro data
used in Chapter 1. All remaining errors are my own.
ii
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ii
List of Tables v
List of Figures vii
List of Appendices ix
Abstract x
Chapter
Introduction 1
I Are Devaluations Expansionary? - Firm-Level Evidence from Estonia 5
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
2 Exchange Rate Movements and Firm Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Empirical Evidence on Exchange Rate Eects at the Firm Level . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 A Semi-Small Open Economy Model with Nominal Rigidities . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
5 antitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
II Austerity in the Aermath of the Great Recession 52
iii
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
2 Empirical Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 56
3 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4 Model and Data Comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
5 Counter-Factual Policy Simulations [to be completed] . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
6 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
III Survival of the Fiest: Corporate Control and the Cleansing Eect of Financial
Crises 116
1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
3 Testing the Implications of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 157
4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 166
Conclusion 169
Appendices 171
Bibliography 213
iv
List of Tables
I.1 Trade Exposure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
I.2 Invoicing Currency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
I.3 Nominal Rigidities and Pass-Through . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
I.4 Eect of Exchange Rates on Firm Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
I.5 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
II.1 Country Size, Import Shares and Exchange Rate Regimes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57
II.2a Summary Statistics of Forecast Deviations: Government Finance Variables . . . . 62
II.2b Summary Statistics of Forecast Deviations: Economic Performance Variables . . . 63
II.3a Austerity, GDP and Inflation: Using Estimated Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
II.3b Austerity, GDP and Inflation: Using Imposed Elasticities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
II.4 Austerity and Economic Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74
II.5 AUSTERITY AND SPILLOVERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
II.6 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
II.7 Comparison of Model and Data: Benchmark Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
II.8 Comparison of Model and Data: Individual Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
III.1 Acquired Share in Data and Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
III.2 Average Size of Ownership Stakes: OLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 161
III.3 Average Size of Ownership Stakes: GLM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
III.4 Divestiture Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 164
A.1 Firm-Year Observations per Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 180
v
A.2 Eect of Exchange Rates on Firm Performance: Continuing Exporters and Importers 182
D.1 Average Deviations from Trend . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 190
D.2 Austerity and GDP under Alternative Forecast and Trend Specifications . . . . . . 191
D.3a Austerity and Economic Performance: Total Outlays (Shortfall) . . . . . . . . . . . 194
D.3b Austerity and Economic Performance: Total Revenue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 195
D.3c Austerity and Economic Performance: Primary Balance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 196
D.4 Interest Rates and Spreads . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 197
G.5 US Monetary Policy Coeicients . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
G.6 Estimated Intercepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 204
vi
List of Figures
I.1 Estonia’s Trade Partners, 2007 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
I.2 Distribution of Eective Firm Exchange Rates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
I.3 Elasticity to Exchange Rates at Dierent Horizons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
I.4 Elasticity of Main Aggregates to Exchange Rate Devaluation . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
I.5 Elasticity of GDP to Exchange Rate Devaluation: Varying Parameters . . . . . . . 48
II.1 Real per Capita GDP Before, During and Aer the Crisis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53
II.2a Measures of Austerity For France . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64
II.2b Measures of Austerity for Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
II.3 GDP and Austerity in Data: Domestic and Spillover Eect . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
II.4 GDP and Austerity: Data vs. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
II.5 Inflation and Austerity: Data vs. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
II.6 Consumption and Austerity: Data vs. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 105
II.7 Investment and Austerity: Data vs. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
II.8 Net Exports and Austerity: Data vs. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
II.9 Nominal Eective Exchange Rate and Austerity: Data vs. Model . . . . . . . . . . 108
II.10 GDP Growth and Austerity: Data vs. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
III.1 Number of Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 118
III.2 Acquisitions with Unconstrained Acquirers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128
III.3 Acquisitions with Financially Constrained Acquirers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
III.4 Cleansing Eect in the Market for Corporate Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
vii
III.5 Average Acquired Share . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 143
III.6 Cleansing Eect of Liquidity Crises . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
III.7 Average Productivity of Producing, Domestic Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
III.8 Resale of Acquired Firms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
III.9 Share of Flipped Acquisitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 156
C.2 Estonia’s GDP per Capita: Trend and Growth Rate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 188
I.6 Non-Targeted Steady-State Shares . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 207
viii
List of Appendices
A Empirical Part . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 172
B Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 183
C antitative Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
D Additional Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 189
E Details on Convergence Estimator . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 198
F Government Spending Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 200
G Monetary Policy Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 201
H Spread Shocks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 205
I Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 206
J Proofs of Propositions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
ix
Abstract
This dissertation analyzes how trade openness aects a country’s set of policy instruments in
times of economic crises. Exploiting variations across Estonian firms trading with dierent mar-
kets, the first chapter shows that firms’ output substantially reacts to exchange rate movements
in both their export and import market. Still, the estimated trade elasticity implies that monetary
policy is equally eective in closed and open economies because traded and non-traded sectors
expand by equal amounts following a monetary expansion. The second chapter shis the focus
on fiscal policy and examines the eects of austerity on economic performance since the Great
Recession. In a panel of 29 mostly European countries it shows that reductions in government
purchases larger than that implied by reduced-form forecasting regressions are statistically as-
sociated with lower real per GDP and lower inflation. The implied multiplier is greater than 1,
which shows that fiscal policy has strong domestic eects even in small and open economies.
A multi-country DSGE model calibrated to the European economies replicates the qualitative
features of the observed paerns, but falls short quantitatively of the multiplier on government
purchases. The last chapter analyzes macroeconomic policies to promote mergers and acquisi-
tions (M&As). A tractable model is developed to study the role of M&As during financial crises
characterized by tighter bank lending standards. It suggests that cross-border M&As can be par-
ticularly beneficial because they help to tap foreign capital markets, while domestic M&As have
a much smaller eect because domestic acquirers themselves face liquidity constraints. Being
open can therefore be a virtue during times of tight domestic credit markets.
x
Introduction
How does an economy’s openness aect its policy options in the face of economic crises? This
topic has regained new interest in recent years as countries in Europe experienced their worst re-
cession for several decades in 2008/09. Aer many years of ever-closer integration policy makers
now face the constraints that this same process of integration puts on their set of policy instru-
ments. Whereas closed economies can freely conduct monetary and fiscal policy to counteract
recessions, open economies are oen restrained in their policy choices, either because they are
part of a monetary union or the eects of fiscal policy simply leaks to neighboring countries.
That being said, open economies might also have additional policy instruments at their disposal,
e.g. if, in times of domestic financial crises, they are able to ’tap’ other countries’ capital.
This dissertation sheds light on this multi-faceted topic by analyzing the eects of three pol-
icy instruments in open economies: monetary and exchange rate policy in a small open economy,
fiscal policy in a set of integrated economies, and policies allowing for cross-border mergers and
acquisitions during financial crises.
The first chapter asks how exchange rate movements aect an economy’s performance. It is
motivated by the experience of Estonia and its neighboring Baltic countries that suered output
losses of 15% or more during the Great Recession, but decided not to abandon their currency
peg to the euro. In this context, an open question is whether a currency devaluation would have
helped these economies. The idea that a currency devaluation would help exporting firms by
making their products more competitive on international markets is intuitive, but lacks thorough
empirical evidence. This chapter provides such empirical evidence by exploiting a rich dataset of
1
Estonian firms. Identification comes from comparing the production of firms that operate in the
same industry, but export to dierent markets and are therefore subject to dierent exchange
rate shocks. The empirical evidence presented in the chapter suggests that a 1 percent exchange-
rate induced decrease in a firm’s output price raises its revenue by 1.3 percent. Similarly, the
data also supports the view that importing firms are hurt by an exchange rate depreciation,
although the eect is somewhat smaller: a 1 percent increase in marginal costs through higher
import costs lowers their revenue by 0.5 percent. To quantitatively assess the economy-wide
impact of an (across-the-bord) exchange rate devaluation, a New Keynesian small open economy
model is developed. A version of this model that is calibrated to the empirical results suggests
that the expansionary eects of a devaluation (modeled as an expansion of the money supply)
dominate, with a 10 percent devaluation raising GDP by more than 5 percent upon impact. Part
of this relatively large eect is driven by the expansion of firms in the non-traded sector as firms
and consumers switch from imports to domestic substitutes. This expansion of the non-traded
sector also explains why the model has very similar GDP predictions for varying degrees of
trade openness. This result that expansionary monetary policy seems equally eective in fairly
closed and more open economies, however, critically hinges on the estimated trade elasticity,
with higher trade elasticities implying stronger eects in more open economies.
The second chapter analyzes to what extent fiscal policy can account for the cross-country
dierences in economic performance in Europe since 2010. Motivated by a popular view that
austerity policies have contributed to the slow European recovery, it empirically analyzes this
claim by constructing measures of austerity and relating them to countries’ economic perfor-
mance. Austerity is measured as the (log) dierence between observed government purchases
(or revenue) and their predicted value. The results support the view that austerity in government
purchases - a reduction in government purchases that is larger than that implied by reducted-
form forecasting regressions - is statistically associated with below forecast GDP and inflation.
The implied GDP multiplier on government purchases is around 1.3. Austerity in form of higher
government revenue, however, is not associated with weaker economic performance. In a sec-
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ond step, a multi-country New Keyneasian DSGE model is developed to compare the observed
empirical relationships and model predictions. Feeding in the empirically observed government
purchases shocks, the model predicts responses of macroeconomic variables that are broadly
consistent with those seen in the data. But quantitatively, the model underestimates the mult-
plier on government purchases (0.75 vs. 1.3). The low multiplier in the model is partially a result
of European economies being particularly open, so that the eects of government purchases leak
out to neighboring countries.
The last chapter focuses on macroeconomic policies that promote (cross-border) mergers
and acquisitions (M&As). Whereas fiscal policy and monetary policy (if the trade elasticity is
low enough) are less eective in open economies, being open might turn out to be a virtue in the
market for corporate control. The chapter is motivated by the financial crises in emerging mar-
kets throughout the 1990s and asks to what extent a flourishing M&A market can substitute for
a distressed banking sector. To answer this question, a model of M&As is developed. M&As are
undertaken by either domestic or foreign firms, but domestic acquirers are assumed to face the
same borrowing constraints as their potential targets. This one-dimensional dierence between
(potentially constrained) domestic and (unconstrained) foreign acquirers leads to distinct pre-
dictions in terms of acquired shares and divestiture rates across acquirers and during financial
crises vs. normal times. These predictions are in line with the empirical evidence presented in
the chapter. The model is then used to analyze how M&As aect an economy’s overall perfor-
mance during financial crises. In a model without any M&As, financial crises do not aect the
average productivity of operating firms, simply because it is assumed that financial constraints
tighten for all firms symmetrically. Allowing for foreign M&As dramatically alters this predic-
tion and leads to a positive cleansing eect. Fixed costs of acquisitions imply that foreign firms
acquire (and save from exit) only firms that are above a certain level of productivity, and this
’cream skimming’ eect becomes particularly strong during financial crises. Allowing for do-
mestic M&As also leads to a positive cleansing eect, but this eect is quantitatively negligible.
Being themselves constrained, domestic firms are unable to save high-productivity firms that
3
are illiquid. Overall, the market for corporate control can therefore substitute for a distressed
banking sector, but this is much more true if foreign capital can be tapped.
4
Chapter I
Are Devaluations Expansionary? -
Firm-Level Evidence from Estonia
1 Introduction
During the global financial crisis the economies in Europe contracted sharply and many of them
had not recovered by the end of 2014. Yet, despite output losses of 15% or more, no country
in Europe le the Eurozone or abandonned its currency peg to the euro. An open question is
whether a currency devaluation would have actually improved economic performance and sped
up the recovery. In fact, this question was raised in the Baltic countries during the recession
and more recently, has aracted renewed aention due to a possible ’Grexit’, an exit of Greece
from the Eurozone. This paper utilizes a firm-level database to assess the eect of exchange
rate fluctuations on economic performance and builds a New Keynesian open economy model
to analyze the general equilibrium eects of a currency devaluation.
A widely accepted view in the literature is that exchange rate depreciations are expansionary
by making exports more competitive (see e.g. Eichengreen and Sachs, 1985). This eect, however,
is empirically hard to identify for at least three reasons: First, large currency devaluations are
oen accompanied by other major macroeconomic changes that aect an economy’s overall per-
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formance, as was observed in South East Asia in 1997 and Argentina in 2002. Second, exchange
rate depreciations entail an increase in import costs as well as an increasing debt burden for
firms that borrowed in foreign currency. Both eects might hinder economic expansion. Third,
foreign demand for export goods following a depreciation will only increase if foreign consumers
see a fall in the price. If prices are sticky and invoiced in the consumer’s currency, such a price
decline may not occur. Establishing the link between nominal exchange rate fluctuations and
real economic performance has therefore proven to be a diicult task.
To address these three identification issues, I make use of an Estonian firm-level database
to exploit variations in exchange rate movements across firms exporting to and importing from
dierent markets. First, by comparing the production of firms in the same industry exporting to
dierent markets, I can control for macroeconomic or industry-level changes that dierentially
impact economic performance. Second, I observe a firm’s imports by its source and can therefore
control for import cost shocks that might be systematically correlated with a firm’s export ex-
change rates. In addition, Estonia’s firms overwhelmingly borrowed in either euros or Estonian
kroons, limiting the impact of exchange rate changes on their debt burden.1 Third, I control for
the invoicing currency of a firm’s trade transactions. I show that under sticky prices, the rel-
evant eective exchange rate for a firm is a trade-weighted average of both bilateral exchange
rates across all its markets and the exchange rates of its invoicing currencies. Changes in these
exchange rates can be interpreted as exogenous changes in a firm’s output price index or a firm’s
marginal cost of production. Using these firm-level eective exchange rates as my independent
variables, I measure their impact on various performance measures at the firm level, including
revenue, hours worked and intermediate inputs.
I find strong eects of nominal exchange rate movements on firm performance. Overall, firms
facing depreciations in their eective export exchange rate expand, whereas firms seeing their
eective import exchange rate depreciate contract. A depreciation of a firm’s eective export
1The Estonian kroon was pegged to the euro till 2011, when Estonia adopted the euro. In 2007, the middle of
my sample, the stock of loans to non-financial corporations was 74 percent in euros and 21 percent in Estonian
kroons, according to Estonia’s central bank, Eesti Pank (http://statistika.eestipank.ee/?lng=
en#treeMenu/FINANTSSEKTOR, 3.3.1. Stock of loans by customer group, residence, currency and maturity)
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exchange rate equivalent to a 1 percent increase in its output price increases a firm’s revenue
in the same year by 1.3 (all firms) to 2 percent (large firms) and its employment by 0.5 to 0.6
percent. A depreciation of a firm’s eective import exchange rate of a size equivalent to a 1
percent increase in marginal cost reduces revenue by 0.5 to 1.5 percent and employment by 0.6
to 1.4 percent.
Taken together, these results predict that a common devaluation of the Estonian kroon in
both the export and import market is expansionary for revenue, but slightly contractionary for
hours worked, all else being equal. The net eect is relatively modest because a large share of
Estonia’s trade is invoiced in foreign currency, which reduces the size of the export expansion
channel. My results are consistent with a trade elasticity in the range of 1 to 2, a value commonly
used in the international business cycle literature and also found in Cravino (2014), who uses
Chilean firm-level trade data. But my results dier from Ekholm et al. (2012), who find that an
exchange rate appreciation leads to an increase in production.
The second part of this paper provides a quantitative assessment of the aggregate impact of
an exchange rate devaluation. The empirical analysis that focuses on firms exposed to exchange
rate changes is silent about the reaction of firms in the non-traded sector and ignores the gen-
eral equilibrium eects of an aggregate devaluation. I therefore set up a small open economy
model to analyze these eects in the context of a full model. The model incorporates Calvo-style
nominal price and wage rigidity, both local and producer currency pricing as well as a downward
sloping demand curve for Estonia’s exports. A key parameter in my model is the degree of price
stickiness, which I estimate from my firm-level data. I exploit the fact that some firms invoice
their exports in a third country’s currency and look at how changes in the invoicing currency
aect the export price in Estonian kroons. I find that at an annual frequency, export prices in
Estonian kroons increase by about 0.6 percent aer a 1 percent depreciation of the invoicing
currency, which corresponds to a quarterly value of 0.88 for the price stickiness parameter.
In my benchmark seing calibrated to the Estonian economy in 2009, a 10 percent devalua-
tion of the Estonian kroon raises GDP by 5.2 percent upon impact. This strong eect is partially
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driven by an increase in exports, but also reflects an expansion of firms in the non-traded sec-
tor. This expansion occurs through two channels: First, a devaluation raises the cost of imports,
causing firms to switch towards domestic substitutes. In the short-run when domestic prices
are sticky, this intratemporal substitution eect outweighs the empirically observed import cost
channel. Second, a devaluation stimulates domestic demand of consumers who expect higher
prices in the future.
While the precise magnitude of the exchange rate eects are specific to the Estonian econ-
omy, some general lessons can be drawn: Devaluations are more expansionary in countries with
more rigid prices and, more importantly, more rigid wages. A high trade elasticity and a low
share of foreign currency invoicing reinforce the export expansion eect and therefore lead to
stronger eects of a devaluation. Lastly, a country’s trade openness is almost orthogonal to the
benefits from a devaluation, mainly because both the non-traded sector and the export sector
expand in equal amounts. A higher trade elasticity would change this result and make more
open economies more sensitive to exchange rate fluctuations.
Some important considerations are in order when interpreting the results from my model:
First, my model does not incorporate financial frictions that make devaluations contractionary
through negative balance-sheet eects.2 Available data on private firms’ balance sheets in Esto-
nia suggest that firms were highly leveraged during the crisis, but the public sector was almost
debt-free so that appropriate debt transfers from the private to the public sector could have
mitigated the negative balance sheet eects. Second, the strong expansionary eects rely on
households and firms switching from imports to domestic products. Finding empirical support
for these indirect eects is diicult and le for future research.3
This paper is related to several literatures. A large literature in international finance empiri-
cally studies the eect of exchange rate movements on pass-through and trade, mainly exports
(see Burstein and Gopinath (2014a) for a good overview). Among papers using firm-level data,
2See e.g. Krugman (1999) and Céspedes et al. (2004). For empirical evidence of the balance-sheet eect, see Kim
et al. (2015).
3Bems and Di Giovanni (2014) find evidence that Latvian consumers switched towards cheaper domestic goods
during the financial crisis, but aribute this behavior to an income eect rather than a substitution eect.
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Fitzgerald and Haller (2014) and Cravino (2014) estimate the response of export revenue to ex-
change rate movements using a dataset of Irish and Chilean firms, respectively. My estimates of
the trade elasticity are similar to theirs. Similar to Cravino (2014), I find support that the invoic-
ing currency is a main determinant of a firm’s pass-through. Amiti et al. (2014) use Belgian data
to point out the relevance of concurrent changes in import costs when studying the pass-through
of exports. My model incorporates this channel, for which I also find support in the data.
Second, several studies have analyzed the eects of exchange rate movements on economic
performance. Almost all of those studies are either based on country-level or industry-level data
and generally find mixed results.4 However, a major shortcoming of these studies is that even
within narrowly defined industries, firms dier significantly in their trade paerns and exposure
to currency fluctuations, which might explain the mixed findings. My paper is unique in that
it combines these two strands of literature to analyze a firm’s overall economic performance in
response to exchange rate changes.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces a simple firm
decision problem to motivate the regressions and my empirical results in Section 3. Section 4
presents a small open economy model. antitative exercises of this model are performed and
discussed in Section 5. The last section concludes.
2 Exchange Rate Movements and Firm Performance
In this section, I derive my estimation equation from a static firm-decision problem. I show that
the firm’s production decision depends on the price of its exports and the cost of its inputs, which
includes the cost of imported inputs. If some of these prices and costs are preset in some invoicing
currency, a firm’s production decision depends on both the exchange rate of its trading partner
and the exchange rate of its invoicing currency. Based on this insight, I define firm-specific
4See e.g. Campa and Goldberg (1995) and Gourinchas (1999) for an analysis of investment and employment in
response to exchange rate movements in U.S. manufacturing industries, and Kim and Ying (2007) for a cross-country
analysis.
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eective exchange rates that take the invoicing currency into account. These exchange rates are
the main covariates of interest in the subsequent empirical analysis.
Consider an Estonian firm producing a dierentiated good i and supplying it to destination
market n. The price for its product sold to destination n is pin,$ and is quoted in invoicing currency
$. The exchange rate of Estonian kroons vis-a-vis $ is denoted E$ and its units are kroons over
$.5 The only source of uncertainty for a firm is whether its price is flexible. With probability θ,
firm i’s price is preset and fixed at p¯in,$. I abstract from a firm’s invoicing choice and assume
that the invoicing currency is preset. The firm operates a single production facility for exports to
all its destinations, so that substitution across destinations is costless. Because the production
function has constant returns to scale, the firm’s marginal cost is independent of the amount
produced. This nominal marginal cost is denoted MCi and quoted in kroons.
Assume consumers in each market have a CES demand over varieties of goods. The elasticity
of substitution across varieties is ψ. Then, market n’s demand for firm i’s production is
yin = ω
i
n
(
E$
Ez
pin,$
)−ψ
Pψn Yn (I.1)
where ωin ≥ 0 is a preference parameter, Pn is the aggregate price index in market n, and Yn is
total absorption of market n. The relevant price for the consumers is the dollar price converted
into their local currency, pin,z = E$/Ezp
i
n,$, where the local currency in market n is denoted by
subscript z. Log-dierentiating the demand function (I.1) and aggregating over all markets n
gives the change in total output yi =
∑
n∈Xi y
i
n as a function of the firm’s output price index, p
i,
and a demand shier, Di, aggregated over all markets:
d log yi = −ψd log pi + d logDi, (I.2)
5The kroon is said to depreciate vis-a-vis $ if E$ goes up.
10
with the change in firm i’s output price index being d log pi =
∑
n∈Xi
yin
yi
d log pin,z .
6 Xi is the set
of destination markets for firm i (potentially including the home market). The expression for the
change in the output price index, d log pi, depends on the firm’s ability to adjust its price: If the
firm has a preset price, then any changes in its price pin,z are driven by changes in the exchange
rate between the invoicing currency and the destination’s currency,E$/Ez . If the firm can adjust
its price, then changes in the price pin,z are decomposed into changes of the adjusted price and
changes in the exchange rates:
d log pi =

(∑
$∈Xi
$
yi
$
yi
d logE$
)
−
(∑
n∈Xi
yin
yi
d logEz
)
if i ∈ Θ∑
n∈Xi
yin
yi
(
d log pin,k − d logEz
)
if i ∈ Θ¯.
(I.3)
Here, Xi$ is the set of invoicing currencies for firm i’s exports, yi$ is the value of its exports that
are invoiced in currency $, Θ denotes the set of firms with preset prices and Θ¯ its complement.
The change in the adjusted price for the flexible-price firms is expressed in kroons, pin,k.
In the next section, I will estimate ψ in equation (I.2). To that end, I need to measure the
change in the output price index, d log pi. Most parts in (I.3) can be directly measured in the
data, including changes in the exchange rates of the destination markets, Ez , and the invoic-
ing currencies, E$, as well as trade shares by destination,
yin
yi
and invoicing currency,
yi
$
yi
. The
remainder of this section shows that changes in the optimal price pin,k are linked to exchange
rate changes in import markets. I also discuss how I estimate the probability that a firm cannot
adjust its preset price, θ.
For a firm i with flexible prices, the maximization problem given a marginal cost MCi is
max
pi
n,$
{∑
n∈Xi
(
E$p
i
n,$y
i
n
)−MC iyi}
6The demand shier is defined as
d logDi =
∑
n∈Xi
yin
yi
(
d logωin + ψd logPn + d log Yn
)
.
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subject to the demand function (I.1). The change in the optimal price equals the change in the
marginal cost:
d log pin,k = d logMC
i. (I.4)
Since marginal costs are determined at the firm level in my model (as opposed to the firm-
destination level), the kroon price is constant across destinations and the law of one price holds
d log pin,k = d log p
i
k.
To derive an expression for marginal cost, suppose that the firm requires labor li and inter-
mediate goods qi for production, with the share of wages in marginal costs being γi. The firm
bundles intermediate goods from dierent sources using a CES aggregator. Let the wage be W
and the kroon price of an intermediate good imported from country n be vn,k. Then, the change
in a firm’s marginal cost can be decomposed into the change in its labor costs and the change
in the price of intermediate goods:
d logMCi = γid logW + (1− γi)d log vi, (I.5)
where vi is the price index of the intermediate goods bundle (in kroons), and its change is given
by d log vi =
∑
n∈Mi
qin
qi
d log vin,k. Here, Mi is the set of source markets for firm i (potentially
including the home market). Analogous to firms in Estonia, suppose that firms in country n also
face price rigidity. A fraction ϑ of firms exporting to Estonia has preset prices. Then, the change
in the average import price in kroons for firm i is
d log vin,k = ϑd logE$ + (1− ϑ) (d logEz + d log vn,z) . (I.6)
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Combining equations (I.4)-(I.6) gives7
d log pik = γ
id logW + (1− γi)
∑
n∈Mi
qin
qi
[ϑd logE$ + (1− ϑ) (d logEz + d log vn,z)] . (I.7)
Inserting this expression into (I.3) and taking the expected value gives89
E
(
d log pi
)
= −d logEiX + (1− θ)(1− γi)d logEiM + (1− θ)
(
γid logW + (1− γi)d log viz
)
,
(I.8)
where the eective firm exchange rates EiX and E
i
M are defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Expected eective firm exchange rate under sticky prices). Let θ denote the
probability that a firm’s output invoiced in currency $ ∈ Xi$, yi$, has a preset price. Then, the log
change in the expected eective export exchange rate for a firm i selling yin to markets n ∈ Xi with
exchange rates Ez is given by
d logEiX =
(∑
n∈Xi
yin
yi
d logEz
)
− θ
∑
$∈Xi
$
yi$
yi
d logE$
 . (I.9)
Similarly, let ϑ denote the probability that a firm’s imports invoiced in currency $ ∈ Mi$, qi$, has a
preset price. Then, the log change in the expected eective import exchange rate for a firm i importing
qin from market n ∈Mi with exchange rates Ez is given by
d logEiM = ϑ
∑
$∈Mi
$
qi$
qi
d logE$
+ (1− ϑ)(∑
n∈Mi
qin
qi
d logEz
)
. (I.10)
7A similar relationship between exchange rate movements and the optimal reset price can be derived in a dy-
namic seing, as I show in my general equilibrium framework. Under Calvo pricing, reset prices reflect expected
changes in future marginal costs. If exchange rates follow a unit root process, firms reset prices one-to-one with
changes in current exchange rates, so that my estimation equation remains unaected.
8In my data, I do not classify firms into sticky-price and flexible-price firms. I therefore use this average (or
expected) change in the output price index as my covariate. In the appendix, I show that the resulting estimator for
ψ is still consistent (see appendix section Appendix A).
9The last term is the change in the price of firm i’s imports, defined in the exporter’s currency d log viz =∑
n∈Mi
qin
qi d log v
i
n,z .
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These exchange rates are firm-level equivalents of the eective exchange rates at the aggregate
level, but take into account the extent to which prices are sticky. As a result, the relevant ex-
change rates for calculating the index are a weighted average of the invoicing exchange rate and
the trade partner’s exchange rate, with the weight depending on the degree of price stickiness,
θ and ϑ.
In the next section, I estimate θ as the elasticity of the export price in Estonian kroons with
respect to the invoicing exchange rate. In my model, the average price in kroons across all firms
is
pn,k = θE$p¯
i
n,$ + (1− θ)pin,k.
The elasticity of this average price with respect to the invoicing exchange rate is
ν ≡ d log pn,k
d logE$
= θ + (1− θ)∂p
i
n,k
∂E$
. (I.11)
The elasticity corresponds to the fraction of firms with preset prices, θ, plus an additional term.
This additional term reflects price adjustments of firms with flexible prices. When estimating
(I.11) in the next section, I explain how I control for this second term to identify θ.
To summarize, I have shown that a firm’s production decision (I.2) depends on exchange
rates in its export market aecting the output price and exchange rates in the import market
aecting the marginal cost. In the next section, I will estimate equation (I.2), where I use equation
(I.8) to construct the change in a firm’s output price index. In appendix section Appendix A, I
derive similar expressions for changes in labor and the value of intermediate consumption. A
depreciation of the export eective exchange rate EiX stimulates all three of them, whereas an
appreciation of the import eective exchange rate EiM has an ambiguous eect on labor and the
value of intermediate consumption, due to competing income and substitution eects.
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3 Empirical Evidence on Exchange Rate Eects at the Firm
Level
In this section, I estimate the firm production equation (I.2) introduced in the last section. I
introduce my dataset of Estonian firms and present the distribution of the firm-specific exchange
rates, my main covariate of interest. I then estimate the price stickiness parameter θ, which,
together with the invoicing currency, controls the degree to which firms are exposed to exchange
rate changes. Finally, I present and discuss my main empirical finding that both export and
import exchange rates have a major impact on a firm’s production decision, especially for larger
firms.
3.1 Data
My analysis is based on two datasets provided by Statistics Estonia with annual data for 2003
- 2012. The first dataset has extensive trade data collected through the Extrastat and Intrastat
system.10 This trade data contains information on both imports and exports by product (CN
8-digit level) and firm, the partner country, the invoicing currency, the value in euros and the
invoicing currency, and the net weight. I merge this dataset with data on firms’ gross output,
hours worked and intermediate consumption. This second dataset contains almost all private
firms with 20 employed persons or more, in addition to a rotating sample of smaller firms, and is
used by Statistics Estonia in their compilation of national accounts. I require firms to appear in
at least two consecutive years, so that I can calculate growth rates, and firms must be involved
in foreign trade. My resulting sample is therefore somewhat skewed towards larger firms and
mainly includes firms in the manufacturing and the wholesale and retail trade sector. Overall,
my sample includes almost 3,000 firms per year, which capture about 60 percent of Estonia’s
total trade in goods and 75 percent of value added in the private sector.
10Extrastat data are based on customs declarations for trade with non-EU countries, while Intrastat data for
within-EU trade is based on statistical declarations and mainly misses small trade flows. The reporting thresholds
for Intrastat in 2014 were annual imports of e130,000 and exports of e200,000.
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In analyzing the degree of price stickiness, my dependent variable is the log change in unit
values, defined as the ratio of trade value to trade quantity (measured as weights). For my
firm performance analysis, the dependent variables are the log change of nominal gross output,
intermediate consumption and hours worked. My measures of gross output and intermediate
consumption follow the concepts used in national accounts, e.g. gross output adds changes
in inventories of finished goods to turnover. My estimation equation in (I.2) is wrien in real
values. Using nominal values adds another control, which is the firm-specific eective exchange
rate of the invoicing currency, but the estimated coeicient on d log pi still corresponds to −ψ
(see appendix section Appendix A for details.)
I use my data to construct firm-specific changes in the export and import eective exchange
rates, d logEiX and d logE
i
M , as defined in equations (I.9) and (I.10). To calculate trade shares,
I use the average trade share across t − 1 and t. Details on the construction of these and the
remaining variables (wages, foreign GDP, price level, and producer price index) as well as their
data sources are provided in appendix section Appendix A.
3.2 Summary Statistics
Estonia is a useful environment for studying exchange rate movements because it is very open to
trade and there is considerable heterogeneity across its trading partners. More than 50 percent
of firms in my sample export and 75 percent import (see Table I.1). Among large firms with fiy
employees or more almost nine out of ten firms import. Exporters sell about one third of their
production abroad, whereas importers buy about 40 percent of their intermediate goods abroad.
This represents roughly 30 percent of total variable costs (= labor costs + costs for intermediate
goods). Even though this is a selected and small sample out of more than 50,000 firms operating
in Estonia, it accounts for three quarters of total production and value added in the private sector.
Hence, trade is not only important for this sample, but also for the economy as a whole.
Thanks to its peripheral position in the eurozone, Estonia trades with both eurozone countries
and countries with floating exchange rates. This gives rise to variation in the exchange rate that
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(a) Exports by Destination (b) Imports by Source
Figure I.1: Estonia’s Trade Partners, 2007
Note: Trade shares by value. ’Blue’ colored countries are in the eurozone or considered to be pegged to the euro.
’Orange’ colored countries have a floating exchange rate.
I exploit in my empirical analysis. Figure I.1 splits up Estonia’s trade by trade partner. Roughly
50 percent of the total export value and 40 percent of the total import value is with floating
exchange rate countries, mainly Sweden and Russia. As reported in Table I.2, there is somewhat
less variation in the invoicing currency. Roughly 80 percent of all product-firm-year observations
in my data sample is invoiced in euros (or Estonian kroons). This includes a substantial share
of partner countries whose currency is not the euro. As a consequence of this large fraction,
invoicing in the destination country’s currency is substantially less common for exports than
for imports: roughly 9 percent of exports outside the eurozone is priced in the buyer’s currency,
whereas 50 percent of imports from non-eurozone countries is priced in euros. There is also lile
dierence between large and small firms. If anything, larger firms are less likely to invoice in the
destination’s currency and more likely to invoice in euros.
Estonian firms face some fluctuations in their eective exchange rates, as shown in Figure
I.2. The figure displays the distribution of the annual change in the eective firm exchange
rates, ∆EiX,t and ∆E
i
M,t. In constructing the change in the exchange rates, I choose θ = 0.6,
which corresponds to the estimate obtained in the next section. Note that the exchange rate
index also includes the domestic market for which the exchange rate change is zero. The two
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Table I.1: Trade Exposure
All Small Large
# firms 2,872 2,038 834
% Exporters 56% 51% 70%
% Importers 76% 72% 85%
% Exporter & importer 46% 39% 63%
Average trade shares
Exports (all) 23% 19% 31%
Exports (exporters only) 34% 31% 41%
Imports (all) 37% 36% 37%
Imports (importers only) 41% 42% 39%
Average material cost share 69% 71% 64%
Large firms refers to firms with 50 employees or
more in the previous period. Sample of firms that ei-
ther export or import. Numbers are averages across
all years (2004 - 2012).
Table I.2: Invoicing Currency
All firms Large firms
Exports Imports Exports Imports
Euros, partner country’s currency euros 34% 51% 39% 54%
Euros; partner country’s currency not euros 50% 25% 49% 27%
Partner country’s currency (excluding euros) 6% 13% 5% 11%
Third country’s currency 10% 10% 6% 8%
Notes: Large firms refers to firms with 50 employees or more in the previous period. Estonia’s, Denmark’s
and Lithuania’s currencies are treated as ’euros’ because they had a fixed exchange rate over the sample
period. Percentages refer to number of observations at the product-firm-year level across all years.
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(a) Export exchange rate (b) Import exchange rate
Figure I.2: Distribution of Effective Firm Exchange Rates
Note: Distribution of ∆EiX,t and ∆E
i
M,t across firms and years. Firms with zero change are excluded (40% for
∆EiX,t , 20% for ∆E
i
M,t). For this figure, exchange rate changes are capped at -0.1 and 0.1.
figures display some variation in the exchange rate that firms face, both in the export and import
market, with a standard deviation of 1.2 percent. The average correlation between export and
import exchange rates within firms across years is 32 percent, indicating that firms have some
tendancy to export to and import from the same partner country and / or in the same invoicing
currency. The typical firm is therefore somewhat hedged against exchange rate movements. Re-
calculating the eective exchange rates based on invoicing currencies alone, i.e. θ = 1, gives
a lower correlation of only 20 percent. This suggests that firms do not actively choose their
invoicing currency to hedge against exchange rate risks.
In summary, Estonian firms dier in their trade and exchange rate exposure, and to a lesser
degree, in their invoicing currency exposure. In the next section, I exploit this variation to analyze
how fluctuations in exchange rates aect a firm’s production decision.
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3.3 Empirical Findings
Price Rigidity
I start by presenting evidence that prices are somewhat sticky in the invoicing currency. For that,
I estimate equation (I.11). A challenge is that the elasticity of the export price in Estonian kroons
with respect to the invoicing exchange rate, ν, captures both nominal rigidities (θ) and changes
in the desired price
(
∂pin,k
∂E$
)
. This makes it diicult to disentangle the two from each other. For
instance, consider Estonian exports to Russia invoiced in rubles. If, following an appreciation of
the ruble, the export price in Estonian kroons increases one by one, then this could be because
Estonian exporters cannot adjust their ruble price to keep their kroon price constant, or it could
be because Estonian exporters do not wish to adjust their ruble export price. This later response
is consistent with models that allow for variable markups: An appreciation of the ruble lowers
the price of Estonian exporters relative to the price level in Russia. Facing less competition, Esto-
nian exporters might increase their markup and prevent their ruble export price from falling too
much.11 In that case, I would misinterpret a high elasticity estimate as a sign of price stickiness,
whereas it really indicates that firms do not wish to adjust their prices.
My data allows me to disentangle the two eects by controling for several factors that aect
a firm’s desired export price in kroons. In particular, my identification of θ comes from Estonian
firms that invoice in a third country’s currency, for instance exporters to Russia invoicing in U.S.
dollars. I control for the exchange rate, the price level and GDP of the destination’s country
because these factors might all be correlated with the invoicing currency exchange rate and the
desired export price. Importantly, I also include firm-year fixed eects to control for changes in
marginal costs at the firm level that might be correlated with changes in the invoicing exchange
rate (e.g. changes in the price of imports). My estimation regression is therefore
∆ log pi,pn,$,t(k) = β1∆ logE$,t + β2∆ logEz,t + β3∆ logD
′
n,t + dn + d
i
t + ε
i,p
p,n,$,t(k). (I.12)
11See Burstein and Gopinath (2014a) and Berman et al. (2012) for a discussion of those models.
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The dependent variable, ∆ log pi,pn,$,t(k), is the log change of the unit value price charged on
exports of product p (defined at the 8 digit CN) to country n at time t, invoiced in $ and quoted
in Estonian kroons.12 ∆ logE$,t, is the exchange rate between the invoicing currency and the
kroon (units of kroons per units of invoicing currency) at time t.
The first column in Table I.3 displays the results. The coeicient on ∆ logE$,t is positive
and highly significant. A 1 percent appreciation of the invoicing currency leads to a 0.6 percent
increase in the kroon price. This estimate indicates a moderate degree of price stickiness, which is
in line with parameter values used in closed economy New Keynesian DSGE models: at quarterly
frequency, my estimate implies a Calvo parameter of 0.88 (= 0.61/4), which is the estimate used
in Del Negro et al. (2013).13
I assume that the degree of price rigidity is the same for both Estonian firms and foreign
firms exporting to Estonia, that is I set θ = ϑ = 0.6 to construct the eective exchange rates,
∆ logEiX and ∆ logE
i
M .
Eects on Firm performance
To estimate the eect of exchange rate movements on a firm’s production, I run the following
regression:
∆ log xt =
T∑
j=0
β1,j∆ logEX,t−j +
T∑
j=0
β2,j(1− γ)∆ logEM,t−j +
T∑
j=0
β3,j∆ logZ
′
t−j + d+ εt
(I.13)
12The model presented in the previous section was wrien for a single-product firm producing a dierentiated
good i. This was done for simplicity. As long as production decisions across products within firms do not aect each
other, the results also hold for multi-product firms. In this section, I make this explicit by introducing a superscript
p to indicate a product.
13My estimate is lower than the one found in Cravino (2014), who reports that producer prices move one-to-
one with the exchange rate of the invoicing currency for a set of Chilean firms. One possible reason for my lower
estimate is that I control for firm-level changes in marginal costs, e.g. caused by concurrent increases in import prices
in response to exchange rate changes. As shown later in this section and by Amiti et al. (2014), these concurrent
movements in import prices aect a firm’s desired price.
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where xit is either gross output, intermediate consumption or hours worked, and T = 0, 1, 2 is the
number of lags. My main covariates of interest are the log changes in the eective firm exchange
rates for exports and imports, ∆ logEiX,t and ∆ logE
i
M,t. I premultiply the import exchange rate
by the share of material costs in total costs because my model predicts that a firm’s response to
changes in the import exchange rate should depend on the share of imports in total costs. I also
add several controls suggested by model, ∆ logZi
′
t , to pick up changes in demand in the foreign
market, changes in marginal costs at the firm level and, for changes in gross output, changes in
the invoicing currency exchange rate.
The short-run contemporaneous elasticity of the output variable xit with respect to the export
and import exchange rates are β1,0 and β2,0. Medium-run elasticities are calculated as the sum
of the coeicients, β1(T ) =
∑T
j=0 β1,j and β2(T ) =
∑T
j=0 β2,j , and reflect the impact of cur-
rent exchange rates on outcome variable over time. I start by discussing the contemporaneous
elasticities.
As reported in Table I.4, both export and import exchange rates aect the firm in the expected
direction. Columns (1), (4) and (7) display the baseline results for all the firms in my sample. A 1
percent depreciation of the eective export exchange rate raises gross output by 1.25 percent, in-
termediate consumption by 1.1 percent and hours worked by almost 0.5 percent. All coeicients
are highly statistically significant. The import exchange rate has a somewhat weaker eect: A 1
percent appreciation, adjusted for the material cost share, raises gross output by 0.5 percent, but
this eect is statistically not significant. It raises intermediate consumption and hours worked
by 0.75 and 0.65 percent, with both coeicients being statistically significant at the 10 and 5
percent level, respectively.
These findings suggest a value for the demand elasticity of around 1.25. The somewhat
weaker eects of changes in the import exchange rates on gross output is in line with the predic-
tions of the model. Marginal cost shocks only aect output through their eect on the output
price. In a model with sticky prices, this eect is mitigated. The response of labor and the value
of intermediate consumption to changes in the import exchange rate are guided by two compet-
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ing eects: On the one hand, firms raise their output price in response to an increase in import
prices. This lowers demand for their output and hence, firms also demand fewer inputs. On
the other hand, firms substitute towards labor and the value of intermediates also rises. The
negative coeicient suggests that the first eect dominates the second eect. In addition, the
similar coeicient for labor and the value of intermediates is consistent with a unit elasticity of
substitution between the two inputs.
The table also reveals that larger firms (50 employees or more) are more sensitive to exchange
rate movements than smaller firms. I first estimate a separate price rigidity parameter for both
groups of firms by re-running regressions similar to (I.12).14 The estimated values in columns
(4) and (5) of Table I.3 are θ = 0.67 for small firms and θ = 0.37 for large firms, which sug-
gests that larger firms have less rigid prices. The elasticities of the value of output, intermediate
consumption and hours worked with respect to the export exchange rate are 2, 1.4 and 0.65.
This can be interpreted as larger firms facing a higher demand elasticity. Larger firms also react
more strongly to changes in the import exchange rate. This is in line with the finding that they
have less rigid prices, so that marginal cost changes more directly translate into output price
changes.15
Figure I.3 displays the output elasticities as a function of the time lag. A 1 percent deprecia-
tion of the export exchange rate leads to a 1.25 percent increase in gross output within the year
of the depreciation. Aer one year, this increase raises to almost 2 percent before it returns to 1.5
percent. A similar response can be observed for intermediate consumption and hours worked.
Changes in the import exchange rates also have stronger eects aer one year. A one percent
depreciation of the import exchange rate lowers output by a cumulative 1.7 percent aer one
14I run the regression without firm-year fixed eects, but control for changes in marginal costs at the firm level.
For that, I assume that both types of firms face the same degree of price rigidity in their import markets, ϑ = 0.6.
Based on this estimate I can construct the change in the import exchange rate, ∆ logEiM .
15The finding that the performance of larger firms is more sensitive to exchange rate movements is somewhat at
odds with findings in the literature on the pass-through of larger firms. For instance, Berman et al. (2012) finds that
larger firms tend to absorb exchange rate movements in their markups so that their export volumes are less sensitive.
My finding, however, is consistent with models where price adjustments require a fixed cost so that larger firms
change prices more oen, and models where larger firms self-select into markets with higher demand elasticities
because fixed export costs increase less than proportionally with firm size.
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Figure I.3: Elasticity to Exchange Rates at Different Horizons
Notes: Figure displays the the elasticity of gross output, intermediate consumption and hours worked to the current
eective export and import exchange rate at dierent horizons. The elasticities are calculated as the sum of the
coeicients β1(T ) =
∑T
j=0 β1,j and β2(T ) =
∑T
j=0 β2,j for each lag specification. The bands represent the 95
percent confidence interval around the point estimate for each lag specification.
year and even 2.3 percent aer two years. This is consistent with firms slowly increasing their
prices over time in response to increases in the cost of imports. Overall, exchange rate move-
ments have a persistent eect on output, which actually becomes somewhat stronger aer one
to two years.
The last part of Table I.4 displays the implied eect of a currency devaluation of the Estonian
kroon. The first row looks at the net eect, which is then broken up into the eects due to changes
in the export exchange rate and eects due to changes in the import exchange rate. The assumed
trade and material cost shares are averages for a firm that both exports and imports (see Table
I.1). The share of foreign currency invoicing is taken to be 83 percent for exports and 85 percent
for imports, which are the value shares observed in Estonian trade data in 2009. The net eect
of a 1 percent devaluation is 0.09 percent for (real) gross output, -0.03 percent for intermediate
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consumption and -0.11 for hours worked.16 For larger firms, the net eect on output is also 0.09
percent, but more negative for hours worked: -0.18 percent. Overall, a depreciation is therefore
slightly expansionary, but leads to a reduction in hours worked. In other words, a depreciation
increases labor productivity. This is in contrast to the finding in Ekholm et al. (2012). They
find that the currency appreciation in Norway in 2001-2002 led to a fall in employment among
net exporting firms, but an increase in production.17 The modest expansionary net eect of a
devaluation can be explained by the small export eect displayed in the following row. The export
eect is small despite the large estimated coeicients because the share of foreign invoicing for
exports is high. Later, in the quantitative analysis of my general equilibrium model, I compare
these partial equilibrium predictions to my model’s responses.
In the last part of this section, I provide evidence for two underlying assumptions of my
model: Both invoicing currency exchange rates and import exchange rates aect a firm’s output
prices. The underlying assumption for these results is that invoicing currency composition is a
main factor in explaining incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Results in Table I.3 support
this claim. Columns (2)-(9) display the results of standard pass-through regressions of the form
described in (I.12). The dependent variable is either the log change in the export price quoted
in the destination’s currency or the log change in the import price quoted in Estonian kroons.
Ignoring the invoicing currency, the pass-through is 0.89 for exports and 0.31 for imports.18 How-
ever, a large share of exports is invoiced in the producer’s currency, while most imports are in-
16As an example, the eect for all firms on gross output, 0.09, is calculated as
0.09 = sX βˆ
go
1
(
1− θˆsX,$
)
− sM (1− γ)βˆgo2
(
1− θˆ(1− sM,$)
)
= 0.34 ∗ 1.247 ∗ (1− 0.594 ∗ 0.83)− 0.41 ∗ 0.69 ∗ 0.48 ∗ (1− 0.594 ∗ (1− 0.85)),
where siX is the export share, s
i
M is the import share, s
i
$ is the share of trade invoiced in foreign currency.
17A possible reason for this contrasting finding could be dierences in identification. Identification in Ekholm et
al. (2012) comes from heterogeneity in a firm’s net export position during a stark appreciation of the Norwegian cur-
rency in 2001-2002. They aribute the exchange rate appreciation to changes in Norwegian monetary policy, which
might aect employment and production through other channels than the exchange rate, potentially explaining
our partially divergent results. Identification in my paper does not only come from firm variation in net exports,
but I also exploit variations in exchange rate movements across firms with similar export or import exposure, but
trading with dierent countries and invoicing in dierent currencies.
18Berman et al. (2012) report a similarly high pass-through of 0.92 for French exporters, whereas Gopinath and
Rigobon (2008) find a low pass-through of 0.22 for U.S. imports.
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voiced in the consumer’s currency. Controling for this asymmetric currency composition, the
pass-through for exports and imports invoiced in the producer’s currency are 0.93 and 0.63 re-
spectively (see columns (3) and (7)). Accounting for the invoicing currency composition therefore
makes the pass-through more complete.19
Besides the relevance of the invoicing currency, my model has also pointed out that changes
in the import exchange rate aect a firm’s production decision because it aects a firm’s output
price. This mechanism finds support in the data. Results in column (3) show that roughly one
third of changes in the import exchange rate are passed on to output prices.20
To summarize, these numbers provide evidence for both the export expansion channel and
the import cost channel of an exchange rate depreciation, with a stronger eect of the export
expansion channel. The elasticity of output with respect to the export exchange rate is between
1.25 and 2, whereas it is between -0.5 and -1.5 with respect to the import exchange rate. My
results also suggest that prices are somewhat sticky (θ = 0.59) and that the net eect of a
devaluation of the Estonian kroon on firm output therefore depends on the invoicing currency.
In particular, since most Estonian trade is invoiced in foreign currency, the export expansion
eect of such a devaluation would be small, so that the estimated net eect would be modest.
However, these firm-level results do not inform about the reactions of firms in the non-traded
sector. To quantitatively assess their reaction and compare the aggregate response to my firm-
level estimates, the next section sets up a general equilibrium model that is calibrated to the
firm-level findings of this section.
19Gopinath (2015) also finds cross-country evidence that the invoicing currency is a main determinant for the
pass-through.
20This also aects the pass-through and can help explain why the import pass-through is lower than the export
pass-through even aer controling for the invoicing currency composition. To the extent that Estonia’s import
partners have a strong correlation between their export and import exchange rates (which is likely if most of their
trade is with the euro area), the estimated import pass-through for Estonia will be low. For example, Swedish firms
exporting to Estonia will not adjust their euro export price aer a euro depreciation if a substantial share of their
inputs is imported from the euro area. The relevance of this import cost channel and more empirical support can
be found in Amiti et al. (2014).
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4 A Semi-Small Open Economy Model with Nominal Rigidi-
ties
The model in this section is a semi-small open economy version of the New Keynesian multi-
country model studied in House et al. (2015). Following Kehoe and Ruhl (2009), I model Estonia
as a small open economy in the sense that it takes world interest rates as given, but Estonia is
not small in the goods market, where it faces a downward sloping demand curve. As in House et
al. (2015), my model features nominal price and wage rigidity to analyze the eects of changes
in the nominal exchange rate on the real economy. I incorporate two additional features: First,
the economy features a domestic and an export sector to study the interaction of changes in
the exchange rate on firms in the traded and non-traded sector. Domestic goods are combined
with imports to produce consumption goods. Second, a share of prices in the export and import
sectors are invoiced in foreign currency, as observed in the data. The size of this share will
aect the transmission of exchange rate movements through the economy. Ultimately, I will use
the model to quantify the aggregate impact of exchange rate changes on the real economy and
compare my results to my firm-level estimates.
4.1 Households
The model is wrien in per capita terms. In each period t the economy experiences one event st
from a potentially infinite set of states. I denote by st the history of events up to and including
date t. The probability at date 0 of any particular history st is given by pi(st).21 The semi-small
open economy has a representative household whose expected discounted sum of future period
utilities is
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
pi(st)βt
C1− 1σt
1− 1
σ
− κL
1+ 1
η
t
1 + 1
η
 ,
21Unless confusion arises, I write Xt instead of X(st).
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where β < 1 is the subjective time discount factor, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion for consumption, η is the Frisch labor supply elasticity and κ is a weight on the disutility
of labor in sector j. Ct is consumption of the final good and Lt is labor. The household chooses
consumption of the final good Ct ≥ 0, as well as next period’s capital stock Kjt+1 ≥ 0 and cur-
rent investment into capital Xjt for both sectors j, for all s
t, t ≥ 0, to maximize the expected
discounted sum of future period utilities subject to a sequence of budget constraints. In addi-
tion, the household determines the utilization level of the capital stock, ujt . Increasing utilization
entails a nominal cost Pta(u
j
t).
22 The allocation of labor Lt is decided by monopolistically com-
petitive labor supply unions (see section 4.1).
Households spend part of their income on consumption and investment goods, which they
purchase at price Pt.
The households own the sector-specific capital stocksKjt of the economy. I introduce invest-
ment adjustment costs to make re-allocation of capital across sectors costly. The households
supply labor and capital to the goods producing firms. In return, they earn nominal wages WtLt
and nominal payments for capital, adjusted for utilization,
∑
j u
j
tR
j
tK
j
t . HereWt is the economy-
wide nominal wage and Rjt is the nominal rental rate of capital that prevails in sector j at time
t. The household also receives profits from domestic firms. Let Πjt be nominal profits in sector j
paid to the household at time t.
In addition to direct factor incomes, the household earns interest on non-contingent bonds.
The household has access to two one-period bonds. The first bond is a purely domestic bond,
denominated in the domestic currency, Estonian kroons. Let Bt be the quantity of those bonds
purchased by the household in t. Their nominal interest rate is it. The second bond is an interna-
tional bond, denominated in euros and denoted by Bet . The gross nominal interest rate on those
international bonds is 1 + iet + ι(B
e
t ), where i
e
t is the euro interest rate at time t and ι(B
e
t ) is
a debt-elastic risk premium with ι′(Bet ) < 0.
23 The nominal exchange rate of Estonian kroons
22Following Christiano et al. (2014), I assume that the utilization cost function is a(u) = R
j
P [exp{h(u−1)}−1] 1h ,
where the curvature parameter h governs how costly it is to increase or decrease utilization from its steady-state
value of u = 1. Note that in steady state, a(u) = 0.
23As is well known, small open economy models with incomplete asset markets feature a steady state that de-
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vis-a-vis euros is denoted E and its units are kroons over euros.
The nominal budget constraints for the representative household are
Pt
(
Ct +
∑
j=d,x
Xjt
)
+ EtB
e
t +Bt = WtLt +
∑
j=d,x
[(
ujtR
j
t − a(ujt)Pt
)
Kjt + Π
j
t
]
+ Et
(
1 + iet−1 + ι(B
e
t−1)
)
Bet−1 + (1 + it−1)Bt−1.
And the law of motion for capital is
Kjt+1 = K
j
t (1− δ) +
[
1− f
(
Xjt
Xjt−1
)]
Xjt ∀j
with f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) ≥ 0. As in Christiano et al. (2005), the function f (·) features
higher-order adjustment cost on investment if f ′′ (1) > 0.
The first-order conditions for an optimum are as follows. The household’s Euler equations
for purchases of domestic and intenational bonds, Bt and Bet , require
Et
U1,t
Pt
= β
(
1 + iet + ιt
)∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)Et+1U1,t+1
Pt+1
(I.14)
U1,t
Pt
= β (1 + it)
∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)U1,t+1
Pt+1
, (I.15)
where ιt = ι(Bet ) and U1,t denotes the marginal utility of consumption at time t. The optimal
choice for capital and investment in capital requires
νjt = β
∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)
(
U1,t+1
(
ujt+1
Rjt+1
Pt+1
− a(ujt+1)
)
+ (1− δ)νjt+1
)
U1,t = ν
j
t
[
1− f jt − f j
′
t
Xjt
Xjt−1
]
+ β
∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)f j′t+1νjt+1
(
Xjt+1
Xjt
)2
where the notation f jt denotes the value of f evaluated at X
j
t /X
j
t−1. The nominal price of in-
stalled capital good j is µt = ν
j
t /U1,tPt.
pends on initial conditions (see Schmi-Grohé and Uribe, 2003)). I follow the literature and introduce a debt-elastic
risk premium to induce stationarity. I assume the functional form ι(Be) = ι¯
(
eB¯
e−Be − 1
)
, where B¯e denotes the
steady-state bond level.
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Households choose a sector-specific capital utilization level that satisfies
Rjt = Pta
′(ujt).
Wage Seing
I follow the treatment by Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005). The household supplies
labor to firms through unions that have some market power. Specifically, I assume that eective
labor is a CES mix of dierent labor types. These labor types are aggregated by aggregation
firms that then supply the labor aggregate to the firms (in either sector) at a nominal wage of
Wt. Eective labor is given by
Lt =
(∫ 1
0
lt (z)
ψl−1
ψl dz
) ψl
ψl−1
where lt (z) is the amount of type s labor supplied. The parameter ψl > 1 governs the degree to
which dierent labor types are substitutable. The labor aggregating firm behaves competitively
and supplies eective labor to the firms at the nominal wageWt, but hires labor by type according
to the type-specific nominal wages wt (z). Demand for each labor type is
lt (z) = Lt
(
wt (z)
Wt
)−ψl
(I.16)
and the competitive aggregate nominal wage at time t is
Wt =
(∫ 1
0
wt (z)
1−ψl dz
) 1
1−ψl
.
Wages for each type of labor are set by monopolistically competitive worker-types. Given the
elasticity of demand −ψl, workers desire a real wage wt (z) /Pt which is a constant markup
over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, −U2,t/U1,t (i.e., the
competitive wage). The desired markup is µw =
ψl
ψl−1 > 1.
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As in Erceg et al. (2000), I model sticky wages with a Calvo mechanism. Let θw be the prob-
ability that a worker cannot reset his wage in a given period. Whenever possible, workers reset
wages to maximize the utility of the representative household. The marginal benefit of additional
money at time t + r is U1,t+r/Pt+r and the marginal disutility to the representative household
from supplying additional labor is−U2,t+r. Workers take the demand curve (II.5) as given when-
ever they can choose a new reset wage. Denote the optimal reset wage at time t by wˆt. The
optimal reset wage satisfies
wˆt =
ψl
ψl − 1
∑∞
r=0 (θwβ)
r∑
st+r pi(s
t+r|st)Lt+r (Wt+r)ψl U2,t+r∑∞
r=0 (θwβ)
r∑
st+r pi(s
t+r|st)Lt+r (Wt+r)ψl U1,t+rPt+r
. (I.17)
Given (II.6), the nominal wage for eective labor evolves according to
Wt =
[
θw (Wt−1)
1−ψl + (1− θw) (wˆt)1−ψl
] 1
1−ψl .
4.2 Firms
The economy features two sectors. The first sector, denoted by superscript j = d, produces a
domestic good that importing firms combine with imports to a final good. The final good can
then be used for either final consumption, intermediate consumption or capital. The second
sector, denoted by superscript j = x, produces an export good for the foreign market. Both
sectors use varieties as inputs. These varieties are specific to each of the two sectors. They
are produced using capital, labor and intermediate goods as inputs. I start by describing the
production of the two sector goods. Both domestic and export goods are produced in the same
way, but I will distinguish between the two sectors when discussing the firms’ pricing behavior.
Sector Goods
Production of the sector goods occurs in two stages. As I did with the supply of labor above,
I employ a two-stage production process, which allows me to use a Calvo price seing mecha-
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nism. In the first stage, monopolistically competitive firms in each sector produce dierentiated
“varieties” which are used as inputs into the assembly of the sector good. In the second stage,
competitive sector goods firms produce the sector good from a CES combination of the varieties.
These firms then sell the sector good at the nominal price pjt . I describe the two-stage process of
production in reverse, starting with the second stage.
Second Stage The second stage producers assemble the sector good from the varieties. They
are competitive in both the market for their output and the market for their inputs. They solve
the following maximization problem
maxyjt (ξ)
{
pjty
j
t −
∫ 1
0
ϕjt (ξ) y
j
t (ξ) dξ
}
subject to the CES production function
yjt =
[∫ 1
0
yjt (ξ)
υ−1
υ dξ
] υ
υ−1
.
Here yjt is the real quantity of sector goods produced at time t. The indexing variable ξ indexes
the continuum of dierentiated types of variety producers (thus ξ is one of the varieties). The
parameter υ > 1 governs the degree of substitutability across varieties. The date t nominal price
of each variety is ϕjt (ξ) and the quantity of each variety is y
j
t (ξ). It is straight-forward to show
that the demand for each variety has an iso-elastic form
yjt (ξ) = y
j
t
(
ϕjt (ξ)
pjt
)−υ
. (I.18)
The competitive price of the sector good pjt is then a combination of the prices of the varieties.
In particular, for the domestic good, all prices are set in domestic currency, so that the price is
pdt =
[∫ 1
0
ϕdt (ξ)
1−υ dξ
] 1
1−υ
. (I.19)
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A shareφX of variety producers in the export market set their price in foreign currency, $ (dollars).
The exchange rate to convert dollars into Estonian kroons is E
E$
, where E$ is the exchange rate
of dollars vis-a-vis euros and its units are dollars over euros. Let the price of variety producer
ξ that invoices in Estonian kroons be denoted ϕx$,t (ξ) and the price of variety producer ξ that
invoices in Estonian kroons, k, be denoted ϕxk,t (ξ). Then, the competitive price in the export
market, converted into domestic currency is
pxt =
[
E$,t
Et
∫ φX
0
ϕx$,t (ξ)
1−υ dξ +
∫ 1
φX
ϕxk,t (ξ)
1−υ dξ
] 1
1−υ
. (I.20)
First Stage The varieties yjt (ξ) which are used to assemble the sector good y
j
t are produced in
the first stage. The first-stage producers rent eective units of capital kjt at the nominal rental
price Rjt , hire workers l
j
t at the nominal wage Wt, and purchase intermediate goods q
j
t at the
nominal price Pt for use in production. Unlike the firms in the second stage, the first-stage,
variety producers are monopolistically competitive. They seek to maximize profits taking the
demand curve for their product (II.7) as given. These firms each have access to a Cobb-Douglas
production function
yjt (ξ) = Z
j
([
kjt (ξ)
]α [
ljt (ξ)
]1−α)γ (
qjt (ξ)
)1−γ
.
Because the first-stage producers are monopolistically competitive, they typically charge a markup
for their products. The desired price naturally depends on the demand curve (II.7). Each type of
variety producer ξ freely chooses capital, labor and intermediate goods each period, but there is
a chance that their nominal price ϕjt (ξ) is fixed to some preset level. In this case, the first-stage
producers choose an input mix to minimize costs taking the date t price ϕjt (ξ) as given. Cost
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minimization implies that
Rjt = MC
j
t
αyjt
kjt (ξ)
Wt = MC
j
t
(1− α) γ
ljt (ξ)
Pt = MC
j
t (1− γ)
yjt (ξ)
qjt (ξ)
,
where MCjt is the marginal cost of production. The factor input ratios are constant for all of the
variety producing firms in sector j, in particular
kjt (ξ)
ljt (ξ)
=
α
1− α
Wt
Rjt
=
ujtK
j
t
Ljt
qjt (ξ)
djt (ξ)
=
1− γ
γ
(
Rjt
α
)α (
Wt
1−α
)1−α
Pt
=
Qjt(
ujtK
j
t
)α (
Ljt
)1−α
where ujt denotes the utilization level and d
j
t(ξ) =
[
kjt (ξ)
]α [
ljt (ξ)
]1−α
is the aggregate of capital
and labor. This implies that (within any sector j) the nominal marginal cost of production is con-
stant across the variety producing firms. Nominal marginal costs can be equivalently expressed
in terms of the underlying nominal input prices Wt, R
j
t and Pt.
MCjt =
(
W 1−αt
(
Rjt
)α)γ
P 1−γt
Zj
[(
1
γ(1− α)
)1−α(
1
γα
)α]γ (
1
1− γ
)1−γ
.
Pricing I first discuss the pricing mechanism for domestic currency pricing. I then point out
the dierence for foreign currency pricing.
The nominal prices of the varieties are adjusted only infrequently according to the standard
Calvo mechanism. I letϕjt (ξ) denote the nominal price of variety producer ξ that prevails at time
t in sector j. In particular, for any firm, there is a fixed probability θp that the firm cannot change
its price that period. When a firm can reset its price, it chooses an optimal reset price. Because
the production functions have constant returns to scale, and because the firms are competitive in
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the input markets, all firms ξ that can reset their price at time t optimally choose the same reset
price ϕˆjt (ξ) = ϕˆ
j
t . The reset price is chosen to maximize the discounted value of profits. Firms
act in the interest of the representative household in their country so they apply the household’s
stochastic discount factor to all future income streams. The maximization problem of a firm that
can reset its price at date t is
max
ϕˆt
∞∑
r=0
(θpβ)
r
∑
st+r
pi(st+r|st)U1,t+r
Pt+r
(
ϕˆjt −MCjt+r
)
yjt+r
(
ϕˆjt
pjt+r
)−υ
.
The solution to this optimization problem requires
ϕˆjt =
υ
υ − 1
∑∞
r=0 (θpβ)
r∑
st+r pi(s
t+r|st)U1,t+r
Pt+r
(
pjt+r
)υ
MCjt+ry
j
t+r∑∞
r=0 (θpβ)
r∑
st+r pi(s
t+r|st)U1,t+r
Pt+r
(
pjt+r
)υ
yjt+r
.
Because the variety producers adjust their prices infrequently, the nominal price of the sector
goods are sticky. For the domestic producers, all prices are sticky in domestic currency. Then,
using (I.19), the nominal price of the domestic good evolves according to
pdt =
[
θp
(
pdt−1
)1−υ
+ (1− θp)
(
ϕˆdt
)1−υ] 11−υ
. (I.21)
Variety producers in the export sector either invoice in domestic currency, kroons, or foreign
currency, dollars. Those producers invoicing in kroons face a similar problem as the firms in the
domestic sector. Those invoicing in dollars maximize the discounted value of profits in kroons:
max
ϕˆx
$,t
∞∑
r=0
(θpβ)
r
∑
st+r
pi(st+r|st)U1,t+r
Pt+r
(
Et+r
E$,t+r
ϕˆx$,t −MCxt+r
)
yxt+r
(
Et+r
E$,t+r
ϕˆx$,t
pxt+r
)−υ
and the solution requires:
ϕˆx$,t =
υ
υ − 1
∑∞
r=0 (θpβ)
r∑
st+r pi(s
t+r|st)U1,t+r
Pt+r
(
E$,t+r
Et+r
pxt+r
)υ
MCxt+ry
x
t+r∑∞
r=0 (θpβ)
r∑
st+r pi(s
t+r|st)U1,t+r
Pt+r
Et+r
E$,t+r
(
E$,t+r
Et+r
pxt+r
)υ
yxt+r
.
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Then, using (I.20) the price index for exporters can be split up into two parts:
pxt =
[
φX
(
Et
E$,t
px$,t
)1−υ
+ (1− φX)
(
pxk,t
)1−υ] 11−υ
, (I.22)
where the price of dollar-invoicing firms evolves according to
(
px$,t
)1−υ
= θp
(
px$,t−1
)1−υ
+ (1− θp)
(
ϕˆx$,t
)1−υ
and that of kroon-invoicing firms follows
(
pxk,t
)1−υ
= θp
(
pxk,t−1
)1−υ
+ (1− θp)
(
ϕˆxk,t
)1−υ
.
Imports
Importing firms bundle imported goods and domestically produced goods to a final good using a
CES production function. The price of the imported goods in Estonian kroons is Etp
m
t
E$,t
. Domestic
goods are purchased at price pdt . Then, importers solve the following maximization problem
maxydt ,ymt
{
PtYt − pdt ydt −
Etp
m
t
E$,t
ymi,t
}
subject to the CES production function
Yt =
(
(1− ω) 1ψ (ymt )
ψ−1
ψ + ω
1
ψ
(
ydt
)ψ−1
ψ
) ψ
ψ−1
. (I.23)
The parameter ψ governs the degree of substitutability between domestically produced and im-
ported goods. The expenditure share on domestic goods is 0 ≤ ω ≤ 1.
Demand for domestically produced goods is:
ydt = Ytω
[
pdt
Pt
]−ψ
.
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Similarly, demand for imported goods is:
ymt = Yt(1− ω)
[
Etp
m
t
E$,tPt
]−ψ
. (I.24)
The implied nominal prices of the final good Yt is
Pt =
(
(1− ω)
(
pmt Et
E$,t
)1−ψ
+ ω
(
pdt
)1−ψ) 11−ψ
.
Since importing firms have production functions with constant returns to scale and they behave
competitively, their profits are zero in equilibrium.
Pricing Pricing of imported goods is analogous to the pricing of exports. In particular, I assume
that exporters to Estonia solve a similar maximization problem to Estonian exporters. The price
index for their exports to Estonia is
pmt =
[
(1− φM)
(
E$,t
Et
pmk,t
)1−υ
+ φM
(
pm$,t
)1−υ] 11−υ
, (I.25)
with
(
pmk,t
)1−υ
= θp
(
pmk,t−1
)1−υ
+ (1− θp)
(
ϕˆmk,t
)1−υ
and
(
pm$,t
)1−υ
= θp
(
pm$,t−1
)1−υ
+ (1− θp)
(
ϕˆm$,t
)1−υ
.
Their optimal export price in dollars ϕˆm$,t is exogenous and constant.
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4.3 Foreign Demand
I model foreign demand as in Kehoe and Ruhl (2009). Although Estonia is small in the sense
that it takes world interest rates as given, it faces a downward-sloping demand curve for its
products. I assume that foreign countries use a similar CES production function to produce their
final goods, which require imports from Estonia. Then, their demand for Estonian imports is
yxt =
[
E$,tp
x
t
EtP ∗$,t
]−ψ
Y ∗t , (I.26)
where Y ∗t denotes foreign real absorption and P
∗
$,t the corresponding price deflator in foreign
currency.
4.4 Monetary Policy
The nominal interest rate on euro-denominated bonds, iet , is exogenous and constant. The mon-
etary authority of the small open economy uses the domestic interest rate it as its policy instru-
ment. It maintains the currency peg to the euro and therefore sets its interest rate such that
∆Et = 0 ∀t.
4.5 Aggregation and Market Clearing
Market clearing For each sector j, aggregate production of the sector goods is (up to a first-
order approximation ) given by
yjt = Z
j
([
ujtK
j
t
]α [
Ljt
]1−α)γ (
Qjt
)1−γ
.
Production of the final good is given by (I.23). Its market clearing condition is
Yt = Ct +
∑
j
(
Xjt +Q
j
t + a(u
j
t)K
j
t
)
. (I.27)
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Market clearing for the domestic bond requires
Bt = 0. (I.28)
Definitions Employment, total investment and total intermediate consumption are defined
as Lt =
∑
j L
j
t , Xt =
∑
j X
j
t , Qt =
∑
j Q
j
t .
Nominal GDP in this economy is
NGDPt = p
d
t y
d
t + p
x
t y
x
t − PtQt = Pt
(
Ct +Xt +
∑
j
(
a(ujt)K
j
t
))
+ pxt y
x
t −
Et
E$,t
pmt y
m
t .
I define real GDP using steady-state prices. Fluctuations in real GDP are therefore driven by
changes in real quantities, but not in relative prices. Finally, inflation and wage inflation are
defined as the gross change in the price of the final good pit = PtPt−1 and the gross change in the
wage piWt =
Wt
Wt−1
.
4.6 Definition of Equilibrium
An equilibrium of this economy is defined as intertemporal sequences of allocations{
Ct, L
j
t , X
j
t , K
j
t , u
j
t , Q
j
t , y
j
t , y
m
t , Bt, B
e
t
}∞
t=0
for j = d, x and prices{
Pt, Et, p
d
t , p
x
$,t, p
x
k,t, p
m
t , ϕˆ
d
t , ϕˆ
x
$,t, ϕˆ
x
k,t,Wt, R
j
t ,MC
j
t , ν
j
t
}∞
t=0
for j = d, x that solve the house-
hold’s problem and the problem of each representative firm, and that satisfy the market clearing
conditions (I.27) and (I.28), for given initial conditions
{
Kj0 , B
e
0 , p
d
0, p
x
$,0, p
x
k,0,W0
}
and intertem-
poral sequences of exogenous variables
{
Y ∗t , E$,t, i
e
t , P
∗
$,t, ϕˆ
m
$,t
}∞
t=0
. In my quantitative analysis
I focus on equilibria that start from initial conditions calibrated to match the Estonian economy
at a stationary equilibrium in 2002 before the accession to the EU. The precise specfication of
these intial conditions is described in the next section.
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5 antitative Analysis
In this section, I analyze my model’s response to a currency devaluation. I consider a counter-
factual experiment of a 10 percent currency devaluation. Such a devaluation would have raised
Estonia’s GDP by more than 5 percent upon impact. I explain that this strong reaction in GDP
can be aributed to a large expansion of the non-traded sector. I conclude by drawing more
general lessons from my model by comparing alternative parameterizations.
5.1 Calibration
My model is calibrated at annual frequency. Here, I discuss the calibrated parameters that are
summarized in Table I.5. Most parameters are calibrated to match ratios observed in 2002, before
Estonia entered the boom and bust cycle.
I set the coeicient of relative risk aversion to σ = 2, the standard value in the IRBC literature.
I assume a unit elasticity of labor supply, i.e η = 1. This a conventional value for the labor supply
elasticity (see e.g. Gorodnichenko et al. (2012)) and is in line with evidence provided by Hall (2007)
for the U.S.
I use my estimate of the Calvo price rigidity parameter θp = 0.59. This ensures that a 1 per-
cent exchange rate change leads to a price change of 0.41 percent within a year, as observed in
my data. There is some evidence that wages are somewhat more rigid than prices (see Dabušin-
skas and Rõõm, 2011). I therefore set θw = 0.65. My model results are somewhat sensitive to
the values for θp and θw and I therefore later evaluate my model at alternative values for these
parameters.
I calibrate the markup µ = υ−1
υ
to match a profit to GDP ratio of 10 percent. The resulting
markup is 4.5 percent.24
I choose the two production parameters, γ and α, to match the share of intermediate con-
24New Keynesian DSGE models without intermediate goods set the elasticity of substitution between subsector
goods to values between 7 and 12 (see e.g. Christiano et al., 2014 or Del Negro et al., 2013). This corresponds to a
profit to GDP ratio of roughly 9-15%.
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sumption in total production (0.58 in 2002) and the labor share (0.55). I take into account that
sub-sector firms earn profits because they are not perfectly competitive. In particular, 1 − γ
is measured as the share of intermediate consumption in total production, augmented by the
markup: 1− γ = µQ
Y
. Similarly, 1−α corresponds to the labor share adjusted for a markup and
the intermediate consumption share: 1− α = WL
GDP
µ−1+γ
γ
. The labor share WL
GDP
is calculated as
the ratio of compensation of employment and gross value added, both in nominal terms. Com-
pensation of employment is compensation of employees times the ratio of total hours worked to
hours worked by employees.
I calibrate the depreciation rate to the investment to GDP ratio in Estonia in 2002. This ratio
was about 0.25, which results in a depreciation rate of 10%.
I choose a low value for the investment adjustment cost parameter, f ′′K = 2.48, which suf-
ficiently reduces the volatility of investment. I set the utilization cost parameter to h = 0.08,
which is in the range of other RBC models (e.g. Christiano et al., 2014).
I choose a value of 1.5 for the trade elasticity ψ, which is in the range of my empirical esti-
mates, lying between 1 (for small firms) and 2 (for large firms).
Estonia’s average trade over GDP ratio has been rising from 62 percent in 2002 to 88 percent
in 2012. I calibrate ω to an average trade share of 75 percent.
The share of firms invoicing in foreign currency is calibrated to my firm-level data. In my
dataset, roughly 17 percent of the value of exports and 15 percent of the value of imports in
2009 is invoiced in Estonian kroons. Those ratios have been constantly declining over the sample
period. I choose values for 2009 because my counterfactual experiments analyze a currency
devaluation during the recession in 2009.
5.2 Response to an Exchange Rate Devaluation
In this section, I discuss the model-implied response to an exchange rate devaluation and explain
why the general equilibrium response is stronger than the partial equilibrium response observed
in the firm-level data.
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I solve the model by log-linearizing the first order conditions around the deterministic steady
state.25 I then shock the economy with a 10 percent devaluation. The solid blue line in the
upper le panel of Figure I.4 displays the resulting impulse response for GDP. The remaining
three panels show the impulse response of the sum of consumption and investment, exports
and imports, all measured in percent of GDP. The figure also decompose the total eect into
an eect driven by changes in the export exchange rate and an eect driven by changes in the
import exchange rate, as I did in my empirical analysis. The export exchange rate eect is based
on a counterfactual experiment where only the exchange rate aecting exports is devalued, and
similarly for the import exchange rate eect. In my model, these two eects sum up to the total
(net) eect.
The model shows that the general equilibrium response to a devaluation is significantly larger
than the partial equilibrium response observed in the data. Following a 10 percent devaluation,
GDP increases by 5.2 percent upon impact and remains 3 percent above trend aer 3 years. The
increase in GDP is driven by an expansion of domestic absorption (55 percent) and an expansion
of net exports (45 percent).
What explains this relatively strong response in the model? First, the decomposition into an
export eect and an import eect shows that the model implies an expansion aer a devaluation
of the import exchange rate, in contrast to the firm-level data. As the import exchange rate
depreciates, imports become more expensive, which leads to two eects: On the one hand, the
higher input costs make production less profitable and firms reduce their production (import cost
eect). On the other hand, demand for relatively cheap domestic goods increases and stimulates
production (import substitution eect). In the short run, the import substitution eect dominates
because prices are sticky: The import cost eect is small because firms relying on imports cannot
raise their price in response to higher marginal costs and keep on producing, albeit at reduced
profit rates. The import substitution eect is particularly strong because domestic prices do
not adjust in the short run and domestic goods remain cheap compared to imports. Figure I.4
25See the appendix sections Appendix B for the steady state.
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shows that the import cost channel starts dominating in the medium run: the import eect turns
negative in the ninth year aer the devaluation.
Second, households frontload consumption in response to an exchange rate devaluation. A
10 percent devaluation requires an increase of nominal prices by 10 percent in the long run,
so that the real exchange rate returns to its steady-state level. A devaluation therefore raises
inflation expectations and households, in expectation of higher prices in the future, raise their
consumption. The increase in consumption (and investment) account for roughly 55 percent of
the increase in GDP.
These two factors—the intratemporal substitution eect and the intertemporal substitution
eect—stimulate production of firms in the non-traded sector and therefore raise total produc-
tion in the economy.
The eects of a devaluation on GDP remain large in the medium run. In 2011, the third year
aer the devaluation, GDP is 3 percent higher than without the devaluation. This medium-run
eect is driven by the increase in exports and subsequent higher demand for intermediates. The
rise in exports is lagged because a large share of Estonian exporters invoice in foreign currency.
Upon impact of a devaluation, exporters invoicing in foreign currency see lile increase in the
demand for their products because their prices are sticky. Over time, they adjust their foreign
currency prices downwards, in line with their lower marginal costs. This stimulates demand and
production, which explains the overall persistence of the devaluation.
5.3 Devaluations, Nominal Rigidities and Trade Openness
Here, I discuss whether my results are specific to the Estonian economy in 2009 and how they
might apply to other countries.
The response of GDP to a currency devaluation mainly depends on the extent to which prices
and wages are sticky, the trade elasticity, the size of the export sector and the share of trade that
is invoiced in foreign currency. Figure I.5 displays the short-run elasticity of GDP as a function
of these parameters. In my benchmark calibration, this elasticity is 0.52. The black dashed line
46
Figure I.4: Elasticity of Main Aggregates to Exchange Rate Devaluation
Note: The figure displays the response of GDP to a 10 percent devaluation of the Estonian kroon (upper le panel).
It also breaks up the GDP response into the sum of consumption and investment (upper right panel), exports (lower
right panel) minus imports (lower le panel). Responses are deviations from steady state, measured in percent of
GDP.
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Figure I.5: Elasticity of GDP to Exchange Rate Devaluation: Varying Parameters
Notes: The figure displays the elasticity of GDP to a nominal exchange rate devaluation as a function of various
parameters. The elasticity is calculated as the percent deviation from steady state in the first year aer the de-
valuation. The elasticity is depicted on the y-axis. The x-axis depicts variations in a parameter, keeping all other
parameters at their benchmark level given in Table I.5. ‘Nominal rigidity’ varies θp (price rigidity) or θw (wage rigid-
ity). ‘Trade elasticity’ varies φ. ‘Share foreign invoicing’ varies the share of foreign currency invoicing, either for
both exports (φX ) and imports (φM ) (blue solid line), or exports only (red doed line) or imports only (green dashed
line). ‘Trade over GDP’ varies ω. The x-axis depicts the ratio of trade to GDP. The benchmark parameter for Estonia
is marked by a blacked dashed line.
in each plot corresponds to this benchmark value.
The first subplot reveals that the response of GDP is smaller in countries with more flexible
prices and wages. It also shows that price rigidity maers less than wage rigidity. The reason is
as follows: Sticky prices keep domestic prices low and reinforce the import substitution eect,
which stimulates the production of non-traded goods. The response of GDP is therefore stronger
when prices are more sticky. But a second eect weakens this relationship: sticky prices hinder
the expansion of exports when the share of exports invoiced in foreign currency is high. As dis-
cussed above, exporters invoicing in foreign currency want to lower their foreign currency prices
because their marginal costs are temporarily low. This would stimulate their exports. When
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prices are sticky, exporters cannot lower their price and GDP will respond less to a devaluation.
These two eects—sticky prices reinforcing the import substitution eect, but weakening the
export competition eect—work in opposite direction. Hence, the degree to which prices are
sticky has less impact on a country’s response to a devaluation when most of that country’s
exports are invoiced in foreign currency and exports are a large share of GDP. This is important
because most countries with pegged exchange rates are small and invoice their exports in foreign
currency (see Gopinath, 2015).
The second subplot shows that countries trading goods with higher demand elasticities would
benefit more from a devaluation because a high elasticity facilitates expenditure switching from
foreign to domestically produced goods. Firm-level studies suggest that an elasticity in the range
of 0.5 to 2 might be reasonable for most countries.26 In that range, the response of GDP to a 1
percent devaluation varies between 0.25 and 0.65.
The invoicing currency composition of Estonia’s trade shows that almost 85 percent of trade
is invoiced in foreign currency. Countries like Sweden, Norway and Switzerland have foreign in-
voicing shares around 60 percent (see Gopinath, 2015). My model predicts a somewhat larger re-
sponse of GDP to currency depreciation in those countries with smaller foreign invoicing shares.
If more exports are invoiced in domestic currency, a devaluation leads to a stronger reduction in
the export price, quoted in foreign currency. This increases the export competition eect. At the
same time, a higher share of imports invoiced in domestic currency reduces the import substitu-
tion eect. The net eect of a lower foreign invoicing share is slightly positive. Monetary policy
is therefore less eective in countries where most trade is invoiced in foreign currency.
The last subplot shows that the eects of devaluations are almost orthogonal to a country’s
trade openness. This somewhat surprising result follows from the discussion in the previous sec-
tion. Under my calibration, both the domestic and the export sector expand at roughly equal
rates. Changing their relative size therefore has lile impact on the overall expansion of GDP.
26For instance, Cravino (2014) finds a trade elasticity of 1-2 for Chilean firms, Dekle and Ryoo (2007) find estimates
around 1 for Japan, Campa (2004) finds an estimate of 0.7 for Spain, Fitzgerald and Haller (2014) report an estimate
of 0.8 for Ireland, and Berman et al. (2012) find an estimate of 0.4 for France
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This result hinges on my calibration to the Estonian economy. For example, for countries with
a larger trade elasticity, the expansion of the export sector dominates the expansion of the do-
mestic sector, so that the eects of a devaluation increase in the country’s trade openness.
To sum up, this section has shown that devaluations are expected to be more expansionary in
countries with sticky wages and prices, a high trade elasticity and a low share of foreign currency
invoicing.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, I analyze whether exchange rate changes aect economic performance. I find
empirical evidence that firms expand in response to exchange rate depreciations in their export
market and exchange rate appreciations in their import market. The elasticity of output with
respect to the export exchange rate is between 1.25 and 2, whereas it is between -0.5 and -1.5
with respect to the import exchange rate.
I then ask whether a currency devaluation would have helped the Estonian economy during
the Great Recession. This experiment only looks at the price eects of an exchange rate change,
obviously ignoring other costs of leaving the peg, such as negative balance sheet eects and a
potential capital flight. Based on my firm-level estimates, I calculate a modest expansionary
eect of 1 to 2 percent in revenue in the traded sector for a 10 percent devaluation. This eect
appears small, but is explained by a large share of trade invoiced in foreign currency, which re-
duces the export expansion eect and reinforces the import cost eect of a devaluation. I then
set up a New Keynesian small open economy model to analyze the aggregate eects of a deval-
uation. The model predicts a much larger increase for GDP, around 5 percent for a 10 percent
devaluation. This larger eect is mainly the result of intra- and intertemporal substitution ef-
fects towards current non-traded goods, which my empirical firm-level estimates cannot pick
up. My model therefore suggests that understanding the full impact of a currency devaluation
requires a beer measurement of how firms in the non-traded sector are aected by exchange
50
rate changes.
In future work, I will extend my model to a 3-country model that incorporates both the Euro
area and the rest of the world to evaluate an alternative policy experiment: a depreciation of the
euro initiated by a more aggressive monetary policy of the European Central Bank. Whether
a euro depreciation would have a stronger eect is unclear. On the one hand, more than 50
percent of Estonia’s trade is with euro area countries and would therefore not directly benefit
from the depreciation. On the other hand, the depreciation will raise overall GDP and demand
for products in the euro area, which will also stimulate Estonia’s economy.
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Chapter II
Austerity in the Aermath of the Great
Recession1
1 Introduction
The economies in Europe contracted sharply and almost synchronously during the global finan-
cial crisis. In the aermath of the crisis, however, economic performance has varied. An open
question is whether the dierence in outcomes is due to variations in the severity of external
shocks, the policy reactions to the shocks or the economic conditions at the time of the cri-
sis. A number of prominent economists, including Ben Bernanke, Paul Krugman and Amartya
Sen, have aributed at least some of the slow rate of recovery to austerity policies that cut gov-
ernment expenditures and increased tax rates at precisely the time when faltering economies
required stimulus. This paper constructs measures of austerity and asks whether austerity can
in fact account for the divergence in national economic performance since the Great Recession.
Figure II.1 plots real per capita GDP for 29 countries, including the U.S., countries in the
European Union, Switzerland, and Norway. The data is normalized so that per capita GDP is
100 in 2008:1 for every country. The figure also plots per capita GDP for the European aggregate.
1This chapter is collaborative work with Linda L. Tesar and Christopher L. House.
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Figure II.1: Real per Capita GDP Before, During and After the Crisis
Note: The figure plots the time paths of real per capita GDP for the period 2006:1-2014:4 for the countries in our
data set. The paths are indexed to 100 in 2008:1. The two shaded regions indicate recession dates according to the
NBER and CEPR.
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Overall, the aggregate European experience is similar to that of the United States. This similarity,
however, masks a tremendous amount of variation across Europe. At one end of the spectrum is
Greece for which the “recovery” never began. Greek per capita income at the end of 2014 is more
than 25 percent below its 2008 level. While Greece’s GDP performance is exceptionally negative,
a contraction in GDP over this period is not unique. About a third of the countries in Figure II.1
have end of 2014 levels of real per capita GDP below their 2008 levels. At the other end of the
spectrum is Poland. Unlike Greece, Poland experienced only a very modest contraction during
the Great Recession and returned to a rapid rate of growth quickly thereaer.
Our goal is to document the cross-country dierences in economic performance since 2010
and to study the extent to which the dierences can be explained by macroeconomic policy. We
do not aempt to explain the Great Recession and its transmission - rather, we focus on the di-
vergence in the paths of economic recovery aer the crisis. Our analysis proceeds in two steps.
The first step is to construct measures of austerity shocks that occurred during the 2010 to 2014
period. We consider both spending-based measures of austerity and revenue-based measures of
austerity. Both measures are constructed as (log) dierences between observed spending (or rev-
enues) and their predicted values. Using our methodology, we find that austerity in government
outlays - a reduction in government spending that is larger than that implied by reduced-form
forecasting regressions - is statistically associated with below forecast GDP. This is particularly
true for government purchases, a subcategory of total government outlays. Our results sug-
gest a multiplier on government purchases that is greater than 1. Revenues and the primary
balance generally have a weak or no statistically significant relationship with our measures of
economic performance. Therefore, we focus our empirical analysis and our theoretical model on
the impact of changes in government purchases. The negative relationship between austerity in
government purchases and GDP is robust to the method used to forecast both GDP and gov-
ernment purchases in the 2010 to 2014 period, and holds for countries with fixed exchange rates
and flexible exchange rates. Austerity in government purchases is positively associated with net
exports and the exchange rate (that is, a real appreciation), and negatively associated with GDP
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growth and inflation.
The second stage of our analysis develops a multi-country DSGE model to make direct com-
parisons between the observed empirical relationships and the model predictions. The model
features trade in intermediate goods, sticky prices, sticky wages, and financial frictions that
drive a wedge between the marginal product of capital and the frictionless user cost of capital.
The model is calibrated to reflect relative country size, observed trade flows and financial link-
ages, and the country’s exchange rate regime. The model incorporates austerity shocks, shocks
to the cost of credit and monetary policy shocks. We focus on these three shocks because there
is broad agreement that these factors played an important role in shaping the reaction to the
Great Recession. We then compare the model predictions for GDP, inflation, net exports and the
exchange rate with actual data in the 2010-2014 period.
Our benchmark model generates predictions that are broadly consistent with those seen in
the data. In the cross-section, a regression of austerity in government purchases on GDP yields
a coeicient of -0.30. That is, a one percent reduction in government spending is associated with
a 0.30 percent reduction in GDP. In the analogous regression based on model-generated data,
the coeicient is -0.17. The model is also successful in generating a positive relationship between
austerity and net exports and the negative relationship between austerity and inflation and GDP
growth. Austerity shocks are responsible for much of the observed variation in measures of eco-
nomic activity in the model though monetary shocks are critical for generating realistic variation
in nominal variables.
Given the success of the model in explaining cross-sectional macroeconomic performance
we use the model as a laboratory for conducting a number of counterfactual experiments [to
be completed]. For example, the model can be used to ask whether floating exchange rates,
which permit for greater flexibility in monetary policy, might have supported a faster economic
recovery in Europe.
55
2 Empirical Findings
We begin by characterizing the economic performance of European nations and the United States
following the crisis. Our primary data sources are Eurostat and the OECD. The dataset includes
all nations in the European Union with the exception of Croatia and Malta (excluded due to data
limitations) and with the addition of Norway and Switzerland (outside of the European Union
but members of the European Free Trade Association, EFTA). Our sample covers the period 1960
to 2014; it is an unbalanced panel due to limitations in data availability for some countries.
Table II.1 lists the countries in our data set together with each country’s relative size, the
share of imports in final demand (both averaged over 2005 and 2010) and the country’s exchange
rate regime as of 2010. Size is measured as the country’s final demand (in nominal US dollars)
relative to the sum of all European countries’ final demand, where final demand is GDP less net
exports. Country size varies from less than one percent of the European aggregate (e.g. Cyprus
and Luxembourg) to over 100 percent (the U.S.). The import share is the share of imports in final
demand. 2 The import share varies from a low of 13 percent in the U.S. to very high shares in
Ireland and Luxembourg (44 percent and 57 percent, respectively). The average import share in
Europe is 32 percent. The model in Section 3 will capture the extent of bilateral trade linkages
between country pairs, as well as the overall openness to trade. Most countries in the sample
have a fixed exchange rate because they are part of the euro area, or they have pegged their
exchange rate to the euro. Nine have floating exchange rates.
2.1 Measuring Austerity
There are two conceptual issues in studying the impact of fiscal austerity on economic outcomes.
One is that a policy can only be said to be austere relative to some benchmark. The second issue
is the endogeneity of fiscal policy to the state of the economy – did a cut in government expen-
ditures adversely aect output, or did government expenditures contract along with the decline
2We construct this share from the OECD Trade in Value Added database, as we explain later.
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in output? A commonly adopted approach is to identify periods of austerity as episodes when,
for example, the primary balance (the general government balance net of interest payments) de-
creases by a certain amount. Such data is available from the IMF and the OECD, oen reported
as a share of “cyclically-adjusted GDP” as a way of correcting for the current stage of the business
cycle. This approach partially addresses the issue of defining austerity by picking an arbitrary
cut o, but does not address endogeneity. An alternative is the narrative approach pioneered by
Romer and Romer (2004). This method relies on a subjective assessment of the historical policy
record to identify policy shis that are motivated by long-run fiscal consolidation rather than
the need for short-run temporary fiscal stimulus. The narrative approach addresses the endo-
geneity problem, though it requires a great deal of judgment in interpreting policy statements
by government oicials. The identified policy shis may also reflect the intent of policymakers
and not capture the policies that are ultimately enacted.
A third approach, and the one we adopt here, is to examine forecast errors in fiscal policy
variables (government purchases, total outlays, total revenue and the primary balance) and their
relationship with forecast errors in economic outcomes. We borrow heavily from Blanchard and
Leigh (2013) who take a similar approach. However, rather than relying on forecasts generated
by the IMF or national governments, we produce our own forecast measures. This gives us the
flexibility to consider dierent methods of detrending and additional explanatory variables. Also,
in addition to focusing on the reaction of GDP, we include the reactions of net exports, inflation,
consumption, investment and the exchange rate in our analysis. We examine four basic measures
of government austerity across countries: government purchases, total outlays, total revenue
and the primary balance. Our preferred measure of government expenditure includes only the
sum of final government consumption expenditure and government gross fixed capital formation
(=government purchases). We also report results based on a broader measure of government
expenditure that adds outlays for social benefits to government purchases (=total government
outlays). Our measure of government revenue is the sum of tax receipts from consumption,
capital and labor taxes (including mandatory social contributions to government health care
58
and retirement programs). Finally, the primary balance is defined as total government revenue
less total government outlays plus net interest payments.
Our preferred forecast specification for the austerity measures includes a country-specific
time trend, contemporaneous GDP and its own lag. The forecast errors can be interpreted as
departures from "normal" fiscal policy reactions to economic fluctuations. That is, if a country
typically does not increase spending in the face of economic contractions and it continues that
policy in the aermath of the crisis, our procedure will dictate that that country is not austere.
On the other hand, a country that typically responds to recessions by spending more but does not
do so in the aermath of the crisis will be interpreted as austere. Austerity “shocks” generated in
this way are not econometrically exogenous. We do not have a valid instrument for government
expenditure and revenue and for that reason, the empirical paerns we report must be inter-
preted cautiously. We focus on the observed, quantitative changes in policy variables and ask
whether there is evidence that such changes are associated with changes in economic variables
and whether the quantitative changes are large enough to explain observed variations in eco-
nomic performance. While the shocks suer from standard endogeneity problems, our preferred
forecast specification does reduce one direct source of endogeneity by including contempora-
neous GDP. Namely, we eliminate the direct connection between current economic activity and
either spending or taxation. By including contemporaneous GDP in the forecast specification,
the forecast errors report changes in spending or tax revenue that are not systematically related
to the current state of the economy.
2.2 Constructing forecasts of austerity
For all variables, we construct reduced-form forecasts of what we would anticipate the variable
to be given a set of information. The forecast equations are estimated on data prior to the
crisis (1960, or the earliest available year, to 2005). We then construct out-of-sample residuals
or forecast errors as the dierence between predicted values and the actual values for the crisis
period. The out-of-sample residuals can be interpreted as unusually high or low realizations of
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that variable relative to its predicted values. Though they are not identified structural shocks
from an econometric point of view, we can still ask whether there is a correlation between the
forecast errors of government policy and various measures of economic performance. In our
analysis below, we will focus on the forecasts for the post-recession period 2010-2014. We treat
the crisis as an anomalous period in that the forecasting regression does not use data during the
crisis and we do not aempt to account for paerns in the data during the crisis.
Fiscal variables We consider four measures of fiscal austerity (the government purchases
shortfall, the total outlays shortfall, total revenue, and the primary balance) for country i at
date t.3 The basic form of the forecast specification is given by equation (II.1) and includes
country-specific time trends, lagged values of the log of Git and the log of real per capita GDP.
lnGit = β
i
0 + β
i
1t+ β
i
2 lnG
i
t−1 + β
i
3 lnGDP
i
t + ε
i
t. (II.1)
Some countries report data for only a relatively short time span and therefore the estimated
coeicients in the forecasting regression may be imprecise. To deal with this lack of precision, we
follow two dierent approaches. The first approach is to use a two-stage “shrinkage” proceedure.
The second approach is to replace our estimates for βi2 by values commonly used in the literature.
For the two-stage shrinkage procedure, we start by estimating two dierent versions of (II.1).
We first seperately estimate (II.1) by OLS for each country in our data. This produces a set of
estimates βˆi,1j with standard errors SE
(
βˆi,1j
)
. We then estimate (II.1) imposing the restriction
that βi2 = β2 and β
i
3 = β3. That is, we assume that all nations have the same reaction to changes
in log real per capita GDP and to lagged values of Git. This produces estimates βˆ
i,pool
j where the
superscript indicates that the data are pooled to produce a common estimate. In the second
3Government purchases, totaly outlays and total revenue are deflated by the GDP deflator and in per capita
terms. They are expressed in constant 2010 euros. We normalize the primary balance by dividing by a country’s
GDP in 2005. Also, we do not use the log for the primary balance, but the percent value of GDP.
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stage we compute the convex combinations
βˆi,2j =
1
γ + SE
(
βˆi,1j
) βˆi,1j + SE
(
βˆi,1j
)
γ + SE
(
βˆi,1j
) βˆi,poolj , for j = 2, 3,
where γ > 0 is a tuning parameter.4 We then re-estimate (II.1) by OLS but impose βij = βˆ
i,2
j for
j = 2, 3. This approach allows countries to have distinct autoregressive coeicients and distinct
reactions to GDP if the estimates in the first stage are precise (in the sense that the standard
errors of the first stage coeicients are low). In contrast, if the initial country specific estimates
are imprecise, our procedure stipulates that the reactions are governed relatively more by the
pooled estimates. Note that we do not convexify the country specific intercept (βi0) or time trend
(βi1).
In the second approach, we contrain the parameters βi2 to some value taken from the liter-
ature and then re-estimate (II.1) to obtain estimates for the remaining parameters. We discuss
these constrained values in greater detail below.
Under either approach, given the estimated (or constrained) coeicients, we use (II.1) to fore-
cast Git for periods aer 2005. The out-of-sample forecasts use actual values of lnGDP
i
t but
quasi-predicted values of Gˆit.
5
Table II.2a reports the statistical properties of the log dierence between the actual time
series and the forecast for each of the four fiscal variables: Government purchases (Gov), total
government outlays (TO), total government revenue (TR) and the primary balance (PB). Subscript
1 indicates the baseline specification of the forecasting regression where we use the shrinkage
4The results presented below have
γj =
meani
(
SE
(
βˆij
))
3
.
This seing implies that a nation i with the average precision (given by its standard error) has a coeicient which
places a weight of 0.75 on the pooled estimate. Note that for any fixed γ, the estimate βˆi,2j is a consistent estimator.
5Specifically, we form an iterative sequence of forecasts as follows. At the start of the forecast period (2006) we
initializeGit−1 according to its actual value in 2005. For the next value however, we use the esitmated version of (II.1)
to predict l̂nGit given current X
i
t and
̂lnGit−1 . We repeat this procedure for the entire out-of-sample period using
predicted values for lnGit rather than actual values. Thus, l̂nG
i
t changes over time due only to realized changes in
lnXit and the time trend. See the appendix for additional details.
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Table II.2a: Summary Statistics of Forecast Deviations: Government Finance Variables
Gov1 Gov2 TO1 TO2 TR1 TR2 PB1 PB2
Average −1.36 0.11 0.11 0.75 −2.82 −2.14 −2.26 −1.59
Std. dev. 13.70 16.57 13.42 18.95 11.09 13.60 4.17 4.48
Correlation matrix
Gov1 1.00
Gov2 0.73 1.00
TO1 0.76 0.40 1.00
TO2 0.68 0.89 0.53 1.00
TR1 0.42 0.37 0.21 0.37 1.00
TR2 0.44 0.17 0.32 0.17 0.77 1.00
PB1 −0.19 −0.16 −0.33 −0.30 0.27 0.33 1.00
PB2 −0.18 −0.26 −0.27 −0.41 0.14 0.22 0.79 1.00
Notes: Table displays statistics of the log-dierence between the actual time series and the fore-
cast, averaged over 2010 - 2014, for government purchases, total outlays, total revenue and the
primary balance. The first row displays the average of this dierence across countries; the second
row displays the standard deviation across countries. The remaining rows display the correlation
across the various measures. For each government finance variable, the first forecast method uses
the shrinkage estimator based on a time trend, contemporaneous GDP and its own lag; the second
forecast method imposes the calibrated elasticity for contemporaneous GDP and re-estimates the
remaining parameters (for the primary balance, the lag has been suppressed).
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Figure II.2a: Measures of Austerity For France
Note: Upper panels display nominal government purchases and government revenue for France on a log scale,
together with their predicted values using either estimated GDP elasticities or imposed GDP elasticities. Lower
panels display the corresponding deviations of the actual series from their forecasts in log points.
estimator for βi2 and β
i
3; subscript 2 indicates the alternate specification of (II.1) where we con-
strain the parameter βi2 to values taken from the literature. The first row of the table – the mean
of the deviation from forecast – indicates that the average of the four fiscal variables is small in
the cross section. The standard deviations are large, reflecting the dispersion in policy responses
across countries. The correlations in the boom section of the table show that the forecasts are
highly correlated across the two forecast specifications (ranging from 0.53 for TO1 and TO2 to
0.79 for PB1 and PB2).
Figures II.2a and II.2b show actual and forecast values of log government purchases and to-
tal revenues for two countries: France and Germany, respectively. During the 2010-14 period,
France pursued a relatively austere path with actual government purchases falling short of the
forecast. Tax revenues were also below forecast, especially towards the end of the sample period.
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Figure II.2b: Measures of Austerity for Germany
Note: See Figure II.2a.
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The forecast with the imposed revenue-to-GDP elasticity suggests 2010 as a starting point for
revenue-driven fiscal consolidation. In Germany, on the other hand, austerity only took the form
of somewhat higher-than-predicted tax revenues, whereas government purchases were clearly
above trend. Whether such dierences in austerity “shocks” can explain the cross-sectional pat-
terns of economic outcomes in Europe is the focus of the next section.
2.3 Austerity and economic performance
Having constructed several alternative measures of austerity, we now estimate the relationship
between austerity and economic performance. We report results for eight measures of economic
activity: GDP, inflation, consumption, investment, net exports, the exchange rate, GDP growth
and unemployment. We describe our procedure for forecasting these variables below.
Measuring economic performance For per capita real GDP, consumption and investment,
we use forecasting specifications of the following form:
lnY it = β
i
0 + β
i
1t+ β
i
2 lnY
i
t−1 + ε
i
t., (II.2)
where Y is either GDP, consumption or investment. One of the diiculties in forecasting the
future path of variables like GDP is that it is unclear how to detrend the series. Many countries
in our sample had rapid rates of growth leading up to the crisis, a sharp fall during the crisis,
and then a slower growth rate aer the crisis. Applying the pre-crisis growth rate to the series
produces massive output gaps in the post-crisis period. We adopt three alternative methods of
detrending to address these problems.
First, following the method described for the austerity forecasts, we convexify the autore-
gressive parameter βi2 with the pooled estimate across countries. We refer to this first forecast
method as the “shrinkage” estimator. The second estimator imposes a condition on the trend
based the pooled estimate βpool2 . In particular, we require that the average deviations from the
forecast are zero for each country. We refer to this second method as the “trend hugging” es-
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timator. The third estimate appeals to basic growth theory and assumes that all countries are
ultimately converging to a common growth rate. For this procedure, we estimate time-varying
growth rates composed of two parts: a constant growth rate that reflects the average growth
rate of Western European countries between 1993 and 2005, and a country-specific time-varying
growth rate component that is a linear function of the log gap in real GDP per capita between the
country and Western European aggregate.6 We refer to this third method as the “convergence”
estimator.
The statistical properties of the deviations from the forecast for log real GDP per capita are in
the first three columns of Table II.2b. Specification 1 (denoted GDP1 in the table) is the conver-
gence estimator. Specification 2 is the trend hugging estimator. Specification 3 is the shrinkage
estimator. Real GDP is below forecast for all three forecasting methods, ranging from −11.7
percent per year for specification 1 to −20.1 percent for specification 3. There is considerable
heterogeneity across countries, reflected in the standard deviations in the second row. The fore-
cast errors are positively correlated across specifications, particularly between the trend hug-
ging estimator and the shrinkage estimator (specifications 2 and 3). For log consumption and
log investment we follow a similar forecasting procedure. The table reports results only for the
convergence estimator – our preferred specification. Consumption and investment, like GDP,
are below forecast with considerable heterogeneity across countries.
Implicitly, our forecasts for GDP, consumption and investment all embody trend stationar-
ity. Following the crisis, few countries experienced above average economic growth while many
experienced below average growth during their recoveries. As a result, the trend stationary per-
spective embodied specification (II.2) produces large measures of the shortfall in GDP. Many
researchers argue that GDP is best modelled as a unit root process in which shocks are essen-
tially permanent.7 To accommodate this view, we also produce forecasts for GDP growth. The
growth rate forecasts take the view that the growth rates are stationary but the levels are in-
6The coeicient βi1 in (II.2) is replaced with β¯1 + γ
(
lnGDPEUt−1 − lnGDP it−1
)
where β¯1 is the average growth
rate for Europe.
7See among others, Nelson and Plosser (1982), Rudebusch (1993), Kilian and Ohanian (2002), Campbell and
Perron (1991) and Campbell and Mankiw (1987).
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tegrated processes. But instead of assuming a pure random-walk specification for the growth
rates, we use our growth rate estimates from our convergence estimator. This convergence es-
timator takes into account that growth rates in Central and Eastern European countries should
be expected to slow down as their per capita GDP approaches Western European levels.
For the inflation rate, the unemployment rate, the eective exchange rate and the ratio of
net exports to GDP, we impose a pure random-walk specification. To reduce the sensitivity to
the last observation, for each country we take an average of the variable xit for all quarters in
the two years 2004 and 2005 as the last “observation.”8 That is, our forecast for these variables is
simply
xit =
1
8
∑
s∈2004,2005
xis + ε
i
t
for dates t aer 2005:4. We use “core inflation” (all items less energy and food) as reported by
Eurostat. For each country we use the nominal eective exchange rate which is an average of
nominal exchange rates weighted according to the trade shares of each of country i’s trading
partners. On average (see the first row of Table II.2b, inflation, net exports to GDP and unem-
ployment are all above forecast.
Austerity, GDP and inflation We estimate the relationship between countries’ degree of aus-
terity and their economic performance using a cross-sectional OLS regression:
1
5
2014∑
t=2010
lnYi,t − ln Ŷi,t = α0 + α1 Gi
GDPi
1
5
2014∑
t=2010
(
lnGi,t − ln Ĝi,t
)
+ εi,t. (II.3)
Economic performance, the dependent variable, is measured as the log deviation of GDP, infla-
tion etc. from its forecast, averaged over 2010 - 2014. Similarly, we average the forecast errors for
our austerity measures over 2010 - 2014. We convert our austerity measures to the same units
8We have also experimented with specifications that build in persistence to these variables as
lnxit = β
i
0 + β
i
1 lnx
i
t−1 + ε
i
t.
However, for countries with adequate data, the estiamtes imply very low values for βi1. Because our focus is on
performance several years into the future, the eects of this persistence are virtually zero.
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as GDP by multiplying them by their share in GDP (averaged over 2000 - 2010). This allows us
to directly interpret the coeicient α1 as a multiplier (for Y = GDP ) or the estimated eect of
austerity in terms of percent changes in GDP.9
Tables II.3a and II.3b report the estimated coeicients αˆ1 for GDP and inflation. The top two
rows show results for the shortfall in government purchases. For the entire sample of countries,
the OLS regression coeicient for our measure of the GDP gap on austerity is −1.37 with a
standard error of 0.49. Thus, a country with a shortfall in government purchases amounting to 1
percent of its GDP, sees a reduction in its GDP by 1.37 percent (relative to forecast). The table also
reports separate results for subsamples of countries with fixed and floating exchange rates. We
find evidence that the multiplier is larger for fixed exchange rate countries (1.79 vs. 0.94). The OLS
estimate for inflation is −0.14 with a standard error of 0.10. So reducing government purchases
by 1 percent of GDP is associated with a very mild reduction in inflation of 0.14 percentage
points. Perhaps surprisingly, the eect is somewhat smaller (0.09 ppt.) in countries with floating
exchange rates.
The other rows in Table II.3a show results for the shortfall in total outlays (purchases plus
social benefits), total tax revenue and the primary balance. For total outlays, the results are
similar to the shortfall in government purchases though the estimates for GDP are somewhat
smaller overall (e.g., for the entire sample, the multiplier for outlays is −0.51 compared to the
purchases multiplier, −1.37) and the estimates for inflation have changed sign for the overall
sample and the two subsamples, but remain imprecisely estimated. The results for total revenues
and the primary balance (revenue less outlays plus net interest payments) are counterintuitive.
Taken at face value, the estimates for tax revenue seem to say that a one percent (of GDP)
unforecasted increase in tax collections is associated with an increase in output of 0.72 percent
for the entire sample. Similarly, the OLS estimate for the primary balance suggests that an
unanticipated increases in the primary balance – either an increase in revenue or a decrease in
9This approach follows Hall (2009) and Barro and Redlick (2009). Ramey and Zubairy (2014) discusses the ad-
vantages of directly estimating the multiplier rather than backing it out from an estimated elasticity. Elasticities
are likely to dier across countries if their fiscal sector vary in size. For instance, government purchases account for
an average of 14 percent of GDP in Switzerland for 2000 - 2005, but 29 percent in Sweden.
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Table II.3a: Austerity, GDP and Inflation: Using Estimated
Elasticities
All countries Fixed XRT Floating XRT
α1 R
2 α1 R
2 α1 R
2
Government Purchases (Shortfall)
GDP −1.37 0.22 −1.79 0.29 −0.94 0.19
(0.49) (0.65) (0.73)
Inflation−0.14 0.07 −0.18 0.12 −0.09 0.03
(0.10) (0.12) (0.19)
Total Outlays (Shortfall)
GDP −0.51 0.07 −0.56 0.09 −0.81 0.13
(0.37) (0.43) (0.79)
Inflation 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.20)
Total Revenue
GDP 0.72 0.08 0.79 0.12 0.28 0.01
(0.46) (0.51) (1.23)
Inflation−0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.31 0.16
(0.09) (0.09) (0.27)
Primary Balance
GDP 0.21 0.01 0.26 0.01 −0.47 0.04
(0.41) (0.51) (0.90)
Inflation−0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.04 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.22)
Notes: Table displays the estimated coeicient on the government finance
variable from regression (II.2) as well as itsR2. All government variables are
forecasted using a time trend, GDP and an own lag. GDP is forecasted using
the ’convergence’ estimator. Inflation is forecasted using the unit root esti-
mator. Reported standard errors in parentheses are (untreated) OLS errors.
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Table II.3b: Austerity, GDP and Inflation: Using Imposed
Elasticities
All countries Fixed XRT Floating XRT
α1 R
2 α1 R
2 α1 R
2
Government Purchases (Shortfall, Elasticity = 0)
GDP −1.54 0.49 −1.59 0.47 −1.50 0.65
(0.30) (0.40) (0.42)
Inflation−0.22 0.29 −0.20 0.29 −0.25 0.31
(0.07) (0.07) (0.14)
Total Outlays (Elasticity = -0.05)
GDP −1.06 0.38 −1.09 0.36 −1.15 0.65
(0.26) (0.34) (0.32)
Inflation−0.09 0.07 −0.09 0.09 −0.09 0.07
(0.06) (0.07) (0.12)
Total Revenue (Elasticity = 1.05)
GDP −0.05 0.00 0.23 0.02 −1.74 0.44
(0.37) (0.41) (0.75)
Inflation−0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 −0.20 0.10
(0.07) (0.07) (0.23)
Primary Balance (Elasticity = 0.20)
GDP −0.22 0.01 −0.53 0.05 −0.03 0.00
(0.39) (0.56) (0.57)
Inflation 0.02 0.00 −0.01 0.00 0.06 0.03
(0.07) (0.09) (0.14)
Notes: See Table II.3a. Government finance variables forecasted using im-
posed GDP elasticities.
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expenditure – is associated with an increase in GDP.
We suspect that these counterintuitive results are driven by the estimates of the elasticity of
the austerity variables to contemporaneous GDP. The main purpose of including contemporane-
ous GDP in the forecasting equations (II.1) was to include the typical predicted reactions of tax
revenue or government purchases etc. to changes in GDP. There are mechanical relationships
between tax collections and income that cause tax revenues to change with GDP and we want
to exclude these eects from our measures of austerity. This is particularly important for tax
revenue and social contributions. Our average estimated elasticity of tax revenue with respect
to GDP is 0.57 – meaning that our forecasting regressions predict that tax revenue should rise by
roughly half a percent for every one percent increase in GDP.10 This is likely too low. Blanchard
and Peroi (2002), Girouard and André (2005) and Giorno et al. (1995) report estimates of the tax
elasticity that are much higher. Girouard and André (2005) report separate elasticities of capital
income taxes, labor taxes, consumption taxes and social contributions. Taking a weighted aver-
age of their elasticities based on observed tax shares gives a predicted tax elasticity with respect
to GDP of 1.05 – nearly twice the estimate from our forecast specification.
Using the estimates in Girouard and André (2005), we construct implied elasticities for all of
our austerity measures. We then re-estimate equation (II.1) constraining the elasticities rather
than estimating them. For government purchases shortfalls, the elasticity with respect to GDP
(βi3 in equation II.1) is set to 0. For shortfalls in total outlays, β
i
3 is−0.05; for total tax revenue βi3
is 1.05 and for the primary balance βi3 is 0.20. Using these restricted forecasting equations, we
again construct forecast errors for each austerity measure and repeat our analysis. The results
are reported in Table II.3b.11
As before, the top two rows show results for the shortfall in government purchases. The
GDP results are robust to whether the elasticity is calibrated or not. The estimated multiplier
is −1.54 for the entire sample and no longer displays variation across exchange rate regimes.
10The full country-specific set of forecast estimates is available in the online appendix.
11The paths for government purchases and total revenue with a calibrated elasticity are shown for France and
Germany in Figures II.2a and II.2b.
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The estimates for inflation are slightly higher (−0.22 for the entire sample). The results for
total outlays are somewhat higher than before and now there is a consistent negative impact on
inflation. The greatest dierences are associated with the tax measures and the primary balance.
In the previous table, the estimates all had the “wrong” sign. With the calibrated tax elasticities,
the estimates now suggest essentially no eect of taxes on GDP or inflation (though they are still
estimated with substantial imprecision) and a consistent negative eect of the primary balance.
To summarize, we find consistent results that indicate that unanticipated reductions in gov-
ernment purchases are associated with large negative forecast errors in GDP and modest nega-
tive forecast errors in inflation. We find similar but smaller eects for total outlays. These results
are robust to alternate forecast specifications. Results for tax revenue are not consistent across
forecast specifications and are measured with substantial imprecision.
Government purchases shortfalls and economic performance Because the results for
government purchases are the most robust relative to the other austerity measures, we provide
more detail on the economic impacts of purchases austerity.12 Table II.4 expands on the eects
of government purchases austerity by including additional measures of economic performance.
The table uses the forecast errors with an unconstrained GDP elasticity though the results for
the calibrated GDP elasticity are quite similar.
According to the table, government purchases shortfalls are associated with large reductions
in consumption and investment. The implied consumption multiplier is −1.52 and the invest-
ment multiplier is−3.01. These are large eects for government purchases shortfalls. The eect
on investment is noteworthy because many models would predict a crowding out eect where
reductions in government purchases would lead to increases in investment. That doesn’t seem to
be the case for our data. Both net exports and the trade-weighted exchange rate rise though the
eect is statistically imprecise. Finally, unemployment rises by roughly 0.59 percentage points
for government purchases reductions equal to one percent of GDP.
12Results for the other government finance variables are provided in the Appendix.
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Table II.4: Austerity and Economic Performance
Government Purchases (Shortfall)
All countries Fixed XRT Floating XRT
α1 R
2 α1 R
2 α1 R
2
GDP −1.37 0.22 −1.79 0.29 −0.94 0.19
(0.49) (0.65) (0.73)
Inflation −0.14 0.07 −0.18 0.12 −0.09 0.03
(0.10) (0.12) (0.19)
Consumption −1.52 0.22 −0.84 0.11 −2.43 0.41
(0.55) (0.58) (1.10)
Investment −3.01 0.15 −4.09 0.22 −2.04 0.12
(1.39) (1.80) (2.07)
Net Exports 0.51 0.07 0.42 0.03 0.65 0.41
(0.35) (0.55) (0.30)
Exchange Rate 0.54 0.03 −0.14 0.00 1.43 0.15
(0.57) (0.49) (1.31)
GDP Growth −0.26 0.16 −0.37 0.21 −0.14 0.21
(0.11) (0.17) (0.10)
Unemployment Rate 0.59 0.17 1.04 0.39 0.12 0.02
(0.25) (0.30) (0.34)
Notes: See Table II.3a. GDP, consumption and investment and GDP growth are forecasted
using the ’convergence’ estimator. Inflation, net exports, exchange rates and unemploy-
ment are forecasted using unit root. Exchange rate is the nominal eective exchange rate.
Reported standard errors in parentheses are (untreated) OLS errors.
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Fiscal spillovers We now analyze whether the eects of fiscal policy spill over to neighboring
countries, following the approach taken in Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). Specifically, we
estimate the following regression:
1
5
2014∑
t=2010
lnYi,t − ln Ŷi,t = α0 − α1 ×Gshocki,t − α∗1 ×Gshock∗i,t + εi,t, (II.4)
where Gshocki,t is country i’s domestic austerity shock at time t:
Gshocki,t = domi
Gi
GDPi
1
5
2014∑
t=2010
(
lnGi,t − ln Ĝi,t
)
and Gshock∗i,t is country i’s spillover shock at time t:
Gshock∗i,t =
N∑
j 6=i
impij
Gj
GDPi
1
5
2014∑
t=2010
(
lnGj,t − ln Ĝj,t
)
.
Country i’s spillover shockGshock∗i is the sum of all other countries’ austerity shocks, expressed
in terms of i’s GDP and multiplied by a scaling factor, impij . This scaling factor is calculated as the
share of country j’s final demand that is satisfied by imports from country i. It therefore captures
country i’s exposure to changes in country j’s final demand. By introducing this scaling factor,
we implicitly assume that a country’s GDP response to ae1 reduction in government purchases
in another country scales with its exports to that country. The scaling factor therefore corrects
for the observed heterogeneity in trade linkages across countries in our sample. In contrast
to Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012), our scaling factor is calculated as a share of j’s final
demand, not j’s government purchases. This captures the idea that changes in fiscal policy might
not only directly translate into imports from other countries, but also indirectly through changes
in consumption and investment. It also completely distributes the eects of fiscal austerity in j
to all its trading partner and itself because domj +
∑N
i 6=j imp
i
j = 1, where domj is country j’s
final demand that is satisfied by its domestic production.
The domestic austerity shock Gshocki applies this ’transmission-through-demand’ idea to
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Table II.5: AUSTERITY AND SPILLOVERS
Government Purchases (Shortfall)
All countries Fixed XRT Floating XRT
α1 α
∗
1 R
2 α1 α
∗
1 R
2 α1 α
∗
1 R
2
GDP −2.80−23.72 0.41 −3.36−20.96 0.52 −2.98−52.65 0.38
(0.69) (9.33) (0.84) (9.18) (1.55) (36.91)
Inflation −0.30 −2.90 0.15 −0.34 −1.81 0.19 −0.62−15.62 0.35
(0.15) (2.05) (0.18) (1.94) (0.38) (9.09)
Consumption −2.91−20.91 0.33 −1.88−19.19 0.36 −5.69−66.38 0.50
(0.83) (11.23) (0.76) (8.31) (2.45) (58.17)
Investment −7.01−81.45 0.41 −8.32−71.35 0.54 −9.07−202.02 0.53
(1.88) (25.34) (2.16) (23.58) (3.68) (87.58)
Net Exports 0.34−14.55 0.19 0.18−15.66 0.18 1.11 3.85 0.41
(0.53) (7.20) (0.79) (8.62) (0.71) (16.94)
Exchange Rate 1.01 3.65 0.04 0.12 13.34 0.15 −0.46−93.06 0.39
(0.92) (12.36) (0.71) (7.73) (2.67) (63.58)
GDP Growth −0.58 −6.48 0.41 −0.72 −6.38 0.47 −0.41 −6.21 0.35
(0.15) (2.09) (0.22) (2.40) (0.23) (5.37)
Unemployment Rate 1.00 1.37 0.20 1.63 −0.24 0.44 0.58 13.88 0.09
(0.41) (5.47) (0.45) (4.96) (0.80) (18.95)
the domestic economy. In contrast to our baseline regression (II.3), we multiply the austerity
shock by country i’s share of final demand that is accounted for by domestic production, domi.
This corrects for countries’ trade openness and captures the idea that domestic fiscal shocks
’leak out’ to other economies if a large share of final demand is satisfied by imports. Data on
the domestic share, domi, and the import shares, impij , is taken from the OECD Trade in Value
Added database, as explained in section .
Table II.5 display the results of regression (II.4) for a shortfall of government purchases. Ad-
justing domestic austerity shocks for the domestic share improves the fit of the regression and
lowers relative standard errors relative to the benchmark results in Table II.4. The estimated
coeicient αˆ is around -2.80 for GDP. This coeicient can be interpreted as a closed economy
multiplier under the assumption that the eect of fiscal policy shocks on GDP perfectly scales
with the domestic share dom.
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Figure II.3 illustrates the regression for GDP. The vertical axes of the two scaer plots display
average forecast residual for GDP (the dependent variable in regression (II.4), in log points times
100. The horizontal axes display either the domestic austerity shock, Gshock, or the spillover
shock,Gshock∗, in the same units as the GDP forecast residual. For example, 2 on the horizontal
axis in the le panel is a reduction in government purchases, scaled by the domestic share of
final demand, corresponding to 0.02 log points of GDP. As can be seen, variation in the spillover
shocks is smaller than the variation in the domestic shock because export shares are somewhat
lower than domestic shares. Also, exports are naturally diversified, so that positive and negative
spillover eects from dierent export markets cancel each other out. Overall, spillover shocks
in terms of government purchases were positive over the sample period, meaning that most
countries faced increased government purchases in their export markets. This is mainly due to
greater than predicted government purchases in large economies like Germany and the U.K.
The estimated results for the coeicient on the spillover shock in Table II.5 support the view
that austerity in export markets dampens economic activity at home. The eects are qualitatively
very similar to domestic austerity shocks, with the exception of net exports. Domestic austerity
has no eect on net exports, whereas foreign austerity reduces net exports (but only in fixed
exchange rate countries). This is in line with the idea that fiscal policy spills over to neighboring
countries through trade. However, at face value, the estimates imply quantitatively implausible
multipliers.13
3 Model
Here we present a multicountry business cycle model of the 29 countries in our data set. The
model includes every country in the Eurozone (except for Malta) and is calibrated to roughly
match both contemporaneous trade flows as well as recent long-run growth trajectories of cer-
13A simple back on the envelope calculation suggests that if all export markets equally raise government purchases
by a total of e1, then the average country in our sample with an export-to-foreign-demand share of
∑N
j 6=i imp
i
j =
0.22 sees its domestic GDP rise by more than e5. Our results cannot directly be compared to those reported in
Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012). Among other things, we use a dierent scaling factor impij .
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tain nations particularly the former Eastern Bloc countries. The model incorporates many fea-
tures from modern monetary business cycle models (e.g., Smets and Wouters (2007), Christiano
et al. (2005), international business cycles models (e.g., Backus et al. (1992), Backus et al. (1994),
Chari et al. (2000), Heathcote and Perri (2002)), and financial accelerator models (e.g., Bernanke
et al. (1999), Brave et al. (2012), Christiano et al. (2014)). The main ingredients of the model are (i)
price and wage rigidity (ii) international trade in productive intermediate goods, (iii) a net worth
chanel for business investment and (iv) government spending shocks, monetary policy shocks
and spread shocks.
3.1 Households
The world economy is populated by n = 1...N countries denoted by subscript i. The number
of households in any country n is Nn. The model is wrien in per capita terms. To convert any
variable to a national total, we simply scale by the population. Thus if Xn,t is per capita invest-
ment in country n at time t, total investment is simply NnXn,t. In each period t the economy
experienes one event st from a potentially infinite set of states. We denote by st the history of
events up to and including date t. The probability at date 0 of any particular history st is given
by pi(st).14
Every country has a representative household, a single type of intermediate goods producing
firm and a single type of final goods producing firm. As in Heathcote and Perri (2002), interme-
diate goods are tradable across countries, but final goods are nontradable. The households own
all of the domestic firms.
We assume that utility is separable in consumption and labor. At date 0, the expected dis-
counted sum of future period utilities for a household in country n is given by
∞∑
t=0
∑
st
pi(st)βt
C1− 1σn,t
1− 1
σ
− κn
L
1+ 1
η
n,t
1 + 1
η

14Unless confusion arises, we write Xn,t instead of Xn(st).
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where β < 1 is the subjective time discount factor, σ is the intertemporal elasticity of substitu-
tion for consumption, η is the Frisch labor supply elasticity and κn is a country specific weight
on the disutility of labor. Households choose consumption Cn,t ≥ 0, next period’s capital stock
Kn,t+1 ≥ 0 and current investment Xn,t for all st and for all t ≥ 0 to maximize the expected dis-
counted sum of future period utilities subject to a sequence of budget constraints. The allocation
of labor Ln,t is decided by monopolistically competitive labor supply unions (see below).
Households in each country own the capital stock Kn,t of that country. They supply labor to
the intermediate goods producing firms and capital to the entrepreneurs. In return, they earn
nominal wages Wn,tLn,t and nominal payments for capital µn,tKn,t. Here Wn,t is the nominal
wage and µn,t is the nominal price of capital that prevail in country n at time t. Let Tn,t denote
nominal lump-sum taxes at time t. Finally, the household may also receive profits from domes-
tic firms. Let Πfn,t be nominal profits from intermediate good firms and Π
e be transfers from
entrepreneurs paid to the household at time t.
Our specification of the payments associated with capital deserves some additional discus-
sion. Rather than assuming that the households rent capital directly to firms, we assume that
the households sell capital to entrepreneurs and then subsequently repurchase the undepreci-
ated capital the following period. This assumption is convenient when we introduce financial
market imperfections later.
In addition to direct factor incomes and transfer payments, the household may receive pay-
ments from both state-contingent and non-contingent bonds. Let bn(st, st+1) be the quantity of
state-contingent bonds purchased by the household in country n aer history st. These bonds
pay o in units of a reserve currency which we take to be U.S. dollars. Let a (st, st+1) be the nom-
inal price of one unit of the state-contingent bond which pays o in state st+1. Each country has
non-contingent nominal bonds which can be traded. Let Sjn,t be the number of bonds denom-
inated in country j’s currency and held by the representative agent in country n. The gross
nominal interest rate for country n’s bonds is 1 + in,t. The nominal exchange rate to convert
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country n’s currency into the reserve currency is En,t.15
The nominal budget constraints for the representative household in country n are
Pn,t [Cn,t +Xn,t] + (1− δ)µn,tKn,t +
N∑
j=1
Ej,tS
j
n,t
En,t
+ Icomp
[∑
st+1
a (st, st+1) bn(s
t, st+1)
En,t
− bn(s
t−1, st)
En,t
]
= µn,tKn,t+1 +Wn,tLn,t + Π
f
n,t + Π
e
n,t +
N∑
j=1
Ej,t (1 + ij,t−1)S
j
n,t−1
En,t
− Tn,t
and
Kn,t+1 = Kn,t (1− δ) +
[
1− f
(
Xn,t
Xn,t−1
)]
Xn,t
with f(1) = f ′(1) = 0 and f ′′(1) ≥ 0. As in Christiano et al. (2005), the function f (·) features
higher-order adjustment cost on investment if f ′′ (1) > 0.
The indicator variable Icomp takes the value 1 if markets are complete and 0 otherwise.16
The first order conditions for an optimum are as follows.17 The household’s Euler equation for
purchases of state contingent bonds bn(st, st+1) requires
a (st, st+1)
En,t
1
Pn,t
C
− 1
σ
n,t = βpi(s
t+1|st) 1
En,t+1
1
Pn,t+1
C
− 1
σ
n,t+1 ∀st+1
where for convenience we are omiing the argument st for state-contingent variables when there
is no ambiguity (i.e., we will write C
− 1
σ
n,t rather than Cn,t (s
t)
− 1
σ , Pn,t rather than Pn,t (st), etc.).
There are also Euler equations associated with the uncontingent nominal bonds Sjn,t. These
15Technically, we assume that households also extend domestic loans to entrepreneurs, Bn,t, at a risky interest
rate (1 + in,t)F (λn,t)e
F
n,t . We later discuss these loans in more detail. We omit these loans for clarity reason in the
budget contraint.
16Because models with incomplete markets oen have non-stationary equilibria, we impose a small cost of hold-
ing claims on other countries. This cost implies that the equilibria is always stationary. For our purposes, we set
the cost suiciently low that its eect on the equilibrium is negligible.
17The reader will notice that the standard labor supply first order condition is “missing.” The reason for this is
that we appeal to market power on the part of labor suppliers (acting on behalf of the household) and thus, as in
the typical sticky wage seing, wages are set above the market clearing level (i.e., workers are “o their labor supply
curves”).
81
require
C
− 1
σ
n,t
Pn,t
Ej,t
En,t
= β (1 + ij,t)
∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)
Ej,t+1
En,t+1
C
− 1
σ
n,t+1
Pn,t+1
 for all j = 1...N.
Finally, the optimal choice for investment and capital requires
C
− 1
σ
n,t = µn,t
C
− 1
σ
n,t
Pn,t
−µn,t
C
− 1
σ
n,t
Pn,t
[
fn,t +
Xn,t
Xn,t−1
f ′n,t
]
+β
∑
st+1
pi(st+1|st)
µn,tC− 1σn,t+1
Pn,t+1
f ′n,t+1
(
Xn,t+1
Xn,t
)2
where the notation fn,t denotes the value of f evaluated at Xn,t/Xn,t−1.
Wage Seing
We follow the treatment by Erceg et al. (2000) and Christiano et al. (2005) by assuming that the
household supplies labor to firms through unions that have some market power. Specifically, we
assume that eective labor is a CES mix of dierent labor types. These labor types are aggregated
by aggregation firms that then supply the labor aggregate to the firms at a nominal wage ofWn,t.
Eective labor is given by
Ln,t =
(∫ 1
0
ln,t (z)
ψl−1
ψl dz
) ψl
ψl−1
where Ln,t is the eective amount of labor supplied to the firms in country n at time t and
ln,t (z) is the amount of type s labor supplied. The parameter ψl > 1 governs the degree to
which dierent labor types are substitutable. The labor aggregating firm behaves competitively
and supplies eective labor to the firms at the flow nominal wage Wn,t but hires labor by type
according to the type-specific nominal wages wn,t (z). Demand for each labor type is
ln,t (z) = Ln,t
(
wn,t (z)
Wn,t
)−ψl
(II.5)
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and the competitive aggregate nominal wage in country n at time t is
Wn,t =
(∫ 1
0
wn,t (z)
1−ψl dz
) 1
1−ψl
.
Wages for each type of labor are set by monopolistically competitive worker-types. Given the
elasticity of demand −ψl, workers desire a real wage wn,t (z) /Pn,t which is a constant markup
over the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure, −U2,n,t+j/U1,n,t+j (i.e.,
the competitive wage). The desired markup is µw =
ψl
ψl−1 > 1.
As in Erceg et al. (2000), we model sticky wages with a Calvo mechanism. Let θw be the
probability that a worker cannot reset his or her wage in a given period. Whenever possible,
workers reset wages to maximize the utility of the representative household in country n. The
marginal benefit of additional money at time t + j is C
− 1
σ
n,t+j/Pn,t+j and the marginal disutility
to the representative household from supplying additional labor is κnL
1
η
n,t+j . Workers take the
demand curve (II.5) as given whenever they can choose a new reset wage. Denote the optimal
reset wage in country n at time t as w∗n,t. The optimal reset wage satisfies
w∗n,t =
ψl
ψl − 1
−∑∞j=0 (θwβ)j∑st+j pi(st+j|st)Ln,t+jWψln,t+jκnL 1ηn,t+j∑∞
j=0 (θwβ)
j∑
st+j pi(s
t+j|st)Ln,t+jWψln,t+j
C
− 1σ
n,t+j
Pn,t+j
. (II.6)
Given (II.6), the nominal wage for eective labor evolves according to
Wn,t =
[
θw (Wn,t−1)
1−ψl + (1− θw)
(
w∗n,t
)1−ψl] 11−ψl .
3.2 Firms
There are three groups of productive firms in the model. First there are firms that produce the
“final good.” The final good is used for consumption, investment and government purchases
within a country and cannot be traded across countries. The final good producers take in-
termediate goods as inputs. Second, intermediate goods firms produce country-specific goods
83
which are used in production by the final goods firms. Unlike the final good, the intermediate
goods are freely tradeable across countries. The intermediate goods firms themselves take sub-
intermediate goods or varieties as inputs (the domestic producers of the tradeable intermediate
in country n use only sub-intermediates produced in country n as inputs). The sub-intermediate
goods are produced using capital and labor as inputs. Like the final good, neither capital nor
labor can be moved across countries. Below we describe the production chain of these three
groups of firms. We begin by describing the production of the intermediate goods which are
traded across countries.
Tradeable Intermediate Goods
Each country produces a single (country-specific) type of tradeable intermediate good. The in-
termediate goods are used in the production of the final good which is ultimately the source
of consumption and investment for each country. The intermediate goods are the only goods
that can be traded between countries. Production of the intermediate good occurs in two stages.
As we did with the supply of labor above, we employ a two-stage production process to allow
us to use a Calvo price seing mechanism. In the first stage, monopolistically competitive do-
mestic firms produce dierentiated “sub-intermediate” goods which are used as inputs into the
assembly of the tradeable intermediate good for country n. In the second stage, competitive in-
termediate goods firms produce the tradeable intermediate good from a CES combination of the
sub-intermediates. These firms then sell the intermediate good on international markets at the
nominal price pn,t. We describe the two-stage process of production of the intermediate goods
in reverse, starting with the second stage.
Second-Stage Producers The second stage producers assemble the tradeable intermediate
good from the sub-intermediate varieties. The second stage firms are competitive in both the
global market for intermediate goods and the market for subintermediate goods in their own
country. The second-stage intermediate goods producers solve the following maximization prob-
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lem
max
qn,t(ξ)
{
pn,tQn,t −
∫ 1
0
ϕn,t (ξ) qn,t (ξ) dξ
}
subject to the CES production function
Qn,t =
[∫ 1
0
qn,t (ξ)
ψq−1
ψq dξ
] ψq
ψq−1
where the parameter ψq > 1. HereQn,t is the real quantity of country n’s tradeable intermediate
good produced at time t. The indexing variable ξ indexes the continuum of dierentiated types of
sub-intermediate producers (thus ξ is one of the sub-intermediate types). The parameter ψq > 1
governs the degree of substitutability across the sub-intermediate goods. The date t nominal
price of each sub-intermediate good is ϕn,t (ξ) and the quantity of each sub-intermediate is
qn,t (ξ). It is straight-forward to show that the demand for each sub-intermediate has an iso-
elastic form
qn,t (ξ) = Qn,t
(
ϕn,t (ξ)
pn,t
)−ψq
. (II.7)
The competitive price of the intermediate pn,t is then a combination of the prices of the sub-
intermediates. In particular,
pn,t =
[∫ 1
0
ϕn,t (ξ)
1−ψq dξ
] 1
1−ψq
. (II.8)
First-Stage Producers The sub-intermediate goods qn,t (ξ) which are used to assemble the
tradeable intermediate good Qn,t are produced in the first stage. The first-stage producers hire
workers at the nominal wage Wn,t and rent capital at the nominal rental price Rn,t for use in
production. Unlike the firms in the second stage, the first-stage, sub-intermediate goods firms
are monopolistically competitive. They seek to maximize profits taking the demand curve for
their product (II.7) as given. These firms each have access to a Cobb-Douglas production function
qn,t (ξ) = Zn,t [kn,t (ξ)]
α [ln,t (ξ)]
1−α .
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Because the first-stage producers are monopolistically competitive, they typically charge a markup
for their products. The desired price naturally depends on the demand curve (II.7). Each type
of sub-intermediate good producer ξ freely chooses capital and labor each period but there is a
chance that their nominal price ϕn,t (ξ) is fixed to some exogenous level. In this case, the first-
stage producers choose an input mix to minimize costs taking the date-t price ϕn,t (ξ) as given.
Cost minimization implies that
Wn,t = MCn,t (1− α)Zn,t [kn,t (ξ)]α [ln,t (ξ)]−α
Rn,t = MCn,tαZn,t [kn,t (ξ)]
α−1 [ln,t (ξ)]
1−α
where MCn,t is the marginal cost of production. The capital-to-labor ratios are constant for all
of the sub-intermediate firms, in particular
kn,t (ξ)
ln,t (ξ)
=
α
1− α
Wn,t
Rn,t
=
un,tKn,t
Ln,t
This implies that (within any country n) the nominal marginal cost of production is constant
across the sub-intermediate goods firms. Nominal marginal costs can be equivalently expressed
in terms of the underlying nominal input prices Wn,t and Rn,t
MCn,t =
W 1−αn,t R
α
n,t
Zn,t
(
1
1− α
)1−α(
1
α
)α
.
Pricing The nominal prices of the sub-intermediate goods are adjusted only infrequently ac-
cording to the standard Calvo mechanism. We let ϕn,t (ξ) denote the nominal price of sub-
intermediate producer ξ that prevails at time t in country n. In particular, for any firm, there is a
fixed probability θp that the firm cannot change its price that period. When a firm can reset its
price it chooses an optimal reset price. Because the production functions have constant returns
to scale, and because the firms are competitive in the input markets, all firms ξ that can reset
their price at time t optimally choose the same reset price ϕ∗n,t (ξ) = ϕ
∗
n,t. The reset price is cho-
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sen to maximize the discounted value of profits. Firms act in the interest of the representative
household in their country so they apply the household’s stochastic discount factor to all future
income streams. The maximization problem of a firm that can reset its price at date t is
max
ϕ∗n,t
∞∑
j=0
(θpβ)
j
∑
st+j
pi(st+j|st)C
− 1
σ
n,t+j
Pn,t+j
(
ϕ∗n,t −MCn,t+j
)
Qn,t+j
(
ϕ∗n,t
pn,t+j
)−ψq
The solution to this optimization problem requires
ϕ∗n,t =
ψq
ψq − 1
∑∞
j=0 (θpβ)
j∑
st+j pi(s
t+j|st)C
− 1σ
n,t+j
Pn,t+j
(Pn,t+j)
ψq−1MCn,t+jQn,t+j∑∞
j=0 (θpβ)
j∑
st+j pi(s
t+j|st)C
− 1σ
n,t+j
Pn,t+j
(Pn,t+j)
ψq−1Qn,t+j
.
Because the sub-intermediate goods firms adjust their prices infrequently, the nominal price
of the tradeable intermediate goods are sticky. In particular, using (II.8), the nominal price of the
tradeable intermediate good evolves according to
pn,t =
[
θp (pn,t−1)
1−ψq + (1− θp)
(
ϕ∗n,t
)1−ψq] 11−ψq
. (II.9)
Our specification of price seing entails firms seing prices in their own currency. As a re-
sult, when exchange rates move, the implied import price moves automatically (there is complete
pass-through). This is somewhat at odds with the data which suggests that many exporting firms
fix prices in the currency of the country to which they are exporting. See Bes and Devereux
(1996), Bes and Devereux (2000) and Devereux and Engel (2003) for a discussion of the dier-
ences between local currency pricing and domestic currency pricing. See Gopinath and Itskhoki
(2011) and Burstein and Gopinath (2014b)for empirical evidence on the relationship between
pass-through, price rigidity and exchange rate movements.
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Non-Tradeable Final Goods
The final goods are assembled from a (country-specific) CES combination of tradeable interme-
diates produced by the various countries in the model. The final goods firms are competitive in
both the global input markets (for the intermediate inputs) and the final goods market. The final
goods producers solve the following maximization problem
max
yjn,t
{
Pn,tYn,t −
N∑
j=1
Ej,t
En,t
pj,ty
j
n,t
}
subject to the CES production function
Yn,t =
(
N∑
j=1
ω
1
ψy
n,j
(
yjn,t
)ψy−1
ψy
) ψy
ψy−1
(II.10)
Here, yjn,t is the amount of country-j intermediate good used in production by country n at time
t. The parameter ψy governs the degree of substitutability across the tradeable intermediate
goods and we assume that ωn,j ≥ 0 and
∑N
j=1 ωn,j = 1 for each country n. Notice that the
shares ωn,j are country-specific so each country produces a dierent mix of the various country-
specific intermediate goods. Later, when we calibrate the model, we choose the ωn,j parameters
to match data on trade exposure.
Demand for country-specific intermediate goods is isoelastic
yjn,t = Yn,tωn,j
[
Ej,t
En,t
pj,t
Pn,t
]−ψy
The implied nominal price of the final good is
Pn,t =
(
N∑
j=1
ωn,j
[
Ej,t
En,t
pj,t
]1−ψy) 11−ψy
Unlike the intermediate goods, the final good cannot be traded and must be used for ei-
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ther investment, consumption or government purchases in the period in which it is produced.
Because the final goods firms have constant returns to scale production functions and behave
competitively profits are zero in equilibrium.
3.3 The Supply of Capital and Financial Market Imperfections
The model incorporates a financial accelerator mechanism similar to Carlstrom and Fuerst (1997),
Bernanke et al. (1999) and Christiano et al. (2014). Entrepreneurs buy capital goods from house-
holds using a mix of internal and external funds (borrowing). The entrepreneurs rent out the
purchased capital to the first-stage sub-intermediate goods producers in their own country and
then sell it back to the household the following period. The interest rate that entrepreneurs face
for borrowed funds is a function of their financial leverage ratio. As a consequence, fluctuations
in net worth cause changes in the eective rate of return on capital and thus directly aect real
economic activity.18
Formally, at the end of period t, entrepreneurs purchase capital Kn,t+1 from the households
at the nominal price µn,t per unit. Entrepreneurs finance the capital purchases with their own
internal funds (net worth) and intermediated borrowing. Let end-of-period nominal net worth be
NWn,t. Then to purchase capital, the entrepreneur will have to borrowBn,t = µn,tKn,t+1−NWn,t
units of their own currency (entrepreneurs borrow money from the households in their country).
Both Bn,t and NWn,t are denominated in country n’s currency. The nominal interest rate on
business loans equals the nominal interest rate on safe bonds times an external finance premium
F (λn,t), with F (1) = 1, F ′ and F ′′ > 0. Here λn,t =
µn,tKn,t+1
NWn,t
is the leverage ratio.19 The interest
rate for securing next period capital is then (1 + in,t)F (λn,t)e
F
n,t , where Fn,t is a shock to the
interest rate spread. The function F (·) implies that entrepreneurs who are more highly levered
pay a higher interest rate.
18See Brave et al. (2012) for the same approach. Christiano et al. (2014) microfound the dependence of the interest
rate on the leverage ratio by introducing agency problems associated with financial intermediation.
19Technically we assume that for any λ < 1, F (λ) = 1 so there is no interest rate premium or discount for
an entrepreneur who chooses to have positive net saving. Since the return on capital exceeds the safe rate in
equilibrium, all entrepreneurs are net borrowers.
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At the beginning of period t+1, entrepreneurs earn a utilization-adjusted rental price of capi-
tal un,t+1Rn,t+1 and then sell the undepreciated capital back to the households at the capital price
µn,t+1. Varying the utilization of capital requires Kn,t+1a (un,t+1) units of the final good. Each
period, a fraction (1− γn) of the entrepreneurs’ net worth is transferred to the households.20
Each period, entrepreneurs choose Kn,t+1 and utilization un,t+1 to maximize expected net
worth NWn,t+1. Net worth evolves over time according to
NWn,t+1 = γn
{
Kn,t+1 [un,t+1Rn,t+1 + µn,t+1(1− δ)− Pt+1a (un,t+1)]− (1 + in,t)F (λn,t)eFn,tBn,t
}
.
We assume that the entrepreneurs can set utilization freely depending on the date t realization
of the state. The utilization choice requires the first order condition
Rn,t = Pn,ta
′ (un,t) .
We assume that the utilization cost function is a (u) = R¯
P
[exp {h (u− 1)} − 1] 1
h
, where the
curvature parameter h governs how costly it is to increase or decrease utilization from its steady
state value of u = 1 (see Christiano et al., 2005). Note that in steady state a (u) = 0.
The first order condition for the choice of Kn,t+1 requires
(1 + in,t)F (λn,t)e
Fn,t =
∑
st+1 pi(s
t+1|st) [un,t+1Rn,t+1 + µn,t+1 (1− δ)− Pt+1a (un,t+1))]
µn,t
.
As is standard in financial accelerator models, the external finance premium F (λn,t) drives a
wedge between the nominal interest rate on bonds and the expected nominal return on capital.21
Notice that if F (λn,t) = 1 then we obtain the standard eicient outcome in which the market
price of capital is the discounted stream of rental prices.
20We set γn =
β
Fn
so that net worth is constant in a stationary equilibrium.
21Our specification technically requires that the banks do not directly observe individual leverage ratios but
instead observe only country-wide leverage when they set interest rates.
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3.4 Government Policy
The model includes both fiscal and monetary policy variables. We assume that government
spending is exogenous and financed by lump sum taxes on the representative households. Gov-
ernment spending in country n is governed by a simple auto-regressive process
Gn,t = (1− ρG)Gn + ρGGn,t−1 + εGn,t.
We choose the parameter Gn to match observe ratio’s of government spending to GDP for each
country.
Monetary policy is conducted through a Taylor Rule which stipulates that in each country, a
monetary authority conducts open market operations in its own currency to target the nominal
interest rate. The Taylor Rule we use has the form
in,t = ı¯n + (1− φi) (φGDPGDPn,t + φpipin,t) + φiin,t−1 + εin,t (II.11)
For simplicity we assume that the reaction parameters φGDP , φpi and φi are common across
countries. In all of our numerical exercises, we require that φpi
1−φi > 1 for local determinacy of the
equilibrium (see e.g., Woodford and Walsh (2005)).
Countries in a currency union have a fixed nominal exchange rate for every country in the
union. Because currency is freely mobile across countries, nominal interest rates for countries in
a currency union must also be equal. As a consequence, individual nations in a currency union
cannot have independent monetary policies. Instead, we assume that monetary policy for the
countries within the union are set by a single monetary authority (the ECB in our case) that
has a Taylor Rule similar to (II.11) with the exception that it reacts to the weighted average of
innovations in GDP and inflation for the countries in the union. For our purposes, the currency
union consists only of the countries in the Eurozone and the weights are proportional to GDP
relative to the total GDP in the Eurozone.
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3.5 Aggregation and Market Clearing
For each country n, aggregate production of the tradeable intermediate goods is (up to a first-
order approximation22) given by
Qn,t = Zn,t (un,tKn,t)
α L1−αn,t .
Final goods production is given by (II.10) and, since the final good is non-tradeable, the market
clearing condition for the final good is
Yn,t = Cn,t +Xn,t +Gn,t + a (un,t)Kn,t.
The market clearing for the intermediate goods produced by country n is
Qn,t =
N∑
j=1
Nj
Nn
ynj,t.
Finally, the bond market clearing conditions require
N∑
n=1
NnSjn,t =
N∑
n=1
Nnbn(st, st+1) = 0 ∀j.
The definition of net exports. Since no final goods are traded, net exports are comprised entirely
of intermediate goods. For each country n, define nominal net exports as
NXn,t = pn,tQn,t −
n∑
j=1
Ej,t
En,t
pj,ty
j
n,t = pn,tQn,t − Pn,tYn,t
22As is well known in the sticky price literature, actual output includes losses associated with equilibrium price
dispersion. In a neighborhood of the steady state, these losses are zero to a first order approximation. Since our
solution technique is only accurate to first order, these terms drop out.
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where the second equality follows from the zero profit condition for the final goods producers.
We can use this expression to write nominal GDP as
NGDPn,t = pn,tQn,t = NXn,t + Pn,t [Cn,t +Xn,t +Gn,t]
Note, since the equilibrium price level in the steady state is P = 1, real GDP is RGDPn,t = Qn,t
(this is the real GDP calculation associated with a fixed price deflator in which the base year
prices are chosen as corresponding to the steady state).
3.6 Steady state
We express each variable’s stationary equilibrium in terms of the final good, Yn.23 We directly
calibrate a certain number of steady-state variables to their empirical counterpart. Those are the
shares of government purchases, Gn, net exports, NXn, and the relative country sizes, NnYnNmYm .
We now derive the shares of the remaining variables, Cn and Xn, and later show that these
non-targeted shares implied by our model match their empirical counterparts quite closely.
Steady-state inflation is zero, so that nominal prices are constant. We normalize the price
level Pn to 1.
We first solve for the steady-state rental price of capital. Combining the Euler equation for
capital with the Euler equation for domestic bonds gives an expression for the rental price of
capital in terms of parameters
Rn =
F (λn)
β
− (1− δ).
The rental price of capital is the marginal product of capital, reduced by the inverse of the markup
ψq−1
ψq
.
Rn =
ψq − 1
ψq
pnαZn
(
Kn
Ln
)1−α
.
23For any variable Xn,t, Xn denotes the corresponding steady-state value.
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We adjust the technology level Zn so that all intermediate goods prices, expressed in the reserve
currency, are 1 in steady state: pnEn = 1. Then, using the price index formula for the final good
gives
1 =
(
N∑
j=1
ωn,j
[
Ej
En
pj
]1−ψy) 11−ψy
.
Since the prices of all intermediate goods are pjEj = 1, one can easily verify that En = 1 solves
this equation, that means the real exchange rate is unity. It follows from the demand equation
for intermediate goods that ωn,j is country n’s import share of country j’s good, measured in
terms of the privately-produced good Yn:
ωn,j =
yjn
Yn
.
Later, we use data on imports to calibrate ωn,j . The implied net export share can be expressed
in terms of country sizes and the import preference parameters. Inserting the market clearing
condition for Qn into the definition of net exports, NXn = Qn − Yn, we have
NXn
Yn
=
(
N∑
j=1
Nj
Nn
ynj
)
− 1
=
(
N∑
j=1
NjYj
NnYn
ωj,n
)
− 1.
Starting from the definition of net exports, NXn = Qn − Yn, and inserting the marginal
product of capital equation for Qn, that is Qn =
ψq
ψq−1
Rn
α
Kn with δKn = Xn gives
ψq
ψq − 1
Rn
αδ
Xn = Yn +NXn
Xn
Yn
=
αδ
ψq
ψq−1Rn
(
1 +
NXn
Yn
)
.
Using the market clearing condition Yn = Cn + Xn + Gn gives the consumption share as a
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residual:
Cn
Yn
= 1− Xn
Yn
− Gn
Yn
.
3.7 Calibration
Preferences We set the subjective time discount factor β to imply a long run real annual in-
terest rate of four percent. We set the intertemporal elasticity of substitution σ to 0.50 and the
Frisch elasticity of labor supply η to 1. These values are comparable to findings in the microeco-
nomic literature on preference parameters (e.g. Barsky et al., 1997)).
Trade and Country Size The preference parameters ωjn are calibrated to the share of imports
yjn in the production of the final good, Yn, in the data. Standard import data cannot be used for
this purpose because it is measured in gross terms, wheras our model requires data in value added
terms. We therefore use data from the OECD dataset on trade in value added (TiVA). The dataset
is derived from input-output tables, which themselves are based on national account data. The
definition of imports and exports in TiVA correspond to those used in national account data and
therefore captures both trade in goods and services. The data series FD_VA has information on
the value added content (in US dollars) of final demand by source country for all country pairs
in our data sample. We directly use these values for yjn and the implied final demand value for
Yn to calculate ωjn. TiVA also has data for a ’rest of the world’ aggregate. We lump together that
data and data for countries that are not in our sample to construct the preference parameters
ωjRoW for the rest of the world in our sample. TiVA is available for 1995, 2000, 2005, and 2008
through 2011. We take an average of 2005 and 2010 to calibrate ωjn.
The trade elasticity ψy is set to 1.5. This is comparable to calibrations used in international
business cycle models with trade. In their original paper, Heathcote and Perri (2002) estimated
ψy = 0.90. Backus et al. (1994) set the trade elasticity to 1.5. Using firm-level data, Cravino
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(2014) and Proebsting (2015) find elasticities close to 1.5.24.
Country sizes are expressed in final demand, NnYn. We choose the relative country sizes to
match relative final demand observed in the TiVA tables, using an average of 2005 and 2010.
Technology The capital share parameter α is set to 0.38, as in Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) who
match data for 14 European countries and the US. The quarterly depreciation rate is set to 1.7% to
match the share of private investment in final demand, Xn/Yn, whose average value was 19.7%
across all countries in our sample for the years 2000 - 2010.
The form of the investment adjustment cost f (.) implies a simple relationship between in-
vestment growth and Tobin’s Q. In particular, if vn,t is the Lagrange multiplier in the capital
accumulation constraint then Tobin’s Q can be defined asQn,t = vn,t/C
− 1
σ
n,t . It is straightforward
to show that the change in investment growth over time obeys the equation
[
X˜n,t − X˜n,t−1
]
=
1
κ
Q˜n,t + β
[
X˜n,t+1 − X˜n,t
]
where X˜ denotes the percent deviation from X from its steady state value. Thus the parameter
κ is similar to a traditional inverse Q-elasticity. We adopt the value κ = 2.48 from Christiano
et al. (2005) which implies that a one percent increase in Q causes investment to increase by
roughly 0.4 percent.
For the utilization cost function a (u) = R¯
P
[exp {h (u− 1)} − 1] 1
h
, the elasticity of utilization
with respect to the real rental price of capital is governed by the parameter h = a
′′(1)
a′(1) . We follow
Del Negro et al. (2013) by seing h = 0.286. This implies that a one percent increase in the real
rental price Rn,t/Pn,t causes an increase in the capital utilization rate of 0.286 percent.
Price and Wage Rigidity We calibrate the Calvo price and wage seing hazards to roughly
match observed frequencies of price adjustment in the micro data. For price rigidity, Nakamura
and Steinsson (2008) report that prices change roughly once every 8 to 11 months; Klenow and
24The literature on international trade outside of business cycle analysis typically adopts higher elasticities. For
instance Broda et al. (2006) find a long-run trade elasticity of 6.8.
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Kryvtsov (2008) report that prices change roughly once every 4 to 7 months. Evidence on price
adjustment in Europe suggests somewhat slower adjustment. Alvarez et al. (2006) find that the
average duration of prices is 13 months (for a quarterly model this corresponds to θp = 0.77).
The evidence on wage rigidity is somewhat more sparse. Perhaps the best study is Baraieri et
al. (2014) who use a careful analysis of SIPP data to conclude that wages change on average once
every 12 months (which corresponds to θw = 0.75).25 Our baseline calibration takes θp = 0.80
and θw = 0.80. These are somewhat higher than the empirical findings for U.S. price and wage
adjustment. Our main reason for adopting this calibration is to match the data indicating slightly
more sluggish price adjustment in European countries compared to the U.S.26
Financial Market Imperfections The steady state external finance premiums, Fn(λss), are
calculated as the average spread between lending rates (to non-financial corporations) and cen-
tral bank interest rates. For every country, we calculate an average across 2000 (or earliest avail-
able) through 2010. The data source for the spread data is the ECB for euro area countries, and
the Global Financial Database and national central banks for the remaining countries. See the
appendix for more details on the data sources.
For the two remaining parameters we adopt the calibration rom Brave et al. (2012). The
elasticity of the external finance premium with respect to leverage F is 0.20 and the quarterly
persistence of the shocks to the external finance premium is set to 0.99.
Fiscal and Monetary policy We set the steady state ratio of government purchases to GDP
to match the average ratio in data provided by the OECD and Eurostat for 2000 to 2010. Our
benchmark calibration is summarized in Table II.6. The persistence of the government purchase
shock is set to 0.93 as in Del Negro et al. (2013). We choose our Taylor rule parameters to be
φpi = 1.5, φGDP = 0.5 and ρi = 0.75.
25If there are implicit wage contracts then the average frequency of wage adjustment may not be the relevant
metric to guage how rapidly wage payments respond to economic conditions. See Basu and House (2016) for a
review of the literature on wage adjustment in macroeconomic models.
26For purposes of comparison, Christiano et al. (2005) have θp = 0.6 and θw = 0.64, Del Negro et al. (2013) have
θp = 0.6 and θw = 0.64 and Brave et al. (2012) have θp = 0.97 and θw = 0.93.
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4 Model and Data Comparison
We can now simulate the calibrated model’s reaction to austerity shocks to compare the model’s
reaction to the observed paerns in the data. Our approach is to treat the austerity forecast
deviations calculated in Section 2 as structural shocks. To incorporate these shocks, we first
modify the forecast deviations to quarterly data (the data in Table II.4 was annual because we
only have quarterly data for a short time period). To construct quarterly forecasts we use fore-
casting equation (II.1) which includes a time trend, as well as lagged government spending and
contemporaneous GDP. We impose the same estimated coeicients from the annual forecasting
equation used to create Table II.4 but we adjust the parameters for quarterly frequencies (e.g.,
the time variable proceeds in quarters of a year rather than integers). The shock is then the log
dierence between actual quarterly government spending and forecast government spending.
We ignore tax shocks and shocks to the primary balance since these shocks appear to exert only
a minor influence on the system.
In addition to the austerity shocks, we also include shocks to monetary policy and shocks
to financial markets. Including other shocks is important because it is likely that some of the
observed dierences in economic performance can be traced to shocks other than austerity. We
describe these additional shocks below.
4.1 Forcing Variables
In addition to the austerity shocks, we will include shocks to monetary policy and shocks to the
financial sector. Here we briefly describe how these shocks are constructed.
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Monetary Policy Shocks To estimate monetary policy shocks we proceed as follows. We
begin by estimating a generalized Taylor rule of the form suggested by Clarida et al. (1997).27
it = ρiit−1 + (1− ρi) [pit + r + φpi (pit − pi∗) + φGDP%GDPt] + εit
where it is the nominal interest rate, r is the long-run interest rate, pit is inflation, pi∗ is the
inflation target, %GDPt are percent deviations of real GDP from its trend (i.e., the output gap),
and εit is a structural shock. Inflation is measured using the GDP deflator. The interest rate and
the inflation rate are measured in annual percent. We estimate this rule by first imposing the
original estimate of ρ = 0.79 by Clarida et al. (1997) and then estimating φpi and φGDP for the
U.S. over the period 1980.1 - 2005.4. This estimation implicitly assumes that the U.S. has been
adhering to a fairly stable monetary rule since the early 1980’s.
We then impose the estimated coeicients φpi, φGDP and the constrained coeicient ρ for
each of the countries in Europe that have an independent monetary policy. We do not estimate
separate Taylor rules for each central bank primarily because of data limitations. For the Eu-
rozone, we assume that the ECB reacts to the weighted average of inflation and output over
all countries in the Euro. With these coeicients we then estimate country-specific intercepts
(corresponding to the parameters r − pi in the Taylor rule). We can then recover the monetary
policy shocks for each country n as εˆin,t = in,t − ıˆn,t.
Financial Shocks We take our measure of financial shocks from data on spreads between
lending rates and central bank interest rates. For the U.S., data on lending rates comes from the
Federal Reserve Survey of Terms of Business Lending. For European countries, we use a dataset
provided by the ECB, which we supplement with data from national central banks and the Global
Financial Database.
27The original rule analyzed by Clarida et al. (1997) depends on expected inflation and the expected output gap
instead of contemporaneous inflation and output gap.
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Table II.7: Comparison of Model and Data: Benchmark Calibration
Data Benchmark
All Fix Float All Fix Float
GDP -1.37 -1.76 -0.92 -0.58 -0.55 -0.63
(0.48) (0.62) (0.74)
Inflation -0.14 -0.17 -0.09 0.00 -0.04 0.04
(0.10) (0.11) (0.19)
Consumption -1.48 -0.83 -2.40 0.09 0.09 0.08
(0.54) (0.55) (1.11)
Investment -3.04 -4.06 -1.97 -1.04 -1.27 -0.79
(1.36) (1.73) (2.09)
Net Exports 0.47 0.36 0.65 0.57 0.50 0.65
(0.35) (0.53) (0.30)
Exchange Rate 0.54 -0.13 1.48 -0.24 -0.03 -0.45
(0.56) (0.47) (1.30)
GDP Growth -0.26 -0.37 -0.14 -0.10 -0.14 -0.06
(0.11) (0.16) (0.10)
Notes: Table displays data and model results for the multiplier α in regression
(II.3).
4.2 Benchmark Model Performance
We can now compare the benchmark model with the earlier empirical results. The le panel
of Table II.7 shows the empirical relationship between the austerity shocks (negative shocks
to government purchases) and our five measures of economic performance. These results are
identical to the estimates in Table II.4. The right panel of Table II.7 shows the results for the
same regression (II.3) but run on the simulated data. Several points are worth emphasizing.
First, the estimated eects of the austerity shocks are substantially smaller than the estimates
from the data. Empirically, the government purchase multiplier on GDP is 1.37. In contrast, the
model estimates suggest a multiplier of only 0.63, less than half the size. Similarly, the inflation
reactions are also not of the same magnitude. A reduction in government purchases of one
percent of GDP is associated with a small reduction in inflation of roughly 0.14 percent, with a
somewhat stronger eect for fixed exchange rate countries. The model implies an even weaker
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reduction of 0.03 percent for fixed exchange rate countries, but an increase of 0.03 percent for
floating exchange rate countries.
As one would anticipate, the model with complete markets fails in generating movements
in consumption in response to government purchase shocks. If anything, the model implies
a crowding-out eect on consumption, with reductions in government purchases leading to
slightly increased consumption. Interestingly, the model predicts a negative response of invest-
ment to government purchase reductions, although, again the response is less than half as big
as the one in the data. In contrast, net exports are positively associated with reductions in gov-
ernment purchases in both the data and the model.
Figures II.4 - II.10 show comparisons of scaerplots of the actual data (le panels) and the
scaerplots of simulated data (right panels). For each panel, the log austerity shocks (i.e., forecast
errors) are on the horizontal axis. The units of both axes are log points times 100. The panels
also show the OLS regression lines for the fixed exchange rate countries (the solid dots) and the
floating exchange rate countries (the open dots).
The figures reveal several dierences between the actual data and the model. First and most
importantly the actual data has substantially more noise than the model simulations. This is
not surprising since the model includes only a limited number of shocks. Second, the inflation
data exhibits substantially more variation across countries within the Eurozone than the model
permits. In the model, even though there are sharp dierences in government spending across
countries, there is a strong tendency for countries in the currency union to have inflation rates
that are nearly the same. On the other hand, the model displays substantial swings in inflation
for countries that are not in the Eurozone while in the data, inflation does not dier radically from
that of the Eurozone. This may be due to the fact that even though these countries technically
have floating exchange rates and independent monetary policy, the monetary authorities in
these countries do not depart from the policies enacted by the ECB. Third, the exchange rate
data display only a very weak relationship to austerity shocks. In the model, exchange rates
in the Eurozone display virtually no variation across countries (recall, these are trade-weighted
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exchange rates and thus countries in the Eurozone can have changes in their exchange rate).28
To understand the mechanisms operating in the model, we examine the model’s reaction to
variation in each of the three forcing variables—austerity, monetary shocks, financial shocks—
separately. Table II.8 reports the results of such a decomposition. It displays the regression
coeicients for the seven measures of economic performance. The two le most panels report
the data and the results for the benchmark model; the three other panels report the results for
each shock separately. The explanatory variable in all regressions are the government purchase
shocks as they are observed in the data and fed into the benchmark model. The decomposition
reveals two things: First, the negative relationship between austerity and performance in the
model is only partially driven by austerity. Countries that are empirically identified as austere
were also hit by contractionary monetary policy and spread shocks. For countries with a floating
exchange rate, the negative austerity-performance relationship derives to an important extent
from austere countries implementing contractionary monetary policy.
Second, while the benchmark model produces regression coeicients that are qualitatively
consistent with those observed in the data, this is not true for the individual shocks. Both aus-
terity and monetary policy shocks are needed to generate paerns as those observed in the data.
Austerity shocks lead to declines in GDP and rising net exports as in the data, but also produce
counterfactual inflation in floating exchange rate countries and a depreciation of their exchange
rates. Monetary policy shocks help explain the paern of inflation and exchange rates in float-
ing exchange rate countries, but—not surprisingly—cannot explain the variation observed across
fixed exchange rate countries. We now explain the eects of these two shocks in the model.
A reduction in government spending leads to a fall in GDP through a reduction in employ-
ment. Firms respond to the drop in demand for their goods by reducing their demand for labor.
On the households’ side, the contraction in government spending has a positive eect on wealth,
and households respond by increasing their demand for goods and reducing their supply of la-
28Slovakia is a clear outlier in the scaer plot in Figure II.9. This is because Slovakia was actively bringing its
exchange rate into alignment with the Euro aer 2005 (when our unit root forecast starts) and before it adopted the
euro in 2009.
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bor. On net, the contraction in government expenditures results in excess supply of the home
good; the real exchange rate depreciates and net exports increase.
The eect on inflation is ambiguous. Inflation is forward looking and depends on the future
path of real marginal costs, including wages. Wages will be low if the reduction in labor demand
outweighs the fall in labor supply. This is typically the case under fairly standard parameteri-
zations of a closed economy New Keynesian model (including a closed economy version of our
model), so that reductions in government spending cause deflation. In our open economy set-
ting, however, reductions in government spending can cause inflation for countries with floating
exchange rate (see the coeicient for inflation, 0.23, in Table II.8 in the ‘Only Govt’ panel). This
is because of the exchange rate: In response to a fall in government spending, the nominal ex-
change rate depreciates (see the coeicient -0.54). This raises the price of imports and stimulates
demand for exports, which counterbalances the fall in labor demand and prevents wages from
falling (too much). Both eects cause inflation.
Although our model features only limited risk sharing, increases in consumption translate
into a depreciation of the real exchange rate in both fixed and floating exchange rate countries.
For fixed exchange rate countries, the depreciation of the real exchange rate is achieved through
deflation. For floating exchange rate countries, the depreciation of the real exchange rate comes
from a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate (despite inflation).29
As mentioned above, the implied response of inflation and exchange rate for floating ex-
change rate countries is counterfactual in the experiment with government spending shocks
only. Adding monetary policy shocks improves the model’s performance along these dimen-
sions. In particular, in our dataset empirically austere countries tend to have interest rates above
the level suggested by the Taylor rule. These high interest rates reduce consumption and output,
push down inflation and lead to an appreciation of the nominal (and real) exchange rates.
29This is at least partially caused by our choice that prices are sticky in the producer’s currency (as opposed to
the buyer’s currency).
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4.3 Variations on the Benchmark Model
The simulations displayed in Figures II.4 - II.10 and the results in Tables II.7 and II.8 all correspond
to the benchmark parameterization described in Table II.6 with government spending shocks (i.e.,
austerity shocks), monetary policy shocks and financial shocks included as forcing variables.
Here we briefly consider some variations of our preferred specification to show whether the
model results depend crucially on particular assumptions.
5 Counter-Factual Policy Simulations [to be completed]
The model with government spending shocks, monetary policy shocks and financial shocks gen-
erate cross-sectional results that are broadly consistent with the observed economic outcomes
in Europe and the United States in the 2010-14 period. We next use the model as a laboratory
for considering some counterfactual scenarios and to conduct policy experiments. The model
makes it possible to assess the costs and benefits of alternative policy options and illuminates
the channels through which national policies are transmied to other economies. Among the
policy experiments we consider include:
• Alternative fiscal policies. The model will make it possible to examine dierent policy mixes
(i.e. varying composition of expenditures and taxes) as well as changes in the timing of fiscal
policy.
• Alternative specifications of the Taylor rule, allowing for more aggressive responses to out-
put and unemployment in dierent countries. Among the questions the framework will allow
us to address is whether a more aggressive monetary policy response immediately following the
global financial crisis would have lessened the depth of the recession in Europe. Another po-
tential experiment is the impact of a monetary policy response that places a greater weight on
periphery countries than that implied by their relative size.
• Outcomes under floating exchange rates with independent monetary policies. The model
will make it possible to assess in quantitative terms the costs and benefits of the constraint
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imposed by the common currency and a shared monetary policy.
• The model captures the importance of trade and financial markets. By varying the degree
of openness it will be possible to explore the importance of such linkages for the transmission of
shocks across national boundaries.
• The relative importance of monetary vs. fiscal policy as a mechanism for responding to
external shocks. The model will make it possible to quantify the impact of alternative policy
instruments.
• Coordinated fiscal policy. The quantitative model will make it possible to assess the trade-
os of unilateral versus coordinated policy responses.
• The cost of debt overhang. The model will make it possible to examine the constraint
imposed by government debt operating through alternative specifications of fiscal rules.
The negative macroeconomic repercussions of the recent financial crisis were felt in both
the United States and Europe. Many economists have argued that the slow pace of recovery in
many European countries is a direct consequence of the macroeconomic austerity policies pur-
sued by dierent governments. By undertaking a retrospective analysis of the policy responses
to the financial crises, this research will make it possible to evaluate the role that austerity played
in limiting the pace of the economic recovery. The theoretical model will enable researchers to
evaluate the impact of alternative policies under dierent conditions. The research will there-
fore provide both theoretical and empirical guidance for government policies designed to aect
overall economic performance.
6 Conclusion
Since the end of the Great Recession in 2009, European countries have experienced radically
dierent recoveries. Some enjoyed a return to normal economic growth shortly following the
financial crisis while others have suered through prolonged periods of low employment and
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low growth. We have aempted to make sense of this diversity of experiences by examining
empirical comovements for various measures of economic activity for the nations of Europe.
Despite substantial noise in the data, there are clear paerns that suggest that a surprising
amount of the dierences in economic performance are due to austerity policies. In particular,
the evidence suggests that contractions in government spending have played a surprisingly large
role in reducing output for some countries. Evidence for tax policies and the primary balance is
more mixed. Countries that increase taxes fare worse than otherwise but the eects of raising
taxes are modest and not strongly statistically significant. In contrast, countries that reduce
government spending experience sharp reductions in output and inflation.
We use a multi-country DSGE model to see whether standard macroeconomic theory can
make sense of the observed changes in economic activity. The model features government spend-
ing shocks, monetary policy shocks, and shocks to financial markets and allows us to make direct
comparisons between the observed empirical relationships in the data and the model’s predic-
tions. The model is calibrated to match the main features of the European countries in our
dataset including country size, observed trade flows and exchange rate regimes. The model out-
put broadly matches the empirical paerns observed in the data. While our preliminary findings
suggest that standard Keynesian mechanisms are playing a strong role in shaping the behavior
of countries across Europe, the quantitative predictions of the model for GDP are too small to
fully match the empirical findings. This likely means that the magnitude of the demand multi-
pliers in the model are simply too weak to match the data. Future work is needed to refine the
model’s performance along this dimension.
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Chapter III
Survival of the Fiest: Corporate Control
and the Cleansing Eect of Financial
Crises1
1 Introduction
Since Joseph Schumpeter’s classic work on competition, innovation and growth in modern economies
(Schumpeter, 1942), a large literature has investigated the so-called cleansing eect of recessions.
Described simply, the cleansing eect works by forcing the exit of the least productive firms and
reallocating resources to the most productive firms following adverse aggregate shocks, thereby
raising the average productivity of the aggregate economy. What is oen overlooked in this lit-
erature is that distressed firms need not exit, but may be acquired by other domestic or foreign
firms through the process of mergers and acquisitions (M&As).2
In this paper we analyze the eects of an aggregate negative financial shock on the market for
1This chapter is collaborative work with Rahul Mukherjee.
2The global M&A market has grown tremendously in the last three decades, and stood at roughly 3.7 trillion
USD in 2007. Cross-border M&As have also kept pace, peaking in 2007 at 1.032 trillion USD starting from 0.098
trillion USD in 1990. For the last year for which data is available (2014), they stood at 0.398 trillion USD. These
numbers are from the latest edition of the World Investment Report (UNCTAD, 2015).
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corporate control, and through it, the aggregate economy. In a nutshell, our main finding is that
major financial shocks, like systemic banking crises, have profound eects in and through the
market for corporate control. By “in”, we mean the changes that occur in the characteristics of
the acquisitions that are completed during financial crises; while “through” refers to the eects
that M&As have on the productivity of the aggregate pool of firms following a financial crisis. In
particular, we show that domestic and foreign acquisitions in countries hit by financial shocks
dier markedly along these two aspects.
Our focus on financial shocks is motivated by recent work that demonstrates the importance
of financial factors as drivers of M&As (Almeida et al., 2011; Erel et al., 2015), as well as the liter-
ature that focusses on financial crises as drivers of domestic and cross-border M&As, especially
in emerging markets (Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Acharya et al., 2011; Alquist et al., 2016). This
literature has noted that financial crises in emerging market economies are accompanied by a
sharp rise in foreign M&A activity, and a concurrent decline in domestic acquisitions. Figure III.1
shows this phenomenon succinctly by ploing the number of foreign and domestic acquisitions
(standardized and detrended as explained below) in a sample of emerging market economies
within a four-year event window of systemic banking crises in these countries.3 While the role
of financial liquidity in driving the stylized fact portrayed in Figure III.1 is generally acknowl-
edged, lile is known besides on the dierences between foreign and domestic M&A activity,
as well as the dierential eects of foreign and domestic M&As on the aggregate allocation of
resources, in the face of aggregate financial shocks.4 Our paper sheds light on these issues, and
as such, has three main contributions, two theoretical and one empirical.
3To construct this graph, we first count the number of domestic / foreign acquisitions per target country and
year. We then standardize this number by its country-specific time-series average. We detrend the standardized
numbers by regressing them, for each target country separately, on an intercept plus a linear time trend (adding a
log time trend leaves our results basically unchanged). We then calculate the country-specific mean of the detrended
numbers of acquisitions for three time periods: (i) four non-crisis years before a crisis, (ii) all crisis years, and (iii)
four non-crisis years aer a crisis. The figure displays, for each time period, the average across countries weighted
by the average number of acquisitions per country. Includes only those countries that had at least one domestic
and one foreign acquisition event during a systemic banking over the period 1990-2007. The full sample of countries
is described later.
4One notable exception is the paper by Aguiar and Gopinath (2005), which notes that firm level liquidity was
a beer predictor of the probability of a foreign acquisition than the probability of a domestic acquisition in the
tradable good sector during the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997-98.
117
Figure III.1: Number of Acquisitions
Note: Figure displays the percentage point deviations from trend for the number of foreign and domestic acquisi-
tions. The time periods correspond to pre-crisis years (t−1), crisis years (t) and post-crisis years (t+1). The number
of acquisitions are standardized and detrended for each country separately and then averaged across target coun-
tries, weighted by the average of number of acquisitions per country. See text for details.
Our first contribution is to develop a simple analytical framework that allows both financially
constrained and financially unconstrained acquirers to engage in M&As. In our model, firms
face borrowing constraints, which make it harder for some firms to pay upfront fixed costs of
operating, and make them more likely to exit. Other firms with more financial resources can
step in and buy them and thus prevent ineicient liquidation. However these acquiring firms
may themselves have to raise funds to finance their acquisition if their internal resources are not
suicient for the purpose.
Target firms that would not be viable by themselves are acquired if they are suiciently pro-
ductive (it is not worthwhile to acquire firms below a certain productivity since acquirers are
unable to recoup acquisition costs), and exit otherwise. We label these acquisitions as “fire-sale”
acquisitions since these are distressed assets whose value to a new owner capable of paying the
fixed cost exceeds their valuation in the eyes of the current owners. “Technology-driven” acqui-
sitions, on the other hand, involve those high-productivity target firms that are worth acquiring
no maer what their financial situation, and as such, may include target firms that are finan-
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cially distressed due to temporary liquidity shortages. Our model has two additional features.
First, fire-sale acquisitions are on average less productive than technology-driven ones because
part of the surplus in these acquisitions is driven by the relaxing of borrowing constraints. Sec-
ond, the higher the productivity of an acquirer-target match, the larger is the stake acquired in
target firms because of variable acquisition costs. In this setup, we analyze the consequences of
a negative aggregate financial shock that tightens the borrowing constraints of all firms in the
economy, including potential acquirers.
To build intuition, first consider the case of those acquiring firms that are unconstrained
under all circumstances. We can think of these as foreign firms involved in cross-border acquisi-
tions that are based in markets that have not faced the financial shock (e.g., the inflow of foreign
capital shown in Figure III.1). These could also be very large domestic firms that have enough in-
ternal funds of their own. The shock raises the share of fire-sale acquisitions in the total number
of acquisitions they undertake, as a larger proportion of potential target firms find themselves
unable to raise enough external debt financing to cover fixed expenses. Since fire-sale acquisi-
tions correspond to lower values of productivity than technology-driven acquisitions, this lowers
the average long-term productivity of the acquisitions made by unconstrained acquirers. We de-
rive analytical results about this extensive margin, which refers to the change in the composition
of acquisitions between fire-sale and technology-driven, and show that it unambiguously low-
ers the average productivity of the acquisitions completed by unconstrained acquirers during
financial crisis episodes.
Things are less straightforward when acquiring firms themselves are financially constrained.
While a negative financial shock can increase the mass of fire-sale acquisitions performed by con-
strained acquirers as well, thereby lowering the average productivity of their acquisitions, there
is an additional force in their case that tends to work in the opposite direction. This force is the
result of the combination of a fixed cost of acquisition and the presence of financial frictions. The
presence of a fixed cost of acquisition means that acquisitions among more productive acquirer-
target entities are more profitable than acquisitions among low productive ones. Credit market
119
frictions reinforce this disadvantage of acquisitions between low-productivity firms. This makes
acquisitions among low-productivity firms even less profitable because the fixed cost weighs
relatively more on their borrowing constraint. This disadvantage for low-productivity firms is
small during normal times when borrowing constraints are loose, but becomes stronger when
borrowing constraints tighten during a negative financial shock. As a result, financial crises do
not only increase the pool of distressed target firms, but they also make acquisitions less likely
because acquiring firms face tighter borrowing constraints, and this is particularly true for low-
productivity acquirers.
This has two consequences for the change in the average productivity of acquisitions under-
taken by constrained firms: First, the share of fire-sale acquisitions might not go up because the
firms acquiring those distressed targets have a low productivity themselves and face particularly
tight borrowing constraints themselves. Thus the overall extensive margin in the case of con-
strained acquirers may move either way. Second, within each group of fire-sale and technology-
driven acquisitions, it is the least productive acquisitions that become particularly less feasible.
This is an intensive margin that raises the average productivity of the acquisitions that are ac-
tually completed.
In order to quantitatively evaluate the net eect of these two margins, we calibrate the model
to match three key first moments of a data set on emerging market M&As – the average share
of a firm acquired, the proportion of acquisitions in which the entire target is acquired, and the
average size dierence between domestic acquirers and their targets – and then simulate a tight-
ening of the borrowing constraint for all firms in the economy. We find that the intensive margin
dominates in the case of constrained acquirers, so that the average productivity of acquisitions
rises in the aermath of an adverse aggregate financial shock. This is a central insight of our
analysis: The average productivity of acquisitions completed by constrained acquirers improves
during financial crises. If the financially constrained firms be interpreted as domestic firms in
crisis-hit economies, then our analysis suggests that acquisitions completed by domestic firms
during financial crises are more productive on average, in contrast to unconstrained acquirers
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(foreign firms). This is, there is a “cleansing eect” in the market for corporate control, whereby
aggregate financial shocks lead to an increase in the average productivity within the group of
firms that become targets of domestic acquirers.
There are two sets of observable implications, diering across unconstrained (foreign) and
constrained (domestic) acquirers, of the mechanisms outlined above. The first is that the av-
erage share of equity acquired by domestic acquirers should rise during financial crises, while
the opposite should be true for foreign acquirers. Second, the model predicts that the divesti-
ture rates for domestic acquisitions should be lower for the crisis cohort of domestic acquisitions,
while the opposite should be true for foreign acquisitions. To the extent that the divestiture rates
of foreign acquisitions is lower than for domestic acquisitions during normal times (which, as
we show later is a feature of the data), the above two predictions jointly imply a convergence in
divestiture rates between foreign and domestic acquisitions for the crisis cohort. It is worth em-
phasizing here that all our contrasting theoretical results for foreign and domestic acquisitions
originate in the assumed dierences in firm level borrowing constraints between them. This one
dimensional dierence between firms is a deliberate modelling choice meant to highlight the
role of liquidity constraints in the M&A process.
Our second contribution is empirical. We test the predictions of the model using data for
about 30,000 foreign and domestic M&As for sixteen of the largest markets for corporate control
in emerging economies between 1990 and 2007 from the Thompson-Reuters SDC database. We
focus on emerging markets because we expect domestic firms there to conform more closely to
the constrained firms of the model. Due to the structure of our hypotheses, which involve com-
parisons of two kinds of acquisitions (relatively financially constrained and unconstrained acqui-
sitions, proxied by those made by domestic and foreign acquiring firms, respectively), across two
macroeconomic regimes (normal times and adverse financial shocks, the laer proxied by the
occurrence of country-specific banking crises), we employ a dierence-in-dierence approach.
Using linear regressions and survival analysis techniques, we find evidence in favor of the main
predictions of the model. In particular, we find that domestic acquisitions during crises involve
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significantly higher stakes, in contrast to foreign acquisitions. The survival rates of foreign acqui-
sitions completed during normal times are found to be higher than domestic ones. However, the
survival rates of domestic acquisitions are significantly higher for the cohort of crisis-time acqui-
sitions – a consequence of the cleansing eect – which implies a convergence in the divestiture
rates of foreign and domestic acquisitions.5
Our third contribution is purely theoretical. While the above results pertain to the group of
firms that are actually acquired, our model also has predictions on the average productivity of
all firms that survive an adverse financial shock, and hence, on the aggregate cleansing eect
of financial crises. First, it is important to note that our model lacks a cleansing eect of ad-
verse financial shocks when we do not allow distressed firms to be acquired. This is due to our
assumption that financial constraints do not depend on firm size, and long-term productivity
and temporary liquidity are uncorrelated: all firms in our model, whether they are productive
or unproductive, are equally likely to exit in a financial crisis, leaving aggregate productivity
unchanged. While this might be unrealistic, these two modeling assumption are deliberate and
meant to isolate the pure eect of the introduction of a market for corporate control. We show
that the presence of unconstrained (foreign) acquirers leads to a positive cleansing eect of a
financial shock due to “cream skimming”: Fixed costs of acquisitions imply that foreign firms
acquire (and save from exit) only firms that are above a certain level of productivity.6 In contrast,
we show that acquisitions by firms that are themselves financially constrained lead to a posi-
tive but small aggregate cleansing eect: These firms, being themselves constrained, are unable
to save high-productivity firms that are illiquid.7 These results also shed light on the extent to
5These empirical results are robust to alternative samples and definitions of aggregate financial shocks, the
inclusion of macroeconomic variables that control for normal business cycle variation in acquisition activity,
country×industry fixed eects that control for time-invariant international dierences across broad groups of in-
dustries, and non-linear estimation procedures.
6Note here that while the average productivity of firms acquired by unconstrained acquirers during financial
crises is lower because more low-productivity firms get acquired (our first set of results), the average productivity
of the overall population of surviving firms goes up because acquired firms are, on average, more productive than
the population of producing firms.
7Once again, note that this result pertains to the aggregate eects of a financial shock in the presence of con-
strained (domestic) acquirers, and is thus perfectly consistent with our earlier set of results that showed that the
firms acquired by domestic acquirers during financial crises would have higher productivity on average.
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which a flourishing market for M&As can, through reallocation of liquidity between firms, sub-
stitute for local credit markets: Under our baseline calibration, an economy without any credit
markets sees its productivity increase by 1.8 percent if domestic acquisitions are possible, but by
more than 35 percent if it opens up to foreign acquisitions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The following section briefly reviews the litera-
ture and outlines our contributions. Section 2 lays out a theoretical model of M&As, and derives
some testable hypotheses that we take to the data in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
1.1 Related Literature
Our paper contributes to two broad strands of literature in macroeconomics and finance. The
first concerns the cleansing eect of recessions and capital reallocation over the business cycle.
This literature has explored several mechanisms in connection with the cleansing eect, related
to labor markets (Caballero and Hammour, 1996), entrepreneurial credit constraints (Holtz-Eakin
et al., 1994), and the contribution of new producers’ productivity advantages and entry (Foster et
al., 2008). Here, the closest paper to ours is Osotimehin and Pappadà (forthcoming), who look at
how credit constraints influence the cleansing eect of recessions in a theoretical model of firm
dynamics. They find that the intensity of the cleansing eect is lower in the presence of credit
frictions, especially when the recession is driven by a financial shock. The exit decision of firms
in their model depends not only on their productivity but also their net worth, and hence some
firms that are productive yet financially distressed exit the market while some low productivity
firms do not. Eisfeldt and Rampini (2006) explore the procyclicality of capital reallocation among
firms, and the apparent countercyclicality of the benefits from reallocation. Their analysis sug-
gests that the cost of capital reallocation needs to be strongly countercyclical to rationalize the
observed joint cyclical properties of reallocation and productivity dispersion. In a similar vein,
Cui (2014) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model where partial capital irreversibility
generates delays in capital reallocation during periods when credit conditions are tighter and
lowers aggregate productivity. Thus there is a large literature that puts forward various chan-
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nels that either strengthen or weaken the basic mechanism of the aggregate cleansing eect.
Our contribution to this literature is theoretical. As outlined earlier, we show that the presence
of a market for corporate control has important consequences for the aggregate cleansing ef-
fects of financial crises. In particular our results suggest that the market for corporate control
is a substitute for credit markets, so that when frictions in the credit market go up – leading
to misallocation and firm exit based on liquidity rather than productivity – the presence of a
corporate control market can aenuate these eects and improve resource allocation.8
Our paper is also related to a more recent literature on the financial determinants of M&As.
Almeida et al. (2011) present a model in which financially distressed firms merge with more liquid
firms in their own industry. Their paper studies the optimal financial policies of firms when the
primary motivation of mergers is to reallocate financial resources to firms that may otherwise
be ineiciently terminated. In related work, Erel et al. (2015) provide evidence that both foreign
and domestic acquisitions ease financial frictions in target firms in a large sample of European
acquisitions. They find that the investment levels of the target firms increase significantly fol-
lowing an acquisition. These findings are consistent with our assumption that part of the gains
from acquisitions arise out of acquirers relaxing the borrowing constraints of the targets. Other
recent papers such as Chari et al. (2010) and Wang and Wang (2015) also document similar fi-
nancial gains from acquisitions. The paper most similar to ours in this literature is Alquist et al.
(2016), who look at fire-sale foreign direct investment in a model where all target firms are credit
constrained and all acquiring firms are unconstrained. In contrast to that paper, we develop here
a more general yet tractable framework where constrained (domestic) and unconstrained (for-
eign) acquisitions can be analyzed simultaneously. We also distinguish between the long-term
productivity of firms, and temporary shocks to their productivity or liquidity, and analyze the in-
terplay of these two factors.9 In addition, our empirical analysis focuses on comparisons between
8Our results also speak to a recent empirical literature on this topic that uses disaggregate data to quantify
resource misallocation during crises. Oberfield (2013) and Sandleris and Wright (2014) provide evidence from the
1982 Chilean economic crisis and the 2001 Argentine crisis, respectively, of a decline in the eiciency of resource
allocation within and across sectors during these crises. These papers do not address resource reallocation through
the M&A market.
9Alquist et al. (2016) emphasize the industry composition of acquisitions. In their model matches between firms
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domestic and foreign acquisitions across crisis and normal times. Our main results, an increase
in the degree of control acquired by domestic firms and a convergence of survival rates between
domestic and foreign acquisitions, are also novel. More broadly, our paper contributes to the
literature on M&As that seeks to explain specific characteristics of acquirer-target matches, for
example, Rhodes-Kropf and Robinson (2008), who build and test a model of assortative matching
in M&As based on firm valuations.
2 Model
This section presents a simple model of the M&A process where both liquid and illiquid firms
can become targets of acquisitions. They can also acquire other firms themselves if they have
enough resources. We start in Section 2.1 by describing the set of firms acquired by uncon-
strained (foreign) firms and contrast it with the set of firms acquired by potentially constrained
(domestic) firms. The main comparative static we consider next is an aggregate financial shock
to the economy that makes it harder for all domestic firms to borrow, for example, a systemic
banking crisis. We show in Section 2.2 that such crises change the composition of acquired firms
in terms of their average productivity, and this change works in opposite directions for foreign
and domestic acquirers. A corollary of this finding that we later test is that the average acquired
share for foreign and domestic acquisitions should also move in opposite directions during fi-
nancial crises. Section 2.3 then shows that financial crises lead to an aggregate cleansing eect
for the domestic economy through the market for corporate control because M&As improve the
allocation of resources towards more productive firms. Finally, we extend our model in Section
2.4 to derive an additional hypothesis that financial crises lead to higher subsequent flipping
rates for foreign acquirers, but lower flipping rates for domestic acquirers, which we also test
in the same industry are more productive and financial crises lead to more inter-industry acquisitions. Our approach
in this paper is more general in that we do not assume any particular industry paerns in the gains from acquisitions.
In addition, Alquist et al. (2016) only model the decision of an unconstrained foreign acquiring firm since their focus
is on foreign direct investment. Earlier research (see Aguiar and Gopinath, 2005; Acharya et al., 2011) has focussed on
the surge of foreign acquisitions and a concurrent decline in domestic acquisitions and portfolio investment during
crisis episodes in emerging economies, as well as the relationship between acquisition prices and firm liquidity.
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empirically.
2.1 Model Setup
Potential Target Firms
The benchmark model has two periods and a continuum of firms. A firm has A in profits at the
end of the first period. The profit margin  is a random variable with an expected value of 1, and is
i.i.d. across firms and time.10 We assume that  is independent of A and constitutes a temporary
shock, whereas A can be thought of as baseline (long-term) productivity or firm size.11 Since a
low (high) realization of  means that the firm has fewer (more) internal resources in the first
period, we also refer to it as “liquidity”. To produce in period two, the firm has to pay an upfront
cost proportional to its size, bA, with b < 1. Expected output next period is E(′)A = A and
expected profits net of costs are A(1− b) so that the firm prefers production to non-production.
To pay for the upfront cost bA, the firm is limited by a collateral constraint
bA ≤ τA, (III.1)
where τ measures the degree of credit frictions that is the same across all firms in the economy.12
In an economy without credit frictions, τ = +∞, whereas τ = 1 implies financial autarky and
firms cannot borrow to pay for the upfront costs. The form of the collateral constraint captures a
common prediction from models of limited contract enforcement: The amount of credit is limited
by the borrower’s wealth (see Bernanke and Gertler, 1989; Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Buera et
al., 2011, for example). If a firm lacks the liquidity to pay for the upfront cost—that is if  < b
τ
—it
10Later on when discussing flipping of acquisitions in a three-period model, we relax the assumption that  is
i.i.d. over time, but allow for persistence in form of an AR(1) process.
11Following an established literature on heterogeneous firms in international trade that demonstrates the cor-
relation between productivity and firm size, we use the terms “size” and “productivity” interchangeably in what
follows.
12In an earlier version of this paper, we considered the case where τ ′(A) > 0, i.e., smaller firms face tighter credit
constraints. Such an assumption would reinforce the mechanism described in this paper, but it is not necessary and
we therefore consider the more “conservative” case of τ ′(A) = 0.
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cannot produce in the second period and the value of the firm is its current profits, A. These
firms either exit the market aer the first period or become targets of acquisitions. Market
exit of this kind can be interpreted as ineicient liquidation of the firm since the firm would
always prefer production to non-production in the second period. If a firm is liquid enough, it
can produce in the second period, which raises its value by the expected net profit A(1 − b).13
These firms can stay in the market as stand-alone entities, can be targets of acquisitions or can
be acquirers themselves. The total value of a potential target firm can then be summarized as
Vtar =

V constar = A if  <
b
τ
V unconstar = A+ A(1− b) = (− b+ 1)A if  ≥ bτ .
We now discuss the acquisition problem of potential acquirers, starting with financially uncon-
strained firms.
Financially Unconstrained Acquirers
An unconstrained acquirer is not subject to the borrowing constraint (III.1).14 It follows that
we do not need to keep track of an acquirer’s productivity Aacq or liquidity acq. When a firm
acquires a target, the target firm produces next period and its productivity increases by a factor
φ while the acquirer incurs a cost c. The precise form of φ and c, which depend on the degree
of ownership acquired, are specified and discussed later. For now, we just assume that c has a
fixed cost component. The value of an acquired target firm to an unconstrained acquirer is then
Vacq = (− b+ φ)A− c.
13So there is a discrete jump in the firm’s value at  = bτ , which is due to the presence of fixed cost. In a model
with capital where period two investment costs are determined by productivity, V d would be a continuous function
of . We abstract from capital as an input for simplicity.
14In our model, we think of an unconstrained firm as being from a market that is much more financially developed
or that hasn’t faced the same financial shock. More generally, our model can also be applied to large domestic firms
that face only very loose financing constraints.
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An acquisition takes place if the surplus generated by such a match is positive. The surplus is the
dierence between the value of the acquired firm aer and before the acquisition, i.e. Vacq−Vtar,
and diers across constrained and unconstrained targets:
S =

Scons = (−b+ φ)A− c if  < b
τ
Suncons = (φ− 1)A− c if  ≥ b
τ
.
Figure III.2: Acquisitions with Unconstrained Acquirers
Note: Combinations of target’s size A and liquidity  for which Stech = 0 and Sfire = 0, with A on vertical axis
and  on horizonal axis. Areas above the S = 0 lines show regions where each type of acquisition generates surplus.
Also shows the maximum value for the target’s liquidity,  = bτ , that makes fire-sale acquisitions profitable during
normal and crisis periods. The subscript on the τ indicates (n)ormal or (c)risis periods. See text for more details.
Figure III.2 shows the zero-surplus line S = 0 as a function of the target’s permanent pro-
ductivity A and the target firm’s liquidity . We denote the permanent productivity levels that
solve Scons = 0 and Suncons = 0 by Afire and Atech:
Afire =
c
φ− b, A
tech =
c
φ− 1 , (III.2)
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with Atech > Afire because b < 1.15 If a target firm of size A ≥ Atech is matched with a
potential acquirer, an acquisition always takes place because the benefits from the resulting
technological synergies always exceed the acquisition costs. This is true irrespective of the target
firm’s liquidity  and the tightness of the collateral constraint. If a target firm of sizeAfire ≤ A <
Atech is matched, technological synergies are not suicient to make an acquisition profitable.
However, if the target firm is constrained (i.e.  < b
τ
), an acquisition generates benefits from both
technological synergies and from relaxing the collateral constraint and is therefore profitable.
Target firms of size A < Afire never get acquired because the fixed acquisition costs make them
unprofitable. We refer to acquisitions of firms with productivity A ≥ Atech as “technology-
driven” acquisitions and acquisitions of firms with productivity Afire ≤ A < Atech as “fire-sale”
acquisitions because the laer only take place if the target firm is borrowing constrained.16 The
mass of these fire-sale and technology-driven acquisitions are
nfire
∗ ≡
∫ Atech
Afire
∫ b
τ
dGdF
ntech
∗ ≡
∫
Atech
dF.
Figure III.2 also shows the line describing the constraint, b
τ
. Firms with A,  combinations to the
le of the constraint line cannot pay for the upfront cost and either have to exit the market or
become targets of an acquisition. Since τ is independent of A, the constraint line is vertical.
Financially Constrained Acquirers
We now analyze the case of acquirers that are similar to target firms in that they face borrowing
constraints, which reduces their ability to perform acquisitions.17 This means that we need to
keep track of the acquirer’s size Aacq and liquidity acq. To keep the model tractable and capture
15As will be apparent later, these definitions of Afire and Atech are implicit definitions because φ and c are
functions of the acquired share, which, in turn, is a function of A. See equation (III.6).
16The set of technology-driven acquisitions contains target firms that are constrained and would exit the market
if they were not acquired. An alternative definition could assign those firms to the set of fire-sale acquisitions.
17We call acquirers that are subject to the borrowing constraint (III.1), and thus can potentially hit the constraint
if they receive a bad liquidity shock, as “constrained” acquirers even if they are not actually constrained.
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the empirical feature that acquirers are invariably much larger than their targets, we impose that
Aacq = kA, with k ≥ 1. We later calibrate k to the actually observed size dierence between
domestic acquirers and targets.
In contrast to this proportional-size assumption, we allow acquirers and targets to freely
dier in their liquidity. Since the acquirer as well as the target are now financially constrained,
we need to consider both of their collateral constraints. The post-acquisition entity’s (i.e., the two
firms’ combined) collateral constraint states that total upfront costs for the target and acquiring
firm, including acquisition costs c, bA + bAacq + c = b(1 + k)A + c, cannot exceed a fraction τ
of the total current assets of the two firms: A+ acqAacq = (+ acqk)A. This condition can be
solved for the target firm’s liquidity:
 ≥ b(1 + k)
τ
+
c
τA
− acqk ≡ l(A, acq, τ) (III.3)
The impact of this joint borrowing constraint on acquisitions is illustrated in Figure III.3.
In addition to Figure III.2 for unconstrained acquirers, there is a new downward sloping line,
 = l(A, acq, τ), describing the joint borrowing constraint of the target firm and the acquirer.
For a given acquirer’s liquidity, acq, only acquisitions to the right of that line can potentially
take place. For more liquid acquirers, the line is shied to the le and lowers the cut-o value
of the target firm’s liquidity . Importantly, the joint borrowing constraint is tighter for smaller
firms (illustrated by the finite negative slope) because upfront costs increase less than one-to-
one with firm size due to the presence of fixed acquisition costs. Smaller firms therefore need
more liquidity to finance an acquisition.
Figure III.3 illustrates that the joint borrowing constraint restrict the mass of both fire-sale
and technology-driven acquisitions. More formally, for an acquisition by a constrained firm to
take place, the following three conditions have to be met: i) as for unconstrained acquirers, it
generates positive surplus, i.e., A ≥ Atech for liquid targets,  ≥ τ
b
, and Afire ≤ A < Atech for
illiquid targets,  < τ
b
; ii) the acquiring firm has suicient collateral so as not to be constrained18,
18We assume that the acquirer has to continue operating its own firm if he wants to acquire another firm.
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Figure III.3: Acquisitions with Financially Constrained Acquirers
Note: Shows the range of values for the target’s current productivity, , that define fire-sale and technology-driven
acquisitions for acquisitions by financially constrained firms during normal and crisis periods. These ranges are
l ≤  ≤ bτ for fire-sale and  ≥ l for technology-driven acquisitions, with the subscript on the τ indicating
(n)ormal or (c)risis periods. See text and notes for Figure III.2 for more details.
i.e., acq ≥ bτ ; and iii) both firms together have enough current resources to pay for their upfront
costs. Based on these conditions, the mass of fire-sale and technology-driven acquisitions are19
nfire ≡
∫ Atech
Afire
f(kA)
f(A)
∫
b
τ
∫ b
τ
min( bτ ,l)
dGdGdF
ntech ≡
∫ A¯
k
Atech
f(kA)
f(A)
∫
b
τ
∫
l
dGdGdF.
Starting from the innermost integral and moving outward, the limits of integration refer to the
relevant ranges of the liquidity of the target firm, the liquidity of the acquiring firm, and the size
of the target firm, respectively. The fraction f(kA)
f(A)
, which is less or equal to one for k ≥ 1 and
reasonable size distributions (e.g. the Pareto distribution), is the probability that a target firm
19Note that the joint borrowing constraint can potentially lie to the right of the individual borrowing constraint.
To ensure that the lower limit of the inner-most integral (over the target firm’s ) is always smaller or equal to the
upper limit, we set it equal to min
(
l, bτ
)
for fire-sale acquisitions.
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actually finds a potential acquirer and is proportional to their relative masses.
2.2 Cleansing Eect of Financial Crises in the Market For Corporate
Control
In this section, we ask whether financial crises aect the composition, and hence, the average
productivity, of acquired firms. In other words, do financial crises lead to a cleansing eect in
the market for corporate control? We model an aggregate financial shock to the economy as a
decrease in τ from τn to τc, so that a higher level of  is needed to be able to pay the upfront cost
from b
τn
to b
τc
. Then, we define the cleansing eect in the market for corporate control as follows:
Definition 2. Cleansing eect in the market for corporate control
A financial crisis leads to a cleansing eect in the market for corporate control if the average long-
term productivity Aˆin of acquisitions increases, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆin,c > Aˆin,n, and to a sullying
eect if the average long-term productivity decreases, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆin,c < Aˆin,n.
This definition only focuses on firms’ long-term productivity A, but ignores temporary liquidity
shocks  or technological synergies that result from acquisitions. We abstract from short-run pro-
ductivity fluctuations, but rather ask whether financial crises aect the composition of acquired
firms in terms of their fundamental productivity of acquired firms.
Cleansing Eect for Acquisitions by Unconstrained Firms
We start by defining the average long-term productivity Aˆ∗in for unconstrained acquirers (the
superscript ∗ indicates unconstrained acquirers). Let F andG denote the distributions associated
with the target firm’s long-term productivity A and liquidity . Then, using Bayes’ formula, we
can write the average productivity as the expected productivity conditional on an acquisition
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taking place:20
Aˆ∗in =
∫ Atech
Afire
∫ b
τ AdGdF +
∫
Atech
AdF∫ Atech
Afire
∫ b
τ dGdF +
∫
Atech
dF
.
We define Afire
∗ ≡ ∫ Atech
Afire
∫ b
τ AdGdF and Atech
∗ ≡ ∫
Atech
AdF as the sum of productivities in
fire-sale and technology-driven acquisitions. Then, the average productivity of acquired firms in
each type of acquisitions, Aˆfire
∗
and Aˆtech
∗
, can be wrien as:
Aˆfire
∗
=
Afire
∗
nfire∗
Aˆtech
∗
=
Atech
∗
ntech∗
.
As discussed, technology-driven acquisitions target more productive firms than fire-sale acqui-
sitions, so that Aˆtech
∗
> Aˆfire
∗
.
The average productivity of unconstrained acquisitions overall, Aˆ∗in, can be conveniently ex-
pressed as the weighted sum of these average productivites, with the weights being the share of
these two types of acquisitions in total unconstrained acquisitions:
Aˆ∗in = ω
∗
inAˆ
fire∗ + (1− ω∗in)Aˆtech
∗
, (III.4)
where ω∗in =
nfire
∗
nfire∗+ntech∗ . Taking the derivative with respect to the borrowing constraint param-
eter then leads to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. Sullying eect of crises on acquisitions by unconstrained firms
Financial crises have a sullying eect on acquisitions by unconstrained firms in the sense that they
lead to a lower average productivity of acquired firms, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆ∗in,c < Aˆ
∗
in,n.
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
The decrease in the average productivity purely comes from a change in the composition
20We omit the bounds on the random variables A and  to avoid cluering integrals and diagrams.
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of acquisitions (extensive margin) rather than any changes in the average productivities of fire-
sale acquisitions and technology-driven acquisitions (intensive margin).21 The shock increases
the share ω∗in of fire-sale acquisitions (region BCDE in Figure III.2) as a larger proportion of
potential target firms find themselves unable to raise enough external debt financing to cover
the upfront cost of operating in the second period, and thus face liquidation.
Cleansing Eect for Acquisitions by Constrained Firms
We write the average productivity of constrained acquisitions as the weighted sum of the average
productivities of fire-sale acquisitions and technology-driven acquisitions, similar to equation
(Appendix J):
Aˆin = ωinAˆ
fire + (1− ωin)Aˆtech
where Aˆfire and Aˆtech denote the average productivities for fire-sale and technology-driven ac-
quisitions by constrained acquirers:
Aˆfire =
Afire
nfire
=
∫ Atech
Afire
f(kA)
f(A)
∫
b
τ
∫ b
τ
min( bτ ,l)
AdGdGdF∫ Atech
Afire
f(kA)
f(A)
∫
b
τ
∫ b
τ
min( bτ ,l)
dGdGdF
Aˆtech =
Atech
ntech
=
∫ A¯
k
Atech
f(kA)
f(A)
∫
b
τ
∫
l
AdGdGdF∫ A¯
k
Atech
f(kA)
f(A)
∫
b
τ
∫
l
dGdGdF
and ωin = n
fire
nfire+ntech
. This expression is useful for analyzing the eect of changes in τ , and hence
the eect of financial shocks, on Aˆin. Its partial derivative with respect to τ is
∂Aˆin
∂τ
=
∂ωin
∂τ
(
Aˆfire − Aˆtech
)
+ ωin
∂Aˆfire
∂τ
+ (1− ωin)∂Aˆ
tech
∂τ
. (III.5)
21The absence of an intensive margin is the result of a borrowing constraint that is constant across firms. If
borrowing constraints are tighter for smaller firms, the intensive margin will contribute to the decrease in the
average productivity.
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A negative financial shock leads to two adjustments: First, as for unconstrained acquirers, it
shis the target’s borrowing constraint line,  = b
τ
, to the right. This has the eect of increasing
the mass of fire-sale acquisitions
(
∂ωin
∂τ
)
> 0, which lowers the average productivity of acqui-
sitions because fire-sale acquisitions have a lower productivity than technology-driven acquisi-
tions
(
Aˆfire < Aˆtech
)
. Second, a financial shock also tightens the joint borrowing constraint,
shiing the  = l(A, acq, τ) line to the right (see Figure III.3) and making it harder for firms to
acquire targets. This second force is only present for constrained acquirers and tends to work
in the opposite direction of the first force. Its first eect is to reduce the increase in the share
of fire-sale acquisitions because some fire-sale acquisitions cannot take place as acquirers find
themselves unable to raise suicient funds. This dampens the rise in ∂ωin
∂τ
.
There is a second, more subtle eect that raises the average productivity of both groups of
fire-sale and technology-driven acquisitions (the last two terms in equation (III.5)). Key for under-
standing this intensive margin eect is the interaction of fixed costs and borrowing constraints.
The presence of fixed costs renders acquisitions among small firms unprofitable. This was also
the reason why foreign, unconstrained firms do not acquire any small firms with A < Afire.
Adding borrowing constraints for the acquiring firm skews the distribution of acquired firms
even further towards bigger firms. The reason is as follows: Firms have to pre-finance their up-
front costs. These upfront costs increase less than one-to-one with firm size due to the presence
of fixed acquisition costs, so that smaller firms need relatively more liquidity to finance an ac-
quisition. Some of those smaller firms might not have enough liquidity and cannot acquire the
target firm, even though it would be profitable. This means that fixed costs do not only render
acquisitions among small firms unprofitable, but they also make some profitable acquisitions
infeasible. This last eect results from the interaction of fixed costs and borrowing constraints
and is only present for constrained acquirers. Importantly, a financial crisis tightens borrowing
constraints and makes more and more acquisitions infeasible, particularly among small firms.
That is, in the presence of fixed costs, tighter borrowing constraints have a more negative impact
on smaller firms than larger firms. Technically, this can be seen from taking the second deriva-
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tive of the joint borrowing constraint (III.3) with respect to τ and A. In Figure III.3, this eect is
illustrated through a stronger shi of the joint borrowing constraint for smaller values of A.
These two channels—the dampening of the extensive margin and the movement of the inten-
sive margin—tend to raise the average productivity Aˆin associated with constrained acquisitions
and may counteract the decline in average productivities caused by the increase in the fire-sale
target pool. Whether that happens is a quantitative question that we sele by numerical simula-
tions. In the simulations that we present below, we find that under certain plausible conditions,
the second set of eects dominates the eect of an increase in the fire-sale target pool, and as
a result, the average productivity by constrained acquiring firms goes up in the aermath of
an aggregate financial shock. This is a central insight of our analysis: The “quality” of acquisi-
tions completed by constrained acquirers improves during financial crises because more of the
matches taking place are between firms with higher values of A, the technology-related funda-
mental. If the financially constrained firms be interpreted as domestic firms, then acquisitions
completed by domestic firms during financial crisis should be based more on fundamentals, in
contrast to unconstrained acquirers (foreign firms). This is, there is a “cleansing eect” in the
market for corporate control, whereby large aggregate financial shocks lead to a higher average
quality of completed acquisitions among the group of domestic acquiring firms.
Before showing quantitative results for the cleansing eect in the market for corporate con-
trol, we discuss how financial crises aect the average acquired share of acquisitions. This eect
is strongly related to the cleansing eect. The acquired share is empirically easy to measure,
which allows us to test our model’s implications.
Acquired Share and Aggregate Financial Shocks
When a firm acquires a target, the productivity of the target increases by a factor φ, which is
both increasing and strictly concave in the acquired share α.22 But the frictions associated with
22The first part of the assumption is meant to capture the gains arising from technological synergies between
the two firms. Thus there are no value-destroying acquisitions (see Moeller et al., 2005) in our setup. The second
part of the assumption is meant to capture the role of ownership in mitigating hold-up problems arising from
incomplete contracts or transaction costs. Higher ownership by the acquiring firm is also more likely to incentivize
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the acquisition process necessitate a cost c(α) with c(0) > 0, c′ > 0 and c′′ ≥ 0.23 The precise
form of the marginal cost curve of acquiring additional ownership is not critical for our results.
For simplicity, we assume that the two parties set up a contract that aligns their interests.
As a result, the acquired share is chosen by the acquiring firm to maximize total surplus:24
φ′(α)A = c′(α). (III.6)
This condition simply states that the marginal benefit of an increase in α, φ′(α)A, has to
equal the marginal cost of an increase in α, c′(α). We can think of the optimal α defined by
this first order condition as a function α(A).25 Under our assumptions about the derivatives of φ
and c, it is easy to show that α′ > 0.26 Ceteris paribus, smaller stakes are associated with lower
productivity. In this sense, there is a strong, monotonic relationship between the fraction of a
target firm acquired and the “quality” of targets acquired, measured by the productivity of the
target firm.
This insight together with our results that the average productivity of acquisitions by uncon-
strained acquirers goes down during crises leads to the following proposition:27
Proposition 2. Smaller acquired shares for unconstrained firms during crises
Unconstrained firms acquire on average smaller shares during financial crises, i.e., if τc < τn then
αˆ∗c < αˆ
∗
n.
the introduction of beer management practices and enable closer monitoring of existing processes.
23This is meant to capture the idea that acquiring higher stakes might involve a greater degree of pre-acquisition
screening and higher administrative or legal costs. The assumption c′′ ≥ 0 can be relaxed if φ is suiciently concave
(see footnote 26).
24This is done to simplify the algebra. Alternatives, such as the acquirer maximizing her share of surplus αS,
would add complexity without adding insight into the main eect the model is meant to highlight. See Alquist et
al. (2015) for a more complete analysis of the contracting problem in an acquisition.
25Practically, we restrict α to be less or equal to 1.
26 This condition holds as long as c
′′(α)
c′(α) >
φ′′(α)
φ′(α) , which is satisfied if c is strictly convex and a is strictly concave.
One can read the inequality condition as saying that c has to be “less concave” / “more convex” than φ for all possible
α.
27This result is similar to Alquist et al. (2016). They emphasize the role of within-industry synergies in driving a
similar result for foreign acquisitions. They do not consider the decision problem of a domestic acquiring firm.
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Proof: See Technical Appendix.
As our previous discussion on constrained acquirers suggest, the movement of the joint bor-
rowing constraint might overturn this result. In the next section, we calibrate our model to show
that under certain plausible conditions, financially constrained firms indeed acquire on average
larger shares during financial crises.
Calibrating and Simulating the Model
We simulate the model to analyze the reaction of the average productivity and average acquired
share to a tightening of the collateral constraint. We first have to choose functional forms and pa-
rameters. Some of these parameters are chosen to match certain features of the data on emerg-
ing market acquisitions from the years 1990-2007, which are described later in the empirical
section. For the purpose of the calibration, unconstrained and constrained acquiring firms are
identified with foreign and domestic acquirers respectively. This seems a reasonable assumption
because the majority of foreign acquiring firms in our sample were from countries with more
well-developed financial markets, not other EMEs.28
For the size parameter A we choose a Pareto distribution with probability density function
f(A) = λA−λ−1 for A ≥ 1. In accordance with the literature on firm size distributions, we
select a value of the shape parameter close, but above 1: 1.01.29 There is less guidance for the
distribution of the temporary shock . We have experimented with uniform, normal, log-normal
and beta distributions and dierent standard deviations. Our qualitative results are robust to
these distributions and reasonable standard distributions. Our results presented in this section
assume a log-normal distribution with a standard distribution of 0.43.30
The cost function and spillover function jointly determine the distribution of the acquired
28This is documented in Alquist et al. (2015) using indices of financial development such as private credit/GDP
and bond market capitalization/GDP ratios.
29See e.g. Di Giovanni et al. (2011) for estimates of λ.
30We choose the log-normal distribution because in a later section on possible resales of acquisitions, we assume
that log() follows an AR(1) process. If the errors of this AR(1) process are Gaussian, then log(t) is normally
distributed as t→∞.
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share. We assume their forms to be:
c = γ0 + α
φ = 1 + αψ
The cost of an acquisition consists of a fixed cost γ0 and a variable cost that is linearly increasing
in the acquired shareα. The value of the fixed cost strongly aects the average acquired share. As
the fixed cost increases, small acquisitions become unprofitable and the average share increases.
The form for the spillover function ensures that productivity spillovers are non-negative and are
increasing in α. As the elasticity ψ increases, spillover more strongly increase in α, making larger
acquisitions more profitable. Since we have to restrict α to be between 0 and 1, an increase in ψ
raises the share of full acquisitions. We choose γ0 and ψ to match as best as possible both the
average acquired share and the fraction of full acquisitions that we observe in the data. Table
III.1 compares acquired shares in the data and the model. We cannot perfectly match the two
moments: In the data, the fraction of full acquisitions is somewhat larger than in the model. At
the same time, the average acquired share is smaller. The reason for the discrepancy is that the
model does not feature any small scale acquisitions with shares of less than 30%, which can be
observed in the data. However, the fit is fairly good for our very parsimonious model. In both
the data and the model roughly 75% of all acquisitions lead to shares with 50% or more.
We calibrate the parameter k to the observed size dierence of domestic acquirers and their
target. We measure a firm’s size as the book value of their total assets. Our dataset contains 1,518
domestic acquisitions for which total assets of both the acquirer and the target are available.
The resulting ratio of the average acquirer’s total assets to the average target’s total assets is 3.2
across all years and countries. We therefore set k = 3.2.
Finally, we choose the fixed cost parameter to be b = 0.9. This implies that expected profits
are 10% of a firm’s size.
We now simulate a tightening of the collateral constraint from τ = 1.33 to τ = 1, translat-
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Table III.1: Acquired Share in Data and Model
< 50% 50− 60% 60− 70% 70− 80% 80− 90% 90− 100% 100% αˆ
Data 28.7% 8.8% 5.9% 2.5% 3.7% 2.7% 47.8% 70.1%
Model 23.0% 10.0% 7.6% 6.0% 4.8% 4.0% 44.5% 76.9%
Notes: The table reports average acquired shares for the total of domestic and foreign acqui-
sitions in the data and the model. Model parameters are explained in the text. For this table,
we set τ = 1.17.
ing into a 25% drop of a firm’s maximum leverage ratio.31 This means that firms loose complete
access to financial markets, so that they can only pay for the fixed cost b if their current pro-
ductivity is high enough, i.e.  ≥ b. We analyze the eect of this tightening on both the average
productivity of acquisitions and the average acquired share.
Figure III.4(a) shows how the average productivity of both unconstrained and constrained
acquirers adjusts to a steady decline in τ from 1.33 to 1. The average productivity is standard-
ized to 100 in normal times (τ = 1.33). As credit constraints tighten, we observe—in line with
Proposition 1—that the average productivity for foreign (unconstrained) acquisitions goes down
by 2.5 percent, whereas it increases by 10 percent for domestic (constrained) acquisitions.32 This
suggests a fairly strong cleansing eect for domestic acquisitions despite the increase in the
pool of low-productivity, distressed targets. Figure III.4(b) decompose this overall change in the
average productivity into three components (where a prime ′ denotes the value aer the change)
∆Aˆ =
(
Aˆfire − Aˆtech
)
∆ω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ext
+ω′∆Aˆfire︸ ︷︷ ︸
Intfire
+ (1− ω′)∆Aˆtech︸ ︷︷ ︸
Inttech
(III.7)
This decomposition follows equation (III.5). The extensive margin captures the composition ef-
fect of a change in the average productivity of fire-sale and technology-driven acquisitions. The
31The leverage ratio typically refers to total liabilities over total assets. We deviate from this definition by calling
the ratio of total liabilities to total equity the leverage ratio. Also, in our two-period model, all liabilities are current.
32The non-monotonic behavior for the average productivity of constrained acquisitions is a result of the distri-
bution for A. The Pareto distribution has no mean for shape parameters smaller than 1. We chose 1.01 for our
simulations are therefore very close to this threshold. We randomly draw 5’000’000 values for A from this distribu-
tion, but only 70’000 of these ’firms’ get acquired by a domestic firm. This number is too small to average out the
randomness introduced by our simulation.
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two intensive margins refer to changes in the average productivity of the two types of acqui-
sitions. Figure III.4(b) shows the result of this decomposition for a change in τ from 1.33 to 1,
for both unconstrained and constrained acquisitions. As discussed before, the fall in the average
productivity for unconstrained acquisitions is completely driven by a composition change. For
domestic acquisitions, this composition eect is weaker and is dominated by an increase in the
average productivity for technology-driven acquisitions. This result supports our intuition that
during financial crises only the best domestic acquiring firms – those with higher productivity
and liquidity – remain in the market for corporate control. The increase in the share of fire-sale
acquisitions is less pronounced for domestic acquirers because the acquirers themselves face
tighter borrowing constraints. Low-quality matches therefore become less profitable.
Finally, Figure III.5 shows that these dierent responses to financial crises by foreign and
domestic acquisitions are also mirrored in their average acquired shares. At τ = 1.33 the share
of both unconstrained and constrained acquirers is somewhat close to each other at 73.8 and 75.4
percent, respectively. As credit constraints tighten, the average share declines for unconstrained
acquisitions by more than one percentage point, whereas it increases by a similar amount for
constrained acquisitions.
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(a) Average Productivity of Acquired Firms
(b) Decomposition of a Change in the Average Productivity
Figure III.4: Cleansing Effect in the Market for Corporate Control
Note: Figure (a) shows the simulated average productivity of firms acquired by unconstrained firms (le panel) and
constrained firms (right panel) as a function of τ (collateral constraint parameter). A financial crisis is modeled as a
decrease of τ . Figure (b) decomposes the percentage change from τ = 1.33 to τ = 1 into a composition change, the
extensive margin, and a change in the average productivity of both fire-sale acquisitions and technology acquisitions
(see Equation (III.7)). See text for more details on the calibration.
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Figure III.5: Average Acquired Share
Note: Simulated average acquired share as a function of τ (collateral constraint parameter) for unconstrained
acquirers (le panel) and constrained acquirers (right panel).
2.3 Aggregate Cleansing Eects of Financial Crises
In this section, we show that the presence of acquirers alters standard predictions on the ag-
gregate cleansing eect of a negative financial shock. Foreign acquisitions amplify the cleansing
eect because acquirers save high-productivity firms and let low-productivity firms go bankrupt.
This is also true for domestic acquisitions, but the presence of financial constraints for domestic
acquirers render this cleansing eect negligible.
We start by defining the aggregate cleansing eect that works through the market for corpo-
rate control:
Definition 3. Cleansing eect through the market for corporate control
A financial crisis leads to a cleansing eect through the market for corporate control if the average
long-term productivity Aˆthru of surviving domestic firms increases, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆthru,c >
Aˆthru,n, and a sullying eect if the average long-term productivity decreases, i.e., if τc < τn then
Aˆthru,c < Aˆthru,n.
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We look at three types of economies to evaluate the relevance of acquirers for the aggregate
cleansing eect. We start with a version of our model without any acquirers. Then, we allow for
either unconstrained or constrained acquirers.
Aggregate Cleansing Eect Without a Market for Corporate Control
The average productivity Aˆthru refers to all domestic firms that decide to produce in the next pe-
riod. In our simple model without any acquirers, only firms that satisfy the borrowing constraint
 ≥ b
τ
can pay for the fixed cost of production. All other firms exit the market.
Aˆnoacqthru =
∫ ∫
b
τ
AdGdF∫ ∫
b
τ
dGdF
≡ A
noacq
nnoacq
.
Figure III.6(a) illustrates the set of firms that exit or stay in the market. A financial crisis shis
the borrowing constraint to the right, which raises the number of firms that exit the market, but,
as the following proposition states, does not aect the average productivity of producing firms.
Proposition 3. No cleansing eect on domestic firms in absence of acquisitions
In a model without any acquirers, financial crises do neither lead to a cleansing eect nor a sullying
eect through the market for corporate control, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆ
noacq
thru,c = Aˆ
noacq
thru,n.
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
Intuitively, our model lacks a cleansing eect for two reasons. First, the borrowing con-
straint is independent of a firm’s productivity A. As a result, both low-productivity and high-
productivity firms are equally aected by financial crises. This is illustrated by the vertical bor-
rowing constraint in Figure III.6(a). Second, we assume that a firm’s liquidity  is uncorrelated
with its productivity A. This assumption is in contrast to the dynamic model in Osotimehin
and Pappadà (forthcoming) that features a negative cleansing eect of financial crises. In their
model, high-productivity firms have a stronger need for borrowing to finance their investment
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(a) No Acquirers (b) With Unconstrained Acquirers
(c) With Constrained Acquirers
Figure III.6: Cleansing Effect of Liquidity Crises
Note: Figure illustrates the change in the average productivity for producing domestic firms in a model without
any acquirers (a), with only unconstrained acquirers (b), and with only constrained acquirers (c). Each plot shows
which domestic firms (characterized by a combination of A and ) exit or stay in the market. Aˆnoacq , Aˆll
∗
and Aˆll
denote average productivity levels of the domestic firms with the respective combinations of A and . See text for
more details.
and will therefore suer more from tight credit markets than low-productivity firms. We ab-
stract from this mechanism to focus on how the presence of acquirers alters the predictions of
the cleansing eect.33 Starting from a baseline of a zero cleansing eect in the absence of a
33It would be straightforward to extend the model to incorporate both of these features. We could have a bor-
rowing constraint that depends on firm size. If smaller firms (which have lower long-run productivity in our static
model) face tighter constraints, then a negative financial shock will lead to a positive cleansing eect as these firms
exit. An earlier version of this paper considered this case. Regarding the correlation of  and A: A positive (or nega-
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market for corporate control, we now introduce acquirers.
Aggregate Cleansing Eect with Unconstrained Acquirers Only
Allowing for unconstrained acquirers alters the predictions on the cleansing eect. Now, some
of the firms that cannot pay for the upfront fixed cost get acquired and stay in the market.
As discussed, unconstrained firms will acquire all low liquidity firms
(
 < τ
b
)
with productivity
A ≥ Afire. That means in addition to all domestic firms with suicient liquidity, also firms
with productivity A ≥ Afire stay in the market. Denote the average productivity of these laer,
(l)ow (l)iquidity firms by Aˆll
∗
. Figure III.6(b) illustrates these two sets of surviving firms. Then,
the average productivity of producing domestic firms is a weighted average of these two sets of
surviving firms:
Aˆ∗thru = ω
∗
thruAˆ
ll∗ + (1− ω∗thru)Aˆnoacq,
where Aˆll
∗
denotes the average productivity of acquired firms with low liquidity
(
 < τ
b
)
:
Aˆll
∗
=
All
∗
nll∗
=
∫
Afire
∫ b
τ AdGdF∫
Afire
∫ b
τ dGdF
and ω∗thru =
nll
∗
nll∗+nnoacq . As Figure III.6(b) suggests, a financial crisis forces more firm exits, but
only of firms with very low productivity. A financial crisis therefore raises the share of acquired,
low-liquidity firms, ω∗thru. This observation leads to the following proposition.
Proposition 4. Cleansing eect on domestic firms with unconstrained acquirers
In a model with only unconstrained acquirers, financial crises lead to a cleansing eect through the
market for corporate control, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆ∗thru,c > Aˆ
∗
thru,n.
tive) correlation between  and A would mean that the bankrupt firms would also be the less (or more) productive
ones, which would lead to a positive (or negative) cleansing eect. Abandoning the assumption of the independence
of  and A, however, would come at the cost of sacrificing some of our earlier analytical results.
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Proof: See Technical Appendix.
The intuition for the positive cleansing eect is that unconstrained acquirers only save high-
productivity firms from exiting the market. Even though financial crises hit all domestic firms
equally, only the “fiest”, high-productivity firms (with A > Afire) survive by geing acquired,
whereas the low-productivity firms exit the market. The average productivity of these low-
liquidity, acquired firms is therefore relatively high, so that, as their share goes up, total average
productivity rises. As we have seen with changes in the average productivity of unconstrained
acquisitions, all the movements in the average productivity level of surviving, constrained firms,
are driven by the extensive margin, i.e. changes in ω∗thru as opposed to changes in Aˆ
ll∗ or Aˆnoacq
This result that the average productivity of producing firms goes up during financial crises
might seem at odds with our finding that, at the same time, the average productivity of uncon-
strained acquisitions goes down. To see that these two results are actually consistent with each
other, one must keep in mind that they concern two dierent groups of firms. During financial
crises, the average productivity of acquired firms goes down because more low-productivity firms
get acquired (sullying eect in the market for corporate control). But as more firms get acquired,
the average productivity of the overall population of producing firms goes up because acquired
firms are, on average, more productive than the population of producing firms (cleansing eect
through the market for corporate control).
Aggregate Cleansing Eect with Constrained Acquirers Only
In a model with constrained acquirers not all low-liquidity firms with A ≥ Afire get acquired.
Acquisitions only take place if the combined borrowing constraint  ≥ l is satisfied. Figure
III.6(c) shows that, compared to the case with unconstrained acquirers, the joint borrowing con-
straint restricts the set of surviving firms to more productive or more liquid firms. As before, the
average productivity of producing domestic firms is a weighted average of two sets of surviving
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firms:
Aˆthru = ωthruAˆ
ll + (1− ωthru)Aˆnoacq,
where Aˆll denotes the average productivity of acquired firms with low liquidity
(
 < τ
b
)
:
Aˆll =
All
nll
=
∫
Afire
f(kA)
f(A)
∫ ¯
b
τ
∫ b
τ
min( bτ ,l)
AdGdGdF∫
Afire
f(kA)
f(A)
∫ ¯
b
τ
∫ b
τ
min( bτ ,l)
dGdGdF
and ωthru = n
ll
nll+nnoacq
. Taking the partial derivative yields
∂Aˆthru
∂τ
=
∂ωthru
∂τ
(
Aˆll − Aˆnoacq
)
+
∂Aˆll
∂τ
ωthru.
For unconstrained acquirers, the cleansing eect was driven by an increase in the share of domes-
tic firms with insuicient liquidity, ω∗thru. As illustrated in Figure III.6(c), this extensive margin
is dampened now because constrained acquirers find themselves unable to save low-liquidity
firms when borrowing constraints tighten ( = l shis right): That is, we expect ωthru to be
less sensitive to changes in τ than ω∗thru, and hence, a dampened cleansing eect. That being
said, the equation has a second term that reinforces the cleansing eect. It relates to changes in
the average productivity of firms with liquidity problems, Aˆll. Since acquisitions among smaller
firms suer more from tighter borrowing constraints due to the fixed cost, we expect relatively
more acquisitions among firms with high productivity. This raises the average productivity of
surviving firms during crises and reinforces the cleansing eect. To quantify these two opposing
channels, we now simulate our model economy.
Figure III.7 shows that the cleansing eect of financial crises in a model with only constrained
acquisitions is relatively small compared to the cleansing eect of unconstrained acquisitions.
The model with constrained acquirers has a relatively small share of firms with liquidity prob-
lems that are saved through acquisitions (low ωthru) because constrained acquirers themselves
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Figure III.7: Average Productivity of Producing, Domestic Firms
Note: Average productivity of producing, domestic firms as a function of τ (collateral constraint parameter) in a
model with unconstrained acquirers only (Aˆll
∗
, le panel) and a model with constrained acquirers only (Aˆll right
panel). Average productivity is standardized by the average productivity in a model without any acquirers, Aˆnoacq .
See text for more details on the calibration.
face liquidity problems. This means that even though the average productivity of firms with
liquidity problems, Aˆll, rises during liquidity crises, this barely aects the total average produc-
tivity because the number of producing firms with liquidity problems is small to begin with.34
Once again, it should be noted that our earlier result, a strong cleansing eect in the market
for corporate control, is consistent with a weak cleansing eect on domestic firms through the
market for corporate control. A large majority of firms acquired by constrained firms do not
face liquidity problems and would have survived on their own. Even though financial crises lead
to a strong cleansing eect among these acquired firms, this barely aects the survival rate of
domestic firms and therefore does not have a strong cleansing eect on domestic firms.
The figure also illustrates the extent to which acquisitions can substitute for local credit
markets. Both the model with foreign (unconstrained) acquirers and domestic (constrained)
34Although the quantitative predictions are sensitive to the calibration, the result that the cleansing eect through
constrained acquisitions is positive, but very weak is robust to e.g. dierent ranges of τ and dierent values for the
size dierence between acquirers and targets, k.
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acquirers feature a higher productivity than the model without acquirers. An economy without
any credit markets (τ = 0) sees its productivity increase by 1.8 percent if domestic acquisitions
are possible, but by more than 35 percent if it opens up to foreign acquisitions.35
2.4 Possible Resale of Acquisitions
The literature on financial crises, especially in emerging markets, has emphasized the resale
or “flipping ” of crisis time acquisitions as a metric of the long term synergy and viability of
such acquisitions (see Acharya et al., 2011; Alquist et al., 2016). The main intuition from that
literature is that crisis time foreign acquisitions, if they were mostly driven by valuations based
on the target’s lack of liquidity, would be sold back aer liquidity returned. This mechanism still
holds true for foreign acquirers in our model. But we show that a second eect overturns this
mechanism for domestic acquirers. During normal times, some domestic acquisitions are flipped
over time because the acquirer himself might suddenly need liquidity for its own operations.
Domestic firms acquiring targets during financial crises, however, are particularly liquid and are
therefore less likely to resell their acquisitions for liquidity purposes. Subsequent flipping rates
for domestic acquisitions made during crises are therefore predicted to be relatively low.
To allow for possible resales aer acquisitions, we extend the model by an additional period,
period 3. The financial crisis occurs at the end of period 1, but is over by the end of period 2, i.e.
τ1 = τc and τ2 = τn. Period 3 is a normal period and represents the long run. In period 2, aer
revenues for that period have been realized, the acquirer receives an all-or-nothing oer V o for
her entire share α of the firm.
We make a number of assumptions to simplify the analysis. The assumptions are that: (i)
the new acquirer making the buy-back oer is not liquidity constrained; (ii) the new acquirer
35These numbers depend on how pervasive acquisitions are. We assume that every firm with liquidity problems is
acquired as long as the acquisition is profitable and feasible (there are no search frictions). This clearly overstates the
actual number of acquisitions, especially of foreign (unconstrained) acquisitions if search frictions are particularly
large for those types of acquisitions. Additionally, the reader should also keep in mind that very large firms (A >
Amax
k ) cannot be acquired in the model with constrained acquirers due to our assumption on the size relationship
between acquirers and target firms. This automatically reduces the benefits of allowing for constrained acquirers.
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has access to the same technology as the original owner of the firm and there are no monitoring
costs (i.e. φ = 1 and c = 0); (iii) acquirer and seller engage in Nash bargaining over any surplus
of an acquisition, with 1− ψ denoting the fraction of the surplus that the acquirer obtains; and
(iv) temporary productivities  and acq follow an AR(1) process with persistence ρ in period 2,
but equal their expected values of 1 in period 3 because period 3 represents the long run. This
laer assumption simplifies our algebra, but is not crucial to our main result.
We discuss the firms’ decision problems in reverse order: First, we show under which con-
ditions acquisitions are resold at the end of the second period. Then, we study the acquisition
decision in the first period.
It is optimal for the initial acquirer to resell the firm whenever the outside oer V o exceeds
the value of holding onto the firm. The value of reselling the firm are the expected net profits of
production in the third period, V flip = A(−b + 1). The value of holding onto the firm depends
on the liquidity position of the post-acquisition entity. If the post-acquisition entity does not
face liquidity problems in the second period, it can pay for the upfront costs of production and
produces in the third period. Then, the value of holding onto the firm equals the net profits in
the third period, A(−b+ φ)− c. Alternatively, the firm cannot produce and net profits are 0:
V keep =

A(−b+ φ)− c if acq,2 ≥ b/τ2 & 2 ≥ l2
0 if acq,2 < b/τ2 or 2 < l2,
where, as before, φ and c denote function values with optimally chosen share α.36 The outside
oer is the sum of the value of holding onto the firm plus a share of the surplus from the trans-
action. We assume that the initial acquirer and the new acquirer engage in Nash bargaining, so
that they share any surplus from the transaction, with share 1− ψ going to the initial acquirer.
The surplus from selling is the value if the firm is sold,V flip, minus the value if it is not sold,
36The optimal chosen α satisfies φ′(α)AE(2|1) = c′(α) in the first period and φ′(α)A = c′(α) in the second
period. In the first part of the paper, we assumed E(2|1) = 1. Allowing for persistence in  does not dramatically
change the predictions on the average acquired share in the previous section.
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V keep. The outside oer is therefore
V o = V keep + (1− ψ) (V flip − V keep)
Then, the acquirer sells back the firm if V o > V keep, that is V flip > V keep. Here, we distinguish
two cases, depending on the post-acquisition entity’s liquidity position.
First, consider a post-acquisition entity that has enough liquidity to produce in the third
period, i.e. acq,2 ≥ b/τ2 and 2 ≥ l2. Then, solving the expression V flip > V keep, the acquirer
sells back the firm aer the second period if A < c
φ−1 = A
tech.37 That is all firms with A < Atech
are flipped in the second period. This formalizes the intuition that acquisitions characterized by
lower values of A are more likely to be resold. The acquisition is flipped because the target firm
no longer requires liquidity.
Second, consider a post-acquisition entity that is liquidity-constrained and does not produce
in the third period. Then, it is always profitable to sell back the firm, no maer the value of A.
In this case, the target firm is flipped because the acquiring firm no longer has enough liquidity
to pay for the upfront production costs. This case is only relevant for constrained acquirers.
Now that we have solved the flipping problem in the second period, we can look at the
initial acquisition problem in the first period: A target firm is acquired if an acquisition generates
positive surplus, i.e. if the value of a firm being acquired, Vacq, exceeds the value of it not being
acquired, Vtar.
The value of a potential target firm that is not acquired in the first period is
Vtar =

A1 + 0 + A(−b+ 1) if 1 < b/τ1
A1 + AE(2)(−b+ 1) + A(−b+ 1) if 1 ≥ b/τ1.
The value of the firm is the sum of all three periods’ profits. First-period (gross) profits are A1.
37This condition holds if A is small. To see this, note that this inequality can be rewrien as A > φA − c. The
RHS is increasing in A faster than the LHS: dφA−cdA =
∂φA−c
∂A +
∂φA−c
∂α
∂α
∂A =
∂φA−c
∂A = φ > 1, where the second
term drops out because α is chosen optimally.
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Expected profits net of fixed costs in the second period are AE(2)(−b + 1) if the firm has paid
the upfront costs (1 ≥ b/τ1) and 0 otherwise. The expected value for 2 is conditional on the
realization of 1 and under the assumption of an AR(1) process equals E(2) = 1− (1− 1)ρ. In
the second period, the owner of the firm can pay for the fixed cost himself, or, if he does not have
enough liquidity, he can sell the firm and the new owner pays for the fixed cost. Either way, the
firm produces in the third period generating additional profit A(−b+ 1).
The value of a firm acquired in the first period is
Vacq =

A1 + AE(2)(−b+ φ)− c+ A(−b+ 1) if A < Atech
A1 + AE(2)(−b+ φ)− c+ p (A(−b+ φ)− c) + (1− p)A(−b+ 1) if A ≥ Atech.
The first two terms, A1 and AE(2)(−b+ φ)− c, are the profit from producing in both the first
and second period. In the second period, the acquirer can either resell the firm or hold on to it.
If the target firm’s long-term productivity level A is low, A < Atech, the acquisition gets flipped
because the target firm no longer needs liquidity. Then, third-period profits are A(−b + 1). If
the target firm’s long-term productivity levelA is high, the acquirer either keeps the acquisition,
and profits areA(−b+φ)−c, or he is forced to sell it because he does not have enough liquidity,
and profits are A(−b+ 1). The probability that the post-acquisition entity has enough liquidity,
conditional on having had enough liquidity in the first period, is
p ≡

Pr
(
acq,2 ≥ b/τ2, 2 ≥ l2|acq,1 ≥ b/τ1, 1 ≥ l1
)
for constrained acquirers
1 for unconstrained acquirers.
Then, aer some algebra, the surplus of an acquisition at the end of the first period, Vacq − Vtar,
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can be wrien as
S =

AE(2)(φ− b)− c < 0 if 1 < b/τ1 & A < Afire
AE(2)(φ− 1)− c < 0 if 1 ≥ b/τ1 & A < Atech
AE(2)(φ− b)− c ≥ 0 if 1 < b/τ1 & Afire ≤ A < Atech
AE(2)(φ− b)− c+ p ((φ− 1)A− c) > 0 if 1 < b/τ1 & A ≥ Atech
(E(2) + p) (A(φ− 1)− c) ≥ 0 if 1 ≥ b/τ1 & A ≥ Atech.
where the inequality signs follow from the restriction on A.
Figure III.8: Resale of Acquired Firms
Note: Figure displays combinations of A and 1 of a target firm, which can be initially acquired and then resold
(’flipping’). The joint borrowing constraint l1 is drawn for a constrained acquirer with a given liquidity level acq,1.
For case 3 and 4, only firms with  ≥ l are acquired. See text for further details on the dierent cases.
Figure III.9 illustrates the resulting five cases: No acquisition takes place in the first two cases
because the target firms’ productivities are too low. In case 1, exits the market because it lacks
liquidity to pay for the upfront cost of production; in case 2, the target firm has enough liquidity
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to produce. Case 3 gives rise to fire-sale acquisitions that will be flipped at the end of the second
period. Finally, cases 4 and 5 above comprise combinations ofA and 1, where initial acquisitions
take place, but those technology-driven acquisitions might be flipped at the end of the second
period if the acquirer is a constrained firm and realizations of liquidity levels 2 and acq,2 are
low. Flipping occurs with certainty in case 3 because the target firm no longer needs liquidity;
and flipping might occur in cases 4 and 5 if the post-acquisition entity faces liquidity problems.
We refer to this last type of flipping as “forced” flipping.
Proposition 5. Higher flipping rates for unconstrained acquirers
Unconstrained acquisitions made during a financial crisis have higher flipping rates, i.e., if τ1 =
τc < τ1 = τn then n
flip∗
c
nc
> n
flip∗
n
nn
.
Proof: See Technical Appendix.
Unconstrained acquirers never face liquidity problems and are therefore never ’forced’ to flip
technology-driven acquisitions (cases 4 and 5). So they only flip fire-sale acquisitions (case 3).
That is the proportion of flipped unconstrained acquisitions is simply equal to the share of fire-
sale acquisitions in total acquisitions. As shown earlier, this share increases when there is an
adverse aggregate financial shock.
For constrained acquirers, the proportion of flipped acquisitions is
nflip
n
=
nfire + (1− p)ntech
nfire + ntech
and the derivative is
∂ n
flip
n
∂τ1
=
p
(
∂nfire
∂τ1
ntech − ∂ntech
∂τ1
nfire
)
n2
− ∂p
∂τ1
ntech
n
.
This expression suggests that the proportion of flipped acquisitions among constrained ac-
quirers might be lower for crisis-cohort acquisitions for two reasons: The first term refers to
changes in the share of fire-sale acquisitions. These fire-sale acquisitions certainly get flipped.
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But, as the simulations in the previous section suggest, the share of fire-sale acquisitions does
not increase by that much for constrained acquirers during a crisis. This keeps flipping rates low.
The second term refers to changes in the number of “forced” resales caused by acquirers run-
ning into liquidity problems. These forced flippings will also be low for crisis-cohort acquisitions
because crisis-cohort acquirers have more liquidity and are therefore more resilient to forced
resales. Only the most liquid firms are able to acquire targets during financial crises. Once the
financial crisis is over and borrowing conditions improve, it is unlikely that these high-liquidity
firms run into liquidity problems and are forced to resell their acquired firm, assuming some per-
sistence in liquidity, ρ > 0. The lower flipping rates observed for crisis-cohort acquisitions are
the result of a “selection eect” in the sense that only the most liquid and hence, most resilient
firms acquire targets. More formally, ∂p/∂τ1 < 0 conditional on τ2: The probability that the
post-acquisition entity has enough liquidity at the end of the second period, p, goes up if the
borrowing constraints become tighter in the first period. Importantly, it is the change in τ from
a low crisis value τ1 = τc to a high value τ2 = τn that raises the probability p.
Figure III.9: Share of Flipped Acquisitions
Note: Simulated share of flipped acquisitions as a function of financial constraint in the first period, τ1, for uncon-
strained acquirers (le panel) and constrained acquirers (right panel). The collateral constraint during normal times
is τ2 = 1.33. For more details, see notes to Figure III.4.
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Figure III.9 shows simulated flipping rates for unconstrained and constrained acquirers as a
function of the collateral constraint during the crisis, τ1. The collateral constraint during normal
times is τ2 = 1.33. An additional parameter of our three-period model is the persistence of
the temporary productivity, ρ. There is lile guidance in the literature on this parameter, but
it is probably lile controversial to assume some persistence. We set ρ = 0.9, but our results
remain robust even for very low values of ρ.38 For the chosen parameters, flipping rates increase
for unconstrained acquirers from 2.8 to 5.5 percent, but decrease for constrained acquirers from
more than 13 to 4 percent for domestic acquirers. We later take this hypothesis to the data,
that flipping rates for domestic (constrained) acquirers decrease and converge to flipping rates
observed for unconstrained acquirers.
3 Testing the Implications of the Model
The theory gives us two sets of testable implications regarding the size and flipping rates of
domestic and foreign acquisitions in times of financial distress, in comparison to normal times. To
test these, we need transaction level data for mergers and acquisitions. Our source for this is the
Thompson-Reuters Securities Data Company Platinum database, which contains information
on the universe of such deals in a large set of EMEs.39 For each transaction, we mainly utilize a
few key variables – the share of a firm acquired, the names of the firms involved, their primary
SIC industry classifications, the country of origin of the acquirer, and the date on which the
transaction was completed – for sixteen of the largest markets for corporate control in EMEs
between 1990 and 2007.40
Due to the structure of the hypotheses, which are essentially comparisons of two kinds of
38If there were no persistence, the share of flipped acquisitions for domestic acquirers would be higher for the
crisis cohort than for the non-crisis cohort. But even a persistence parameter as low as ρ = 0.05 is suicient to
reverse this prediction.
39See Alquist et al. (2016) for a detailed description of the SDC data.
40The countries are Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China, India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Singa-
pore, South Africa, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam. Our data contains both private and publicly listed
firms.
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acquisitions (relatively financially constrained and unconstrained acquisitions, proxied by those
made by domestic and foreign acquiring firms, respectively), across two macroeconomic regimes
(normal and adverse financial shock), we employ a dierence-in-dierence approach. To test
whether there is convergence in the size of acquisitions between foreign and domestic acquisi-
tions during an adverse financial shock, we estimate the following linear model:
fracacqkjct = βjcδjc + βCD
ct
C + βFD
kjct
F + βC,FD
kjct
C,F + controls
′
c,t−4βmc + kjct. (III.8)
Here k, j, c, and t stand for transaction, single-digit SIC industry of the target firm, country,
and time, respectively. The dependent variable is the fraction of the target firm acquired in
transaction k. The two main independent variables are DCct, that indicates whether an acqui-
sition took place during a period when there was an aggregate adverse financial shock, and
DkjctF , which indicates whether the acquirer involved in a particular transaction is a foreign firm.
We also include a vector of fixed eects δjc and a set of lagged country-level macroeconomic
controls controlsc,t−4. The standard errors are clustered two-way along the cross-sectional
(country×target-industry) and time (month) dimensions.41 Since fracacqkjct ∈ [0, 1], a linear
model might potentially lead to predicted values outside this range. Hence we also estimate βC
, βF and βC,F in a Generalized Linear Model (GLM) framework using maximum likelihood. This
takes into account the bounded nature of our dependent variable (see Papke and Wooldridge,
1996). DCct, which serves as our proxy for an aggregate adverse financial shock, is defined using
the (annual) systemic banking crises dates from Laeven and Valencia (2010).42 DkjctF = 1 when
the acquirer is from a developed market, which is in the spirit of our theoretical model. The
results are insensitive to defining foreign firms simply as those not from the target’s country be-
cause the vast majority of our foreign acquirers are from developed markets. Following Brown
41This procedure adjusts for the possible correlation of the error terms within the same country×target-industry,
as well as among firms within the same month. Petersen (2009) shows that failing to cluster along multiple di-
mensions can lead to deflated standard errors in firm level studies and provides code to implement inference in
Stata.
42See Alquist et al. (2016) for a detailed discussion on the arguments in favor of using the banking crisis dates as
a proxy for financial shocks, as opposed to currency or twin crises.
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and Dinc (2011), lagged macroeconomic variables are used to control for the business cycle deter-
minants of M&A activity.43 Alquist et al. (2016) find regional dierences (especially, between Asia
and Latin America) in their empirical analysis of acquisitions in emerging economies. Hence, we
report results for our full sample, for Asia, and for all other countries.
As noted before, we identify the eects predicted by the models empirically using the as-
sumption that domestic acquirers are constrained, while foreign acquirers are not, and that the
banking crisis dates proxy an adverse financial shock for all firms in a country. Based on the
theory, we frame two key empirical hypotheses regarding the coeicients βC and βC,F in Re-
gression III.8.44 Note below that we do not frame hypotheses involving βF , which measures the
dierence in acquired shares during normal times between foreign and domestic acquisitions.
We want to focus on the comparative static results of a financial shock rather than the initial
or final level dierences in acquired shares, which could be due to dierences in technology be-
tween constrained (domestic) and unconstrained (foreign) firms that are not part of the model.
Accordingly, we remain agnostic about the sign of βF and interpret its estimates in the context
of the literature.
(i) βC : Domestic acquisitions involve larger stakes during a banking crisis, i.e., βC > 0.
(ii) βC + βC,F : We expect crisis-time foreign acquisitions to involve smaller stakes, i.e., βC +
βC,F < 0.
The results are shown in Tables III.2 and III.3 for the OLS and GLM estimations, respectively.
We find strong empirical support for our two key hypotheses in the full sample of acquisitions,
with some regional dierences that are discussed below. First, domestic acquisitions involve
significantly higher stakes during crises. The point estimate for the full sample and the uncon-
ditional mean fraction acquired in the sample (about 63%) for domestic acquisitions indicates a
6.3% increase in the size of domestic acquisitions during crises. The model also does well on the
43Specifically, they are the change in the nominal exchange rate (quarterly), the use of IMF credit and loans as a
percentage of a country’s quota (quarterly), real GDP per capita (annual), and real GDP growth (annual). The data
sources are the Penn World Tables, the IMF’s International Financial Statistics, Taiwan’s National Statistical Oice,
and the Central Bank of the Republic of China. More details and descriptions of the macroeconomic controls are
provided in Alquist et al. (2016).
44The baseline group in the regression is (βC = 0, βF = 0), i.e., domestic acquisitions during normal times.
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second prediction. By the OLS estimates, crisis-time foreign acquisitions are found to be smaller,
though not significantly so, in the full and non-Asian sample, while they are significantly smaller
in the Asian samples. The GLM estimates suggest that they are significantly smaller in the full
sample as well.
The sign and significance of βF and βF + βC,F can be interpreted using the model. The
estimates of βF suggest that foreign and domestic acquisitions do not dier significantly during
normal times in the full sample, but this result masks large regional dierences. In particular,
the GLM results show that foreign stakes are significantly larger than domestic ones during
normal times in the Asian samples, while the opposite is true for the non-Asian sample (mostly
Latin America). These two cancel out in the full sample to yield an insignificant coeicient on
the foreign acquisition dummy. Through the lens of our model, this finding is consistent with
foreign-owned firms being engaged in acquisitions that lead to long-term synergies in Asia, and
being more productive than domestic firms. There is ample evidence in the literature in favor
of the laer point (see Yasar and Morrison Paul, 2007; Blalock and Gertler, 2008; Arnold and
Javorcik, 2009). Next, note that βF + βC,F < 0, i.e., foreign stakes acquired during crises are
significantly smaller than domestic stakes acquired during crises, in all the samples using both
OLS and GLM estimates. These two results together point to a “convergence” in the size of stakes
acquired in foreign and domestic acquisitions during financial crisis episodes. Recall that this
convergence is one observable implication of the change in the relative average productivity of
constrained and unconstrained acquisitions in a crisis. It is a distinctive prediction of our model
and suggests the existence of “cleansing eect”, whereby only the most productive domestic
acquiring firms in a country hit by a negative financial shock are able to compete in the market
for corporate control.
To test whether there is convergence in the flipping rate of acquisitions between foreign and
domestic acquisitions during crisis times, we estimate a Cox proportional hazards model of the
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Table III.2: Average Size of Ownership Stakes: OLS
Full Asia Post-1997 Asia Non-Asia
βˆC 0.04a 0.04a 0.03b 0.02
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.03)
βˆF 0.00 0.02 0.03 -0.04a
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
βˆC,F -0.07a -0.09a -0.09a -0.03
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04)
No. obs. 29,728 20,410 17,524 9,318
R2 0.091 0.078 0.086 0.054
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country×Target-Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Combination Tests
Foreign Crisis Versus Foreign Non-Crisis
H0 : βC + βC,F = 0 -0.03 -0.05b -0.06b -0.01
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Foreign Crisis Versus Domestic Crisis
H0 : βF + βC,F = 0 -0.07a -0.07a -0.06a -0.07c
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.04)
Notes: The table reports the point estimate of the coeicient associated with the banking crisis dummy
βC , foreign acquisition dummy βF and their interaction term βC,F obtained from a linear model. The
regression is Equation III.8 in the text. The dependent variable is the fraction of a firm acquired. It is based
on the full sample of acquisitions by domestic and foreign acquirers. The dates for the domestic banking
crises are from Laeven and Valencia (2010). a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
levels, respectively. Standard errors, clustered two-way at the level of country×target-industry and month,
are reported in parentheses. The coeicient estimates for the country×target-industry fixed eects and
the macroeconomic controls lagged four quarters are omied from the table to conserve space.
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Table III.3: Average Size of Ownership Stakes: GLM
Full Asia Post-1997 Asia Non-Asia
βˆC 0.21a 0.20a 0.16a 0.08
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.08)
βˆF -0.00 0.08a 0.13a -0.21a
(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
βˆC,F -0.33a -0.40a -0.39a -0.13
(0.06) (0.07) (0.08) (0.10)
No. obs. 29,728 20,410 17,524 9,318
Log L -15,905 -11,233 -9,591 -4,655
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country×Target-Industry Fixed Eects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Combination Tests
Foreign Crisis Versus Foreign Non-Crisis
H0 : βC + βC,F = 0 -0.12b -0.20a -0.24a -0.05
(0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07)
Foreign Crisis Versus Domestic Crisis
H0 : βF + βC,F = 0 -0.33a -0.32a -0.26a -0.34a
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.09)
Notes: The table reports the point estimate of the coeicient associated with the banking crisis dummy βC ,
foreign acquisition dummy βF and their interaction term βC,F obtained from the Generalized Linear Model.
The dependent variable is the fraction of a firm acquired. It is based on the full sample of acquisitions by
domestic and foreign acquirers. The dates for the domestic banking crises are from Laeven and Valencia
(2010). a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. Robust standard
errors are reported in parentheses. The coeicient estimates for the country×target-industry fixed eects
and the macroeconomic controls lagged four quarters are omied from the table to conserve space.
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following form:
ln[hjc(τ |X)] = ln[hjc(τ)] + βCDctC + βFDkjctF + βC,FDkjctC,F + controls
′
c,t−4βmc + kjct (III.9)
where X is a vector of independent variables as defined before. The only new object is the esti-
mated hazard function hjc(τ), which is the probability density that an average firm experiences
an acquisition event in a small interval of time ∆τ , conditional on it not having been the target
of an acquisition for τ units of time since the last acquisition event.45
We frame two empirical hypotheses regarding the coeicients βC and βC,F in Regression
(III.9). For the reasons outlined before we do not frame hypotheses involving βF and instead
interpret the estimates through the lens of the model. Note that a positive coeicient in the Cox
model indicates a higher hazard, i.e., a higher risk of flipping.
(i) βC : Domestic acquisitions undertaken during a banking crisis (compared to domestic
acquisitions during normal times) have lower subsequent hazard rates, i.e., βC < 0.
(ii) βC + βC,F : Foreign acquisitions undertaken during a banking crisis (compared to foreign
acquisitions during normal times) have higher subsequent hazard rates, βC + βC,F > 0.
The results of the Cox regression estimation are shown in Table III.4. Our first prediction
cannot be rejected. The coeicient βC is negative and statistically significant in all the samples.
The second prediction is weakly rejected by the data. The point estimates in all the samples are
negative, though they are insignificant in three out of the four samples (it is significant at 5% in
the post-1997 Asia sample).
In addition, the model oers economic interpretations of the two other empirical results.
45The duration τ of an acquisition is measured as follows. We first identify firms that appear at least twice in
our data as a target firm, which implies: (a) either that the first acquirer sold o her stake in the second acquisition
if the initial acquisition involved 100% of the firm; (b) a dierent prior owner sold a stake in the firm. Since we
are interested only in resales by acquirers, we limit ourselves to 50% or 100% acquisitions (we report results for the
former) because we are more confident in those cases that the initial buyer was flipping her acquisition. Under this
assumption, the initial transaction identifies the beginning of the relationship. The second sale is thus assumed to
mark the end of the immediately preceding ownership relationship, and so on for subsequent appearances by the
same target in the dataset. The duration of an acquisition is thus the distance in time between each transaction
involving the same target. A detailed discussion about the merits and drawbacks of this method can be found in
Alquist et al. (2016).
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Table III.4: Divestiture Rates
Only Majority Acquisitions
Full Asia Post-1997 Asia Non-Asia
βˆC -0.27b -0.46a -0.68a 0.31c
(0.13) (0.15) (0.15) (0.17)
βˆF -0.18b -0.35a -0.29b 0.10
(0.08) (0.11) (0.13) (0.09)
βˆC,F 0.12 0.35b 0.27 -0.43c
(0.16) (0.17) (0.19) (0.26)
No. Obs. 21,216 13,830 12,085 7,386
Log L -8,685 -5,932 -4,641 -2,735
Macroeconomic Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country×Target-Industry Stratification Yes Yes Yes Yes
Linear Combination Tests
Foreign Crisis Versus Foreign Non-Crisis
H0 : βC + βC,F = 0 -0.15 -0.10 -0.41b -0.12
(0.13) (0.18) (0.19) (0.17)
Foreign Crisis Versus Domestic Crisis
H0 : βF + βC,F = 0 -0.07 0.01 -0.01 -0.33
(0.15) (0.15) (0.16) (0.25)
Notes: The table reports the point estimates of the coeicients associated with the banking crisis dummy
βC , foreign acquisition dummy βF , their interaction term βC,F and the fraction owned aer the acquisition
βfracownaft obtained from the Cox regression model. The regression is Equation III.9 in the text. The
dependent variable is the hazard rate of an acquisition. It is based on the full sample of acquisitions by
domestic and foreign acquirers in which post-acquisition stake is at least 50%. The dates for the domestic
banking crises are from Laeven and Valencia (2010). Standard errors are reported in parentheses. a, b and c
indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. The coeicient estimates for the
macroeconomic controls lagged four quarters are omied from the table to conserve space.
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From the second row of coeicients in Table III.4, βF < 0 and significantly so in three out of
the four samples. This indicates that foreign acquisitions in normal times have lower divestiture
rates than domestic ones. Through the lens of our model, this suggests that foreign acquirers in
Asia, on average, completed acquisitions that had higher technological synergies than domestic
acquirers, a finding that is consistent with our earlier result that foreign acquisitions in Asia
also resulted in larger stakes. Next, we find that βF + βC,F is not significantly dierent from
zero, which says that foreign and domestic acquisitions of the crisis cohort do not have dierent
divestiture rates. These two findings together point to a convergence in divestiture rates between
foreign and domestic acquisitions aer an adverse financial shock: While the divestiture rates
of foreign acquisition are significantly lower than domestic ones for the normal-time cohort, the
two are statistically indistinguishable for the crisis cohort.46
We perform a few checks to assess the sensitivity of our baseline results to alternative em-
pirical specifications. First, we use an alternative proxy for an aggregate financial shock, making
use of the annual banking crisis dates from Reinhart and Rogo (2009) instead of our baseline
dating scheme from Laeven and Valencia (2010). Our results are insensitive to this alternative.
The reader might also wonder if our macroeconomic control variables (change in the nominal
exchange rate, the use of IMF credit and loans as a percentage of a country’s quota, real GDP per
capita, real GDP growth), that are meant to control for normal business cycle fluctuations in our
dependent variables, may be influencing the estimated eect of the financial crisis indicators.
To check this, we estimate all the reported regressions without including macroeconomic con-
trols. The results (not reported) show that all our conclusions remain unchanged. In fact, quite
intuitively, the point estimates of the crisis eects increase marginally in magnitude when the
macroeconomic controls are excluded from the regression. Third, we perform all our estimations
excluding financial sector acquiring firms from the sample, as these acquisitions might be driven
46A specification that controls for the fraction of the firm that is acquired or the fraction that is owned aer a
transaction yields very similar results. We prefer not to control for the fraction acquired in our baseline specification
because our theory suggests that the size, like the duration, is a reflection of the underlying quality of the match
between the acquiring and target firms. Thus using it as a control would introduce endogeneity. The estimate of the
coeicient on the fraction acquired is negative and significant (i.e., larger stakes reduce the hazard of a divestiture),
which is in line with the theory.
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by quite dierent considerations. For example, investment banks or private equity investors
might intrinsically buy smaller stakes and flip their acquisitions faster than, say, acquiring firms
that are in the manufacturing sector. Then, some of the paerns we find might simply be driven
by proportionately larger increases and declines in foreign financial and domestic financial ac-
quisitions during a financial crisis, respectively. All our results turn out to be robust to excluding
financial acquiring firms from the estimation sample. The results of the above robustness checks
are excluded from the paper for conciseness but are available upon request from the authors.
To summarize our empirical results, we find strong empirical support for all our predictions
regarding the fraction of a firm acquired. Our evidence on divestiture rates generally favors the
mechanism highlighted by the model. In particular, we find evidence for convergence during
financial crises of both the fraction acquired and divestiture rates between domestic and foreign
acquisitions.
4 Conclusion
This paper provides a simple analytical framework for assessing the eects of adverse aggregate
financial shocks on the market for corporate control. We model two kinds of acquiring firms:
Those operating under financial constraints similar to target firms, and those that are finan-
cially unconstrained. Using the model, we first show that adverse financial shocks lead to only
the most productive domestic firms, which are themselves financially constrained, performing
acquisitions. This is contrast to foreign acquisitions, who perform more fire-sale acquisitions
that may have lower productivity. Intuitively, larger and more productive domestic firms are
less subject to credit constraints and find it easier to raise financial resources to complete ac-
quisitions. Interpreting constrained and unconstrained acquiring firms as domestic and foreign
acquirers in a large dataset of emerging market acquisitions spanning the years 1990-2007, we
provide evidence of an increase in the stakes acquired in domestic acquisitions, as well as a
novel “convergence” in divestiture rates of foreign and domestic acquisitions in the crisis cohort,
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as predicted by the model.
We also provide theoretical insight into the cleansing eect of financial crises on the aggre-
gate economy. In this respect, we show that the presence of a market for corporate control has
important implications for the traditional cleansing eect. In particular we show, using simula-
tions, that the presence of foreign acquiring firms leads to much larger positive cleansing eects
of financial shocks than having only domestic acquirers. Our theoretical results clearly show that
allowing, or even facilitating, foreign acquisitions during periods of aggregate financial stress not
only has the function of liquidity provision (which has been stressed in the literature so far), it
also has a positive cleansing eect on aggregate productivity. While the number of foreign ac-
quisitions is oen small compared to the total number of firms in the economy, these oen
involve medium or large sized firms that are of great importance in terms of market value and
employment. A cleansing eect within that group of firms is thus likely to have large aggregate
consequences.
It is worth stressing that our contrasting results for unconstrained (foreign) and constrained
(domestic) acquisitions highlight the role of firm level borrowing constraints, which in our model
comprise the only dierence between firms, in determining which financially constrained firms
remain active in the market for corporate control. It should be noted that this is a deliberate
modelling choice, and done to demonstrate the eect we are aer—the dierence in the behavior
of foreign and domestic firms when the laer are faced by financial shocks—most cleanly. Thus
our results have mostly focussed on the comparative statics of a financial shock rather than the
initial level dierences in the variables of interest (such as shares acquired and divestiture rates),
which could be due to dierences in technology between foreign and domestic firms that are
explicitly excluded in the model.
The paper has a rich set of firm level predictions regarding the joint distribution of produc-
tivity and financial liquidity for acquirers and targets, as well as the aggregate cleansing eect,
that we do not test. Using firm level balance-sheet data from select EMEs to explore these pre-
dictions is a fruitful direction for future work. Also, while applied to the data in the context of
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EMEs, the model in this paper is equally applicable to acquisitions in developed markets, for
which beer quality and more extensive firm-level data exist, and where financial liquidity has
also been shown to be important for the M&A process (see Almeida et al., 2011; Erel et al., 2015).
The model can thus help guide future empirical work on the role of productivity and financial
constraints in the market for corporate control in these countries. These and other investigations
are le for future work.
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Conclusion
This dissertation has analyzed how a country’s trade openness aects its set of policy options in
the face of economic crises. The first chapter has provided empirical evidence that exporting and
importing firms react to exchange rate movements. Exchange rates are therefore an important
channel of monetary policy in open economies. Whether monetary policy becomes more or less
eective as an economy opens up to trade depends on the trade elasticity to price changes. In
the particular case of the elasticity estimate presented in the first chapter, a country’s openness
barely aects the eectiveness of monetary policy. This result has important implications for
monetary policy in a currency union. The Euro area, for instance, is composed of a few large
and relatively closed countries like France, Italy and Germany, but also many smaller and open
countries like Belgium and the Baltic countries. Countries also dier in their exposure to non-
euro-area trade. This heterogeneity, combined with imperfect movements of production factors,
can potentially pose a challenge to monetary policy (in addition to the challenge of potentially
asymmetric shocks across countries). But the results presented in the first chapter suggest that,
despite this heterogeneity, a common monetary policy is likely to have symmetric eects across
all member countries.
The second chapter contributes to the debate on austerity policies in Europe. It provides em-
pirical evidence that shortfalls in government purchases are associated with lower-than-predicted
GDP and inflation, but such a relationship cannot be established for government revenue. The
implied multiplier on government purchases of 1.3 is relatively large and shows that fiscal policy
is still quite eective in open economies, at least in the data. The multi-country DSGE model
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qualitatively replicates the eects of government purchases shortfalls on macroeconomic aggre-
gates observed in the data. A challenge for the model is to replicate the large multiplier observed
in the data. In future work, it will be used to analyze the role of exchange rate policies, trade
openness and fiscal spillover eects in shaping the economies’ response to austerity policies.
The last chapter analyzes a third set of macroeconomic policies that promote (cross-border)
M&As. The chapter shows that M&As can substitute for bank lending to allocate resources to-
wards more productive firms. Promoting M&As can therefore be an important tool in times of
financial crises and tight bank lending. The presented quantitative model suggests that M&As
can be particularly helpful if the acquiring firm is foreign and not subject to tighter financial con-
straints. Just promoting domestic M&As is not suicient because domestic acquirers themselves
have lile access to capital during financial crises. These results are informative of the current
economic situation in Europe. The global market for corporate control experienced a large draw-
back during the Great Recession and has not fully recovered since then. At the same time, the
recovery across European economies has been very unequal, and whereas credit spreads have in-
creased in periphery countries, financial capital is abundant in core countries like Germany and
Switzerland. The low take-o in cross-border M&A rates is therefore surprising and indicates
potentially large benefits of policies promoting those cross-border M&As.
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Appendix A Empirical Part
Derivation of changes in firm performance measures
In this section, I derive expressions for changes in the nominal output, labor, nominal interme-
diate consumption and nominal value added. In the derivation, I make use of the following two
equations describing changes in the output price and changes in marginal costs:
E
(
d log pi
)
= −d logEiX + (1− θ)d logMCi
d logMCi = γid logW + (1− γi) (d logEiM + d log viz) .
Equations (I.2) shows the change in real output. The change in nominal output is the change in
real output plus the change in the export price index quoted in Estonian kroons:
E
(
d log(piky
i)
)
= E
(
d log pik − ψd log pi
)
+ d logDi.
For sticky-price firms, the change in the export price index in kroons equals the eective ex-
change rate of the invoicing currency. For flexible price firms, the change in the export price
index is the change in marginal costs. Then, defining d logEi$ =
∑
n∈Xi
$
yi
$
yi
d logE$, the change
in nominal output is
E
(
d log(piky
i)
)
= θd logEi$ + (1− θ)d logMCik − ψE
(
d log pi
)
+ d logDi
= ψd logEiX + θd logE
i
$ + (1− ψ)(1− θ)d logMCi + d logDi
And inserting the expression for d logMC i gives
(III.10)E
(
d log(piky
i)
)
= ψd logEiX + θd logE
i
$ + d logD
i
+ (1− ψ)(1− θ) [(1− γi)d logEiM + γid logW + (1− γi)d log viz] .
Using nominal output instead of real output does not change the coeicient on d logEiX , ψ.
To gain intuition for this result, consider an Estonian firm that exports in Estonian kroons to
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Russia. If the Russian ruble appreciates, the Estonian firm will increase its exports because its
export price in rubles has gone down. However, its export price in kroons is unaected. Since the
export price in kroons is unaected, real and nominal exports are the same. This is no longer true
if the Estonian firm invoices in a dierent currency. I therefore add θd logEi$ as an additional
covariate that controls for changes in the invoicing currency exchange rate.
To derive the change in labor and the value of intermediate consumption, I have to make
assumptions on the production function. I assume a CES production function in labor and inter-
mediate consumption with an elasticity of substitution . Its log-linearized form is
E
(
d log yi
)
= γidE
(
log li
)
+ (1− γi)E (d log qi) .
Inserting the optimal factor employment condition
E
(
d log qi
)
= E
[
d log li
)−  (d log vi − d logW)
gives
E
(
d log yi
)
= E
(
d log li
)− (1− γi) (d log vi − d logW) .
Using E (d log yi) = −ψd log pi + d logDi, gives an equation for E (d log li)
E
(
d log li
)
= −ψE (d log pi)+ d logDi + (1− γi) (d log vi − d logW)
= ψd logEiX − ψ(1− θ)(1− γi)d logEiM − ψ(1− θ)
(
γid logW + (1− γi)d log viz
)
+ d logDi + (1− γi) (d log vi − d logW) ,
which can be simplified to (using d log vi = d logEiM + d log v
i
z)
(III.11)E
(
d log li
)
= ψd logEiX − (1− γi) [ψ(1− θ)− ]
(
d logEiM + d log v
i
z
)
− [− γi (− ψ + θψ)] d logW + d logDi
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Similarly, the value of intermediate consumption is
E
(
d log(viqi)
)
= E
(
d log li
)
+ d logW + (1− )d log vi
or:
(III.12)E
(
d log(viqi)
)
= ψd logEiX −
[
(1− γi)ψ(1− θ)− 1 + γi] (d logEiM + d log viz)
+ γi (1− ψ + θψ) d logW + d logDi
The eect of changes in the export exchange rate on both labor and the value of intermediate
consumption is the same and given by ψ. Intuitively, a depreciation of the export exchange rate
raises demand for a firm’s output and hence, it will demand more inputs one-for-one with the
output change. The eect of a change in the import exchange rate is ambiguous. Generally, one
can distinguish two eects of a depreciation of the import exchange rate, which raises the price
of imports:
1. Marginal costs increases and to the extent that the firm can adjust its output price, demand
will go down and the firm will demand fewer inputs. The magnitude of this eect depends
on the demand elasticity ψ and the share of firms with flexible prices, (1− θ).
2. Labor becomes more aractive, especially if the elasticity of substitution between inter-
mediates and labor is high, i.e.  is large.
For labor the coeicient on the import exchange rate is negative if  is low, ψ is high and θ is
low. For intermediate consumption, the coeicient is negative if  is high, ψ is high and θ is low.
Note that the coeicient is not proportional to (1− γi) if  6= 1.
Equations (III.10) to (III.12) are the equations describing changes in nominal gross output,
labor and nominal intermediate consumption that I estimate in the empirical section.
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Construction of variables for empirical analysis
The following equations show the construction of my independent variables:
∆ logEiX,t = s
i
X,t
∑
n∈Xi
(
siX,n,t∆ logEn,k,t − θ
∑
$
(
siX,n,$,t∆ logEn,$,t
))
∆ logEiM,t = ∆s
i
M,t
∑
n∈Mi
(
(1− θ)siM,n,t∆ logEn,k,t + θ
∑
$
(
siM,n,$,t∆ logEn,$,t
))
∆ log viz,t = s
i
M,t
∑
n∈Mi
(
siM,n,t∆ log vz,n,t
)
+
(
1− siM,t
)
∆ log vEE,,t
∆Diy,t =
(
1− siX,t
)
∆ log YEE,t + s
i
X,t
∑
n∈Xi
(
siX,n,t∆ log Yn,t
)
∆Dip,t =
(
1− siX,t
)
∆ logPEE,t + s
i
X,t
∑
n∈Xi
(
siX,n,t∆ logPn,t
)
.
The first two indices are the eective export and import exchange rate as defined in (I.9) and
(I.10). Trade shares are given by s, with the X subscript denoting exports and the M subscript
denoting imports. For instance, the shares siX,t are averages of period t − 1 and t shares of a
firm’s export value in total output, and the shares siM,t are shares of a firm’s import value in total
material costs. The shares siX,n,$,t are average shares of export values to country n in currency
$ in the firm’s total exports. Taking the average across t − 1 and t takes into account that
firms substitute across source countries when facing relative price changes.47 For the exchange
rates En,$,t, the first subscript n indicates the country and the second subscript indicates the
invoicing currency $. I allow for firms exporting to the same country n in dierent currencies $.
I therefore sum over all invoicing currencies $ and weight them by their respective shares siX,n,$,t
in total exports. The exchange rate of the invoicing currency is provided by Statistics Estonia and
measured as the average exchange rate of the month that the transaction took place. I calculate
the exchange rate of the destination currency myself, using the annual average rate as it is listed
in the UN national accounts database.48
47The resulting price index is very similar to Fisher’s ideal price index.
48See http://unstats.un.org/unsd/snaama/dnlList.asp. I only have access to trade data
aggregated at the annual level.
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The third index ∆ log viz,t reflects changes in producer prices both abroad and in Estonia. The
terms vz,n,t are measured as the producer price index of manufactured goods in country n or the
GDP deflator, depending on data availability.49
For the indices for absorption and the price level in the destination markets, ∆Diy,t and ∆D
i
p,t,
I use the GDP deflator in country n for Pn,t and real GDP for Yn,t, taken from the UN national
accounts database.
Changes in wages, ∆ logWt, are measured by sector-specific labor cost indices provided by
Statistics Estonia.50
I calculate γi as the average share of labor costs in total costs (= a firm’s wage bill plus total
material costs) for each firm, averaging over all available years that the firm is in my dataset.
Consistency of estimator
In my empirical analysis, I estimate a regression of the form51
d log yit = ψd logE
i
X,t + ε
i
t. (III.13)
49Several sources are used for the producer price index. For most European countries, Eurostat data on non-
domestic PPI is used (’sts_inppnd_a’). If available, the non-domestic industry sector output price index for the
euro area is used; if not, the general non-domestic industry sector output price index is used. Estonia’s producer
price index is vEE,t. All producer price indices and GDP deflators are quoted in the currency of their country. For
countries not listed on Eurostat (Norway, Switzerland, New Zealand, USA, Australia, Canada, Chile and China), the
OECD total producer price index for all industrial activities (from the Producer Prices dataset) is used. For other
countries (Portugal, Turkey, Russia, Korea, Japan), the domestic PPI for manufacturing retrieved from the St. Louis
FRED database is used. For missing countries, GDP deflators are calculated based on data from the UN national
accountrs. The GDP deflator is constructed based on nominal GDP data measured at current prices in national
currency and real GDP measured at constant 2005 prices in national currency.
50See http://pub.stat.ee/px-web.2001/I_Databas/Economy/databasetree.asp..
Sectors are defined at the section level (e.g. ’C’ is Manufacturing. The quarterly data in series ’WST21’ has been
transformed to annual data using a log-linear average.
51I ignore, for simplicity, other regressors from this regression.
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My discussion has pointed out that the eective firm exchange rate for exports, EiX,t, should
dier across firms, depending on whether they can adjust their price or not:
d logEiX =

(∑
n∈Xi
yin
yi
d logEz
)
−
(∑
n∈Xi
yi
$
yi
d logE$
)
≡ d logEiz − d logEi$ if i ∈ Θ∑
n∈Xi
yin
yi
(d logEz) ≡ d logEiz if i ∈ Θ¯
But in my empirical analysis, I use the same eective exchange rate for all firms (see equations
(I.9)):
d log E¯iX = d logE
i
z − θd logE$
where, here, I make explicit that this is an expected exchange rate across both types of firms by
adding an upper bar.
Theorem 1. The OLS estimator of β in the regression
d log yit = βd log E¯
i
X,t + ε
i
t. (III.14)
is a consistent estimator of −ψ, that means plim
(
βˆ
)
= −ψ, under the assumptions
plim
((
d log E¯X
)′ (
d log E¯X
)
N
)
= Q,
plim
((
d log E¯X
)′ (
d log E¯$
)
N
)
= M,
plim
((
d log E¯X
)′
(ε)
N
)
= 0,
where M and Q are positive and finite.
Proof. Denote the two subsamples of firms with sticky and flexible prices by a superscript 1 and
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2. The estimates of β from a regression (III.14) on either sample are
βˆ1 =
[(
d log E¯1X
)′ (
d log E¯1X
)]−1 (
d log E¯1X
)′ (−ψ (d log E¯1X − (1− θ)d logE1$)+ ε1)
βˆ2 =
[(
d log E¯2X
)′ (
d log E¯2X
)]−1 (
d log E¯2X
)′ (−ψ (d log E¯2X + θd logE2$)+ ε2) ,
where I used the fact that I can rewrite the regression in (III.13) as
d log yit = ψ
(
d log E¯iX,t − (1− θ)d logEi$,t
)
+ εit if i ∈ Θ
d log yit = ψ
(
d log E¯iX,t + θd logE
i
$,t
)
+ εit if i ∈ Θ¯.
The probability limits of the estimators are
plim
(
βˆ1
)
= −ψ − (1− θ)ψM
Q
plim
(
βˆ2
)
= −ψ + θψM
Q
,
using Slutsky’s theorem on probability limits. Running regression (III.14) on the entire sample
gives an estimator
βˆ =
[(
d log E¯X
)′ (
d log E¯X
)]−1 (
d log E¯X
)′
−ψ (d log E¯1X − (1− θ)d logE1$)
−ψ (d log E¯2X + θd logE2$)
+ ε

=
[(
d log E¯X
)′ (
d log E¯X
)]−1 (
d log E¯1X
)′ (−ψ (d log E¯1X − (1− θ)d logE1$))
+
[(
d log E¯X
)′ (
d log E¯X
)]−1 (
d log E¯2X
)′ (−ψ (d log E¯2X + θd logE2$))
+
[(
d log E¯X
)′ (
d log E¯X
)]−1
ε
=
[(
d log E¯X
)′ (
d log E¯X
)]−1 [(
d log E¯1X
)′ (
d log E¯1X
)
βˆ1 +
(
d log E¯2X
)′ (
d log E¯2X
)
βˆ2
]
.
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Its probability limit is
plim
(
βˆ
)
= θplim
[(d log E¯X)′ (d log E¯X)
n
]−1 (
d log E¯1X
)′ (
d log E¯1X
)
θn
 plim(βˆ1)
+ (1− θ)plim
[(d log E¯X)′ (d log E¯X)
n
]−1 (
d log E¯2X
)′ (
d log E¯2X
)
(1− θ)n
 plim(βˆ2)
= θplim
(
βˆ1
)
+ (1− θ)plim
(
βˆ2
)
= θ
(
−ψ − (1− θ)ψM
Q
)
+ (1− θ)
(
−ψ + θψM
Q
)
= −ψ.
More information on the firm-level dataset
Datasets My firm-level data is provided by Statistics Estonia, a government agency that pub-
lishes oicial statistics on the Estonian economy. My analysis is based on two datasets. The
first dataset has extensive trade data collected through the Extrastat and Intrastat system. Ex-
trastat data are based on customs declarations for trade with non-EU countries, while Intrastat
data for within-EU trade is based on statistical declarations and mainly misses small trade flows.
The reporting thresholds for Intrastat in 2014 were annual imports of e130,000 and exports of
e200,000. This trade data contains information on both imports and exports by product (CN
8-digit level) and firm, the partner country, the invoicing currency, the value in euros and the in-
voicing currency, and the net weight. Exports include goods originating from Estonia and goods
from third countries.
The second dataset contains financial data of enterprises, which were collected on the basis
of the annual statistical questionnaire "EKOMAR". The EKOMAR survey collects data on em-
ployment and hours worked, opening and closing balance sheets, income statements and capital
expenditure. The survey population is based on the register of economically active enterprises.
The population includes all firms with either positive revenue or at least one person employed
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Table A.1: Firm-Year Observations per Sector
Total 25,846
B Mining and quarrying 259
C Manufacturing 10,458
D Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 134
E Water collection, treatment and supply 237
F Construction 1,293
G Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles 8,790
H Transportation and storage 1,706
I Accommodation and food service activities 261
J Information and communication 879
L Real eastate activities 143
M Professional-, scientific and technical activity 753
N Administrative and support service activities 408
P Education 74
Q Human health and social work activities 133
R Arts, entertainment and recreation 158
S Other service activities 160
The table displays the number of firm-year observations per sec-
tor for all years (2004 - 2012).
in the commercial register. The statistical unit is the enterprise as a company, including pub-
lic limited companies, private limited companies and branches of foreign companies with 20 or
more persons employed. All companies of private ownership with 20 or more persons employed
are completely enumerated (although some companies might fail to return survey responses),
whereas smaller companies are sampled. Every year a new sample of smaller firms is drawn,
using stratified random sampling. The population is stratified by economic activity, by number
of persons employed and by type of owner.
I merge these two datasets using a firm’s tax ID as a common identifier. Not all trade data
can be matched because some trade is done by government agencies, private persons and foreign
firms that are not registered in Estonia.
Table A.1 displays the number of firm-year observations in my matched sample by sector.
Most observations correspond to firms in the manufacturing or the wholesale / retail trade sector.
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Dependent variables. My three main dependent variables at the firm level are gross output,
intermediate consumption and hours worked. I use the term ‘gross output’ instead of revenue
because my firm-level measure diers from revenue in several respects and its construction,
in principle, is closely related to gross output at the national level. In particular, gross output
subtracts the cost of merchandise from revenue, which is particularly important for firms in
the wholesale and retail sector. In addition, it adjusts for changes in inventories and subtracts
payments to subcontractors. Intermediate consumption includes both consumption of goods and
services, and can be broken down into purchases of materials, supplies and intermediate goods,
purchases of fuel and power, long-term rental and other laid-out work. Note that this definition
includes rented capital services, but excludes capital services of purchased capital goods.
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Appendix B Model
Steady state
I focus on a steady state with balanced trade. I choose the price of the domestic good to be the
numeraire
(
pd = 1
)
. I also adjust the desired price for imports in dollars such that p
mE
E$
= 1. The
investment FOC gives νj = U1 for all j. Utilization is uj = 1, so that a(uj) = 0. Then, from the
capital Euler equations I have
Rj
P
=
1
β
− (1− δ),
which implies that the rental price is equal across sectors: Rj = R. The optimal price seing
equation gives the price in sector j as the marginal cost times the markup:
pj = µMCj,
where µ = υ
υ−1 is the markup. Then, the optimal choice of k
j requires that the rental price of
capital equals the marginal product of capital, reduced by the inverse of the markup
1
β
− (1− δ) = p
j
P
αγyj
µKj
.
I choose Zd so that aggregate gross output, Y = 1. I then adjust Zx so that px = 1 in steady
state. It follows that P = 1. From the demand for domestic goods, this gives yd = ω and
ym = yx = 1− ω. From the optimal demand for intermediate goods, I can find Qj :
Qj =
1− γ
µ
yj
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Next, I adjust the labor disutility weight κ so that
(
R
α
)α ( W
1−α
)1−α
= 1. Then, optimal factor
employment requires
Dj =
γ
1− γQ
j
=
γ
µ
yj.
Inserting this into the expression for capital above gives Kj
RKj =
αγ
µ
yj
And Lj directly follows from the optimal capital-labor ratio:
WLj =
(1− α)γ
µ
yj.
Total investment and total intermediate consumption are
X = δ
(
Kd +Kx
)
Q = Qd +Qx.
The market clearing condition for the final good allows me to find C
Y = C +X +Q
C = Y − (X +Q).
To recover the productivity levels, I use the real marginal cost equation to get Zj = µ.
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Appendix C antitative Analysis
Data sources for aggregate data
Data for impulse responses My main data sources are Eurostat and Statistics Estonia.52
• Real GDP, real consumption, real investment, net exports over GDP: Eurostat: National
accounts (ESA 2010), arterly national accounts, Main GDP aggregates, GDP and main
components [namq_10_gdp], seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by working days;
Chain-linked volume (in 2005 Euros); real GDP: Gross domestic product at market prices
(B1GQ), real consumption: Household and NPISH final consumption expenditure (P31_S14_S15),
real investment: gross capital formation (P5G), net exports over GDP: (Exports of goods
and services (P6) - Imports of goods and services (P7))/B1GQ ; Real GDP, real consumption
and real investment are detrended using the estimated trend growth rate gt
ydetrt = log yt −
(
log yss +
t−1∑
s=1
log(1 + gs+1)
)
for y being real GDP, real consumption or real investment, and where gt is the trend growth
rate of GDP per capita (see its estimation in the next section) and lower-case leers denote
per capita variables.
nxdetrt =
ext − imt
gdpt
• Hours worked: Statistics Estonia: National accounts, Auxiliary indicators to national ac-
counts, Employment by domestic concept by economic activity (NAL0011), Total, season-
ally adjusted and adjusted data by working days
ldetrt = log lt − log lss
52See http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/data/database and http://pub.stat.ee/
px-web.2001/I_Databas/Economy/databasetree.asp.
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• Inflation: Calculation based on harmonized index of consumer prices (CPI), Eurostat:
Prices, HICP (2005 = 100) - monthly data (index) [prc_hicp_midx], Overall index excluding
energy, food, alcohol and tobacco; monthly data log-linear averaged to quarterly data by
author
pidetrt = logCPIt − logCPIt−4 − piss,
where piss is inflation in the first quarter of 2002.
• Wage inflation: Calculation based on total labor cost index (LCI), sectors B-S: Industry,
construction and services, time series WST21, seasonally adjusted and adjusted data by
working days
piw,detrt = logLCIt − logLCIt−4 −
4∑
s=1
log(1 + gt−s)− piwss,
where piwss is wage inflation in the first quarter of 2002.
• Population: Eurostat: Population and Social Conditions, Population on 1 January by age
and sex [demo_pjan]; annual data log-linearly interpoplated to quarterly data by author
Data for calculating trend growth To calculate the trend growth rate (see section ’Data de-
trending’), I use data from twelve European countries, in addition to Estonian data. EU-12 is
composed of Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Nether-
lands, Austria, Portugal and Finland.
• Real GDP: OECD quarterly national accounts, seasonally adjusted; Unit: Millions of US
dollars, volume estimates, fixed PPPs, OECD reference year, annual levels
• Population: Eurostat: Population and Social Conditions, Population on 1 January by age
and sex [demo_pjan]; annual data log-linearly interpoplated to quarterly data by author
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Data detrending
I estimate a trend growth rate in a two-step procedure. I allow for a time-varying growth rate to
reflect an economic catch-up process. One of the goals of the EU is economic cohesion across all
member states (see Single European Act, Article 158), which is typically interpreted as reducing
disparities in GDP per capita. Between 1995 and 2014, Estonia indeed increased its GDP per
capita from 30% to more than 60% of the EU average. I therefore assume that Estonia’s growth
rate consists of two parts: a constant growth rate that is identical to the EU growth rate, and a
time-varying part that depends on the log dierence between (predicted) EU-12 GDP per capita
and Estonia’s GDP per capita:
ln gdpt − ln gdpt−1 − ˆ¯g = γ
(
̂ln gdpEUt−1 − ln gdpt−1
)
+ gt ,
where I assume that the EU-12 growth rate is constant over time. I recover it as a log-linear trend
of its GDP per capita:
ln gdpEUt = β0 + g¯t+ 
gEU
t .
A positive γ gives rise to a catch-up process. In that case, Estonia’s GDP per capita will converge
to the EU average as t goes against infinity. I detrend Estonia’s data by the estimated growth
rate gt = ˆ¯g + γˆ
(
̂ln gdpEUt−1 − ̂ln gdpt−1
)
, and I set l̂n gdp1 = ln gdp1, where the first period
corresponds to the first quarter of 1996.
I estimate both regressions using annual data from Eurostat over the years 1995 to 2014. The
estimated growth rate for EU-12 is an annual 1%. Figure C.2 displays Estonia’s estimated trend
growth rate as well as the estimated trend and actual data.
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Figure C.2: Estonia’s GDP per Capita: Trend and Growth Rate
188
Appendix D Additional Tables
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Table D.2: Austerity and GDP under Alternative Forecast and Trend Specifications
Government Purchases (Shortfall)
Gov1 Gov2
All countries Fixed Floating All countries Fixed Floating
β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2
Convergence−0.30 0.21 −0.37 0.27 −0.20 0.15 −0.35 0.47 −0.35 0.45 −0.37 0.64
(0.11) (0.14) (0.18) (0.07) (0.09) (0.10)
Shrinkage −0.39 0.15 −0.48 0.19 −0.27 0.13 −0.48 0.38 −0.46 0.33 −0.55 0.72
(0.18) (0.23) (0.26) (0.12) (0.15) (0.13)
Total Outlays (Shortfall)
TO1 TO2
All countries Fixed Floating All countries Fixed Floating
β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2
Convergence−0.17 0.07 −0.19 0.09 −0.25 0.10 −0.38 0.38 −0.37 0.35 −0.46 0.68
(0.12) (0.14) (0.29) (0.09) (0.12) (0.12)
Shrinkage −0.19 0.03 −0.19 0.04 −0.46 0.16 −0.45 0.23 −0.42 0.19 −0.61 0.60
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(0.19) (0.22) (0.40) (0.16) (0.20) (0.19)
Total Revenue
TR1 TR2
All countries Fixed Floating All countries Fixed Floating
β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2
Convergence 0.24 0.09 0.28 0.14 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.10 0.03 −0.55 0.42
(0.15) (0.16) (0.40) (0.13) (0.14) (0.25)
Shrinkage −0.10 0.01 −0.17 0.02 0.31 0.04 −0.14 0.02 −0.10 0.01 −0.34 0.08
(0.24) (0.26) (0.55) (0.19) (0.21) (0.44)
Primary Balance
PB1 PB2
All countries Fixed Floating All countries Fixed Floating
β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2 β1 R
2
Convergence 0.21 0.01 0.26 0.01 −0.47 0.04 −0.22 0.01 −0.53 0.05 −0.03 0.00
(0.41) (0.51) (0.90) (0.39) (0.56) (0.57)
Shrinkage 0.13 0.00 0.09 0.00 −0.98 0.08 −0.43 0.02 −0.51 0.02 −0.65 0.09
(0.63) (0.77) (1.24) (0.60) (0.86) (0.77)
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Notes: Table displays coeicients from regressing deviations of government finance variables on deviations of GDP deviation. Deviations are
averaged over 2010 - 2014. Government finance variables are predicted either using a time trend and GDP or a time trend, GDP and a lag. GDP
is predicted using either convergence, hugging or shrinkage estimators. Reported standard errors in parentheses are (untreated) OLS errors.
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Table D.3a: Austerity and Economic Performance: Total Outlays (Short-
fall)
Total Outlays (Shortfall)
All countries Fixed XRT Floating XRT
α1 R
2 α1 R
2 α1 R
2
GDP −0.51 0.07 −0.56 0.09 −0.81 0.13
(0.37) (0.43) (0.79)
Inflation 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.02 0.00
(0.07) (0.07) (0.20)
Consumption −0.31 0.02 0.00 0.00 −2.03 0.26
(0.43) (0.36) (1.28)
Investment −0.31 0.00 −0.55 0.01 −1.13 0.03
(1.04) (1.19) (2.26)
Net Exports −0.05 0.00 −0.15 0.01 0.50 0.23
(0.25) (0.33) (0.35)
Exchange Rate 0.08 0.00 −0.17 0.02 1.42 0.13
(0.40) (0.29) (1.37)
GDP Growth −0.10 0.05 −0.12 0.07 −0.09 0.07
(0.08) (0.11) (0.12)
Unemployment Rate 0.21 0.05 0.31 0.10 0.24 0.06
(0.19) (0.22) (0.35)
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Table D.3b: Austerity and Economic Performance: Total Revenue
Total Revenue
All countries Fixed XRT Floating XRT
α1 R
2 α1 R
2 α1 R
2
GDP 0.72 0.08 0.79 0.12 0.28 0.01
(0.46) (0.51) (1.23)
Inflation −0.04 0.01 0.01 0.00 −0.31 0.16
(0.09) (0.09) (0.27)
Consumption 0.32 0.01 0.18 0.01 1.14 0.04
(0.54) (0.42) (2.13)
Investment 0.86 0.02 1.08 0.03 −0.42 0.00
(1.31) (1.41) (3.34)
Net Exports 0.00 0.00 0.09 0.00 −0.48 0.10
(0.32) (0.39) (0.55)
Exchange Rate −0.06 0.00 0.24 0.03 −1.70 0.09
(0.50) (0.34) (2.04)
GDP Growth 0.27 0.22 0.33 0.33 −0.11 0.05
(0.10) (0.11) (0.17)
Unemployment Rate−0.34 0.07 −0.28 0.06 −0.69 0.25
(0.23) (0.27) (0.46)
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Table D.3c: Austerity and Economic Performance: Primary Balance
Primary Balance
All countries Fixed XRT Floating XRT
α1 R
2 α1 R
2 α1 R
2
GDP 0.21 0.01 0.26 0.01 −0.47 0.04
(0.41) (0.51) (0.90)
Inflation −0.00 0.00 −0.00 0.00 −0.04 0.01
(0.08) (0.08) (0.22)
Consumption 0.01 0.00 0.26 0.02 −1.61 0.14
(0.47) (0.39) (1.49)
Investment 1.30 0.05 1.12 0.04 −0.04 0.00
(1.10) (1.31) (2.48)
Net Exports 0.23 0.03 0.20 0.02 0.75 0.43
(0.27) (0.36) (0.33)
Exchange Rate 0.16 0.01 −0.22 0.02 2.15 0.26
(0.43) (0.32) (1.37)
GDP Growth 0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 −0.13 0.13
(0.09) (0.13) (0.12)
Unemployment Rate−0.45 0.17 −0.43 0.16 −0.18 0.03
(0.19) (0.24) (0.38)
Notes: Table displays the estimated coeicient on the government finance variable from
regression (II.2) as well as its R2. The column m¯ reports the average implied multiplier,
which is the coeicient estimate divided by the share of the government finance variable in
GDP (displayed in Table ??). All government variables are forecasted using time trend (not
for the primary balance), GDP and an own lag. GDP and GDP growth are forecasted using
the ’convergence’ estimator. Inflation, net exports, exchange rates and unemployment are
forecasted using unit root. Exchange rate is the nominal eective exchange rate. Reported
standard errors in parentheses are (untreated) OLS errors.
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Table D.4: Interest Rates and Spreads
CB rate Taylor deviation Spread
04-07 08-09 10-14 04-07 08-09 10-14 04-07 08-09 10-14
Belgium 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.6 1.9 1.6
Bulgaria 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 7.9 8.5 7.8
Czech Republic 3.3 3.5 1.1 −1.3 -4.1 1.3 1.4 1.6 2.2
Denmark 2.9 3.1 0.6 0.1 -0.1 1.8 2.0 2.9 3.6
Germany 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 2.4 2.3 2.5
Estonia 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 2.3 3.5 3.0
Ireland 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 2.3 2.7 3.6
Greece 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 2.9 3.1 5.5
Spain 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.7 2.5 3.8
France 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.5 1.8 1.7
Italy 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.9 2.1 3.2
Cyprus 4.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 2.4 4.4 5.8
Latvia 4.4 5.3 2.5 0.1 -0.1 1.8 3.5 8.5 2.8
Lithuania 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 3.2 5.9 4.3
Luxembourg 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.8 1.7 1.6
Hungary 8.3 8.7 5.0 −0.4 2.2 4.3 2.6 3.1 3.2
Netherlands 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.4 2.0 2.5
Austria 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.4 1.6 1.6
Poland 4.9 4.7 3.5 −1.4 -6.5 −5.9 2.1 2.7 2.2
Portugal 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 3.5 4.1 5.5
Romania 11.8 9.4 5.2 −1.0 -0.9 5.4 6.3 7.6 4.6
Slovenia 3.8 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 2.5 3.7 4.8
Slovak Republic 4.1 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.6 2.5 3.2
Finland 2.7 2.6 0.8 0.1 -0.1 1.8 1.5 1.6 2.1
Sweden 2.4 2.4 1.0 −2.3 -3.2 −1.8 1.5 1.6 2.3
United Kingdom 4.8 2.7 0.5 0.6 -0.7 −0.7 1.0 1.7 2.0
Norway 2.7 3.5 1.7 −1.1 -3.6 −2.6 2.0 2.4 2.7
Switzerland 1.5 1.2 -0.1 0.3 -2.8 −0.7 0.7 0.9 1.8
United States 3.6 1.0 0.1 −0.4 -0.9 0.4 1.8 2.1 2.3
Average 3.5 3.2 1.2 −0.1 -0.8 1.2 2.4 3.1 3.2
Notes: Table displays the average central bank interest rates (CB rate, in percent), the average central bank interest rate
less the rate implied by a monetary policy rule (Taylor deviations, in percentage points) and the spread between lending
rates to businesses and the central bank interest rate (Spread, in percentage points). Averages are taken over 2004 - 2007
and 2009 - 2014. See text for details on the monetary policy rule.
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Appendix E Details on Convergence Estimator
This estimator is based on the conditional convergence hypothesis. We assume that countries
in Europe converge to a common path for GDP per capita. This can be justified on basis of the
Single European Act (Article 158), which foresees economic cohesion across all member states
as a central goal of the EU. Economic cohesion is typically interpreted as reducing disparities in
GDP per capita. This convergence process especially aects our forecasts for Central and Eastern
European countries, which, aer strong economic growth in the 90s and 2000s, have reduced the
gap to Western European countries. For instance, between 1995 and 2014, Estonia increased its
GDP per capita from 30% to more than 60% of the EU-12 average.
To implement this idea, we estimate a time-varying growth rate for all countries in our sample
in a two-step procedure. The two steps break the growth rate into a constant part and a time-
varying part. In a first step, we estimate a constant growth rate for twelve advanced European
countries, called EU-12 (Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Ireland, Spain, France, Italy, Luxembourg,
Austria, Netherlands, Portugal and Finland). This growth rate g¯ is estimated on data from 1993:1
to 2005:4:
lnGDPEUt = β0 + g¯t+ 
EU
t ,
where GDP is GDP per capita. The estimate of g¯ is 0.49 percent with a standard deviation of
0.01 percent, i.e. the average annual growth rate over this time period was about 2 percent. In
a second step, we estimate the time-varying part of the growth rate. We assume that the time-
varying part is a linear function of the log dierence between the predicted EU-12 GDP per capita
and a country’s GDP per capita:
git = g¯ + γ
(
̂lnGDPEUt−1 − lnGDP it−1
)
,
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where ̂lnGDPEUt−1 = βˆ0 + ˆ¯g(t− 1). We estimate γ by regressing
lnGDP it − lnGDP it−1 − ˆ¯g = γ
(
̂lnGDPEUt−1 − lnGDP it−1
)
+ it.
We estimate a common γ for all countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Bulgaria, Czech Repub-
lic, Estonia, Greece, Cyprus, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Poland, Romania and Slovenia, Slovak
Republic) using 1993:1 (or earliest available data) to 2005:4 as our sample period. Our estimate of
γ is 0.51 percent with a standard deviation of 0.05 percent. The positive γ indicates convergence.
Our forecast for country i’s log GDP per capita at time t is
ln ĜDP
i
t = lnGDP
i
t−1 + ˆ¯g + γˆ
(
̂lnGDPEUt−1 − lnGDP it−1
)
∀t ≤ 2006:1
ln ĜDP
i
t = ln ĜDP
i
t−1 + ˆ¯g + γˆ
(
̂lnGDPEUt−1 − ln ĜDP
i
t−1
)
∀t > 2006:1.
The estimated growth rate of country i’s GDP per capita at time t is
gˆit = ˆ¯g + γˆ
(
̂lnGDPEUt−1 − lnGDP it−1
)
∀t ≤ 2006:1
gˆit = ˆ¯g + γˆ
(
̂lnGDPEUt−1 − ln ĜDP
i
t−1
)
∀t > 2006:1.
We repeat this two-step procedure to forecast private consumption and total investment. The
estimated values for g¯ and γ are 0.45 (0.01) percent and 0.71 (0.06) percent for private consump-
tion, and 0.67 (0.03) percent and 1.17 (0.22) percent for total investment.
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Appendix F Government Spending Shocks
In our empirical section we estimate deviations for government finance variables from their fore-
casts constructed from annual data. In the quantitative analysis, we treat those deviations as
shocks and feed them into our model. The model, however, is calibrated at quarterly frequency.
We use the Chow-Lin method to transform our predicted annual government spending series to
quarterly series. As auxiliary high-frequency indicators we solely rely on real, quarterly GDP.
Adding quarterly unemployment rates would barely aect the resulting time-series and the esti-
mated coeicients are most of the time statistically non-significant. We estimate the model with
maximum likelihood. The government spending shocks that we feed into our model are then the
deviations of actual quarterly government spending data from their predicted quarterly levels.
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Appendix G Monetary Policy Rules
Specifications
Taylor rule
it = pit + r + φpi
(
pit − pitar
)
+ φGDP%GDPt + t
where it is the nominal interest rate, r is the long-run real interest rate, pit is inflation, pitar is the
inflation target, %GDPt are percent deviations of real GDP from its trend (output gap), and t
is an error term. Inflation is measured using the GDP deflator. Interest rates, inflation and the
unemployment rate are measured in annual percent.
In the original Taylor rule, the parameters are set to r = 2 and pitar = 2, and the estimated
coeicients are φpi = 0.5 and φGDP = 0.5.
Ben Bernanke53 suggests to use core inflation as a measure of pi and sets φGDP = 1.
Clarida, Gali and Gertler (1999) propose a generalized Taylor rule that allows for interest rate
smoothing:54
it = ρit−1 + (1− ρ)
[
pit + r + φpi
(
pit − pitar
)
+ φGDP%GDPt
]
.
Their estimates are ρ = 0.79, φpi = 1.15 and φGDP = 0.93. They don’t provide an estimate
for the intercept or r.
Mankiw rule
it = φ+ φpi,u(pit − ut) + t,
where it is the nominal interest rate, pit is core inflation, ut is unemployment, and t is an error
term. Mankiw estimates φ = 8.5 and φpi,u = 1.4.
53see hp://www.brookings.edu/blogs/ben-bernanke/posts/2015/04/28-taylor-rule-monetary-policy
54In addition, their rule depends on expected inflation and the expected output gap instead of contemporaneous
inflation and output gap. Their β coeicient corresponds to 1 + φpi in our setup.
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Estimation
For the US, we estimate three dierent rules: A simple Taylor, a generalized Taylor rule a la CGG,
and a Mankiw rule. For the Euro area and all countries with floating exchange rates, we us the
slope coeicients from the US regressions and estimate a new intercept. We always impose that
inflation targets a rate of 2%.55
Taylor rule Starting from the generalized Taylor rule
it = φiit−1 + (1− φi)
[
pit + r + φpi
(
pit − pitar
)
+ φGDP%GDPt + t
]
,
our estimation equation is
it − φiit−1
1− φi − pit = β0 + β1
(
pit − pitar
)
+ β2%GDPt + t.
Our estimates for r, φpi and φGDP are βˆ0, βˆ1 and βˆ2. In our estimation approach, we set φi = 0
for the original Taylor rule and φi = 0.79 for the CGG specification.
When we only estimate the intercept, the estimation equation is
it − φiit−1
1− φi − pit − φˆpi
(
pit − pitar
)− φˆGDP%GDPt = β0 + t
Mankiw rule Our estimation equation for the Mankiw rule is
it = β0 + β1(pit − ut) + t.
Our estimates for φ and φpi,u are βˆ0 and βˆ1.
55Unless we make further restrictions, we cannot estimate r and pitar separately, so we fix one of the two pa-
rameters prior to the estimation. CGG assume that r equals its average value of their estimation period and then
estimate pitar . They do not report their estimate of r. Their estimate of pitar is 3.56. Here, we us the alternative
approach of fixing pitar = 2 and estimate r for every specification, including the original CGG specification.
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When we only estimate the intercept, the estimation equation is
it − φˆpi,u(pit − ut) = β0 + t.
Estimation periods
• US: 1985.1 - 2005.4
• Eurozone: 1999.2 - 2005.4
• Czech Republic: 2000.2 - 2005.4
• Hungary: 2002.2 - 2005.4
• Poland: 2002.2 - 2005.4
• Romania 2003.2 - 2005.4
• Sweden: 1994.3 - 2005.4
• UK: 1985.1 - 2005.4
• Norway: 1991.2 - 2005.4
• Switzerland: 1991 - 2005.4
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Table G.5: US Monetary Policy Coefficients
Panel A: Taylor rules
r φpi φGDP ρ
Taylor 2.00 0.50 0.50 0.00
- - - -
Bernanke 2.00 0.50 1.00 0.00
- - - -
Estimated Bernanke 2.88 0.39 0.75 0.00
(0.18) (0.14) (0.10) -
CGG 2.35 1.15 0.93 0.79
(0.24) - - -
Estimated CGG 2.98 0.22 1.08 0.79
(0.29) (0.23) (0.15) -
Panel B: Mankiw rule
φ φpi,u
Mankiw 8.50 1.40
- -
Estimated Mankiw 10.73 1.79
(0.56) (0.17)
Note: Every row displays the coeicients for a dierent estimation run on US data.
Reported standard errors are (untreated) OLS errors. See text for estimation period.
Table G.6: Estimated Intercepts
USA ECB CZE HUN POL ROM SWE GBR NOR CHE
Bernanke 2.88 0.49 0.95 1.35 7.23 1.54 4.58 2.40 3.51 1.33
(0.18) (0.09) (0.43) (0.31) (0.31) (0.93) (0.29) (0.33) (0.28) (0.22)
CGG 2.35 0.07 0.16 0.28 6.91 -1.96 4.11 1.72 3.17 1.14
(0.24) (0.24) (0.48) (1.48) (0.51) (2.65) (0.37) (0.44) (0.42) (0.28)
Note: Coeicients are estimated intercepts for the Bernanke rule and the CGG rule. The intercept corresponds to the real interest rate,
r. See text for estimation period.
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Appendix H Spread Shocks
Our measure of financial shocks comes from data on spreads between lending rates and central
bank interest rates. Data on interest rates on business loans mainly comes from the ECB, but
has been complemented by additional sources. The ECB reports monthly interest rates for new
business loans up to 1 year original maturity to non-financial corporations in domestic currency
(e.g. MIR.M.AT.B.A2A.F.R.0.2240.EUR.N for Austria). For countries accessing the euro area over
the sample period, we try to use loans in domestic currency up to the year they access the euro
area, and then switch to loans in euros. For some countries (e.g. Bulgaria, Estonia, Cyprus, Malta,
Slovak Republic, Sweden, UK, Norway and Switzerland) we used national bank data sources to
append the data series (or replace them if missing). For a few countries, we used data from the
Fixed Income Global Financial Database to append the data series. The list below indicates the
specific series used for each country:56
• Czech Republic: Business loans up to 1 year (ILCZESTM)
• Poland: Corporate lending rate (ILPOLCM)
• Romania: Average lending rate (ILROUM)
• Switzerland: Mortgage lending rate (ILCHEM)
Finally, US data comes from the Federal Reserve Survey of Terms of Business Lending, where we
use the weighted-average eective loan rate for all commercial and industry loans.
We use central bank interest rates to calculate the spread. For countries accessing the euro
area over the sample period, we use the national central bank’s interest rate up to the year they
access the euro area.57
56We checked that the GFD data tracks reasonably well our preferred interest rate series for time periods with
overlap.
57In our model, we assign those countries directly to the euro area, ignoring the fact that in the beginning of the
sample period they had an independent monetary policy.
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Appendix I Calibration
Figure I.6 displays the non-target steady-state shares of net exports to final demand, NXn/Yn,
and investment to final demand, Xn/Yn. It compares the average shares observed in the data
over 2000 - 2010 to the model-implied shares. The correlation between model and data is 0.99 for
net exports. This is a surprisingly high correlation because the net export shares in the model
are derived from parameters calibrated using data for 2005 and 2010 only: Net export shares in
the model are functions of the trade preference parameters ωjn and relative country sizesNnYn,
both of which are calibrated using input-output tables and the trade in value added database
covering the years 2005 and 2010. The correlation between model and data for investment is sub-
stantially lower, but still positive: 0.36. Recall that the depreciation rate is calibrated so that the
average investment shares in data and model match each other. Two features of the model cre-
ate dispersion in investment shares: cross-country dierences in net export positions NXn/Yn
and in the external finance premium Fn. The figure suggests that the model underpredicts in-
vestment shares of countries in Central and Eastern Europe such Bulgaria, Romania and Latvia,
but overpredicts investment shares of most advanced countries like Luxembourg, Norway and
Great Britain. The high investment shares in Central and Eastern Europe could be rationalized
by a catching up process towards the European core countries.
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(a) Net Exports over Final Demand
(b) Investment over Final Demand
Figure I.6: Non-Targeted Steady-State Shares
Note: Table displays the non-target steady-state shares of net exports to final demand, NXn/Yn, and investment
to final demand, Xn/Yn. Data period is 2000 - 2010. The correlation between data and model is 0.99 for net exports
and 0.36 for investment.
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Appendix J Proofs of Propositions
Proposition 1. Sullying eect of crises on acquisitions by unconstrained firms
Financial crises have a sullying eect on acquisitions by unconstrained firms in the sense that they
lead to a lower average productivity of acquired firms, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆ∗in,c < Aˆ
∗
in,n.
Proof: To prove the proposition we show that the partial derivative of Aˆ∗in with respect to τ is
positive. Aˆ∗in is a weighted sum of the average productivities of fire-sale and technology-driven
acquisitions:
Aˆ∗in = ω
∗
inAˆ
fire∗ + (1− ω∗in)Aˆtech
∗
,
with ω∗in =
nfire
∗
nfire∗+ntech∗ and
Aˆfire
∗
=
∫ Atech∗
Afire∗ G
(
b
τ
)
AdF ∗∫ Atech∗
Afire∗ G
(
b
τ
)
dF ∗
=
∫ Atech∗
Afire∗ AdF
∗∫ Atech∗
Afire∗ dF
∗
Aˆtech
∗
=
∫ A¯
Atech∗ AdF
∗∫ A¯
Atech∗ dF
∗
nfire
∗
=
∫ Atech
Afire
∫ b
τ
dGdF = G
(
b
τ
)∫ Atech
Afire
dGdF
ntech
∗
=
∫
Atech
dF.
The partial derivative is
∂Aˆ∗
∂τ
=
∂ω∗in
∂τ
(
Aˆfire
∗ − Aˆtech∗
)
+ ω∗in
∂Aˆfire
∗
∂τ
+ (1− ω∗in)
∂Aˆtech
∗
∂τ
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We simplify this expression step by step. Let n∗ = nfire
∗
+ ntech
∗
, then the partial derivative of
the share of fire-sale acquisitions is:
∂ω∗in
∂τ
= n∗−2
(
∂nfire
∗
∂τ
ntech
∗ − ∂n
tech∗
∂τ
nfire
∗
)
= −n
tech∗
n∗2
b
τ 2
g
(
b
τ
)∫ Atech
Afire
dF ∗ < 0.
Note that both Aˆfire
∗
and Aˆtech
∗
are independent of τ . Taken together, the partial derivative of
Aˆ∗in equals:
∂Aˆ∗
∂τ
=
∂ω∗in
∂τ
(
Aˆfire
∗ − Aˆtech∗
)
> 0,
where the inequality sign follows from ∂ω
∗
in
∂τ
< 0 and Aˆfire
∗
< Aˆtech
∗
. 
Proposition 2. Smaller acquired shares for unconstrained firms during crises
Unconstrained firms acquire on average smaller shares during financial crises, i.e., if τc < τn then
αˆ∗c < αˆ
∗
n.
Proof: The proof follows the proof above, but replacing Aˆfire∗ and Aˆtech∗ with αˆfire∗ and αˆtech∗ .
The partial derivative of αˆ∗ is
∂αˆ∗
∂τ
=
∂ω∗in
∂τ
(
αˆfire
∗ − αˆtech∗)+ ω∗in∂αˆfire∗∂τ + (1− ω∗in)∂αˆtech
∗
∂τ
,
with
αˆfire
∗
=
αfire
∗
nfire∗
αˆtech
∗
=
αtech
∗
ntech∗
.
The average acquired share for fire-sale acquisitions is lower than the average acquired share for
technology-driven acquisitions: αˆfire
∗
< αˆtech
∗
. This is the result of i) the positive dependence
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of the acquired share on the firm’s permanent level of productivity, α′(A) > 0 and ii) the lower
productivity range for fire-sale acquisitions Afire ≤ A < Atech compared to technology-driven
acquisitions A ≥ Atech. Then,
∂αˆ∗
∂τ
=
∂ω∗in
∂τ
(
αˆfire
∗ − αˆtech∗) > 0,
where the inequality sign follows from ∂ω
∗
in
∂τ
< 0 and αˆfire
∗
< αˆtech
∗
. 
Proposition 3. No cleansing eect on domestic firms in absence of acquisitions
In a model without any acquirers, financial crises do neither lead to a cleansing eect nor a sullying
eect through the market for corporate control, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆ
noacq
thru,c = Aˆ
noacq
thru,n.
Proof: Proving the proposition requires taking the partial derivative of the average productiv-
ity with respect to the financial constraint parameter τ . Rewriting the average productivity
Aˆnoacq =
(
1−G ( b
τ
)) ∫
AdF(
1−G ( b
τ
)) ∫ A¯
A
dF
=
∫
AdF
shows that it is independent of τ , so that the partial derivative with respect to τ is zero. 
Proposition 4. Cleansing eect on domestic firms with unconstrained acquirers
In a model with only unconstrained acquirers, financial crises lead to a cleansing eect through the
market for corporate control, i.e., if τc < τn then Aˆ∗thru,c > Aˆ
∗
thru,n.
Proof: We show that the partial derivative of Aˆ∗thru with respect to τ is negative. The average
productivity can be wrien as
Aˆ∗thru = ω
∗
thruAˆ
ll∗ + (1− ω∗thru)Aˆnoacq,
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where
Aˆll
∗
=
All
∗
nll∗
=
∫
Afire
∫ b
τ AdGdF∫
Afire
∫ b
τ dGdF
=
∫
Afire
AdF∫
Afire
dF
and ω∗thru =
nll
∗
nll
∗
+nnoacq
. Note that both average productivities Aˆll
∗
and Aˆnoacq are independent
of τ . Then, taking the partial derivative with respect to τ gives:
∂Aˆll
∗
∂τ
=
∂ω∗thru
∂τ
(
Aˆll
∗ − Aˆnoacq
)
=
∂nll
∗
∂τ
nnoacq − nll∗ ∂nnoacq
∂τ
(nll∗ + nnoacq)2
(
Aˆll
∗ − Aˆnoacq
)
< 0
because
∂nll
∗
∂τ
= −g
(
b
τ
)
b
τ 2
∫
Afire
dF < 0
∂nnoacq
∂τ
= g
(
b
τ
)
b
τ 2
∫
dF > 0
and Aˆll
∗
> Aˆnoacq. 
Proposition 5. Higher flipping rates for unconstrained acquirers
Unconstrained acquisitions made during a financial crisis have higher flipping rates, i.e., if τ1 =
τc < τ1 = τn then n
flip∗
c
nc
> n
flip∗
n
nn
.
Proof: The proportion of flipped acquisitions by unconstrained acquirers is
nflip
∗
n∗
=
nfire
∗
nfire∗ + ntech∗
= ω∗in
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In the proof for proposition 1, we have shown that ∂ω
∗
in
∂τ1
< 0. 
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